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This report describes the results of the study on options for changing the eco
nomic incentive structure for groundwater extraction in Yemen. The study aims 
to evaluate the potential role of economic incentives to reduce unsustainable ir
rigation water consumption and to make recommendations for implementing 
water conservation incentives. It first identifies factors that have triggered 
groundwater overdraft, then studies farmers' behaviour regarding groundwater 
extraction on the basis of indepth interviews with farmers in each of the follow
ing three basins  in the Sana'a Basin, the Taiz Basin and Wadi Hadramout. Fi
nally, a number of changes in the incentive structure are evaluated, among 
others incentives that decrease the profitability of irrigation water use and sub
sidies on improved irrigation technology. The study shows that although the lit
erature and economic theory suggest that the range of possible interventions is 
wide (water pricing, metering, water rights, water markets, taxes, subsidies, in
formation, participatory management, et cetera), the range of potentially effec
tive interventions in the Yemeni political context is more limited. The Yemeni 
case is unique, as there is a close linkage between water and a central socio
economic issue: qat. This adds to the difficulties of implementing or enforcing 
change. 
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Preface 
 
 
This report describes the results of the study on incentives to reduce groundwa
ter extraction in Yemen. The objective of this study is to evaluate the potential 
role of economic incentives to reduce unsustainable water consumption in agri
culture and to make recommendations for implementing water conservation in
centives. It first identifies factors that have triggered groundwater overdraft, 
then studies farmers behaviour regarding groundwater extraction on the basis 
of indepth interviews with about one hundred farmers in each of the following 
three areas: the Sana'a Basin, the Taiz Basin and Wadi Hadramout. Finally, a 
number of changes in the incentive structure are evaluated. 
 The study is funded by the National Water Resources Authority of Yemen. 
The duration of the study was 8 months. From October 2007 to June 2008 
several visits to Yemen have been undertaken by the international consultants. 
The results of the study were presented at stakeholder symposia. The feedback 
obtained from the workshops is included in this report.  
 The research is conducted by LEI Wageningen UR in the Netherlands in 
close collaboration with the Water and Environment Centre (WEC) of Sana'a Uni
versity in Yemen. The authors are grateful for the work done by the support 
staff of WEC and especially the accurate financial work done by Mr. AlAroosi. It 
was also very pleasant working with Prof. Babaqi (WEC/Director) and with Dr. 
Naif, who has been a great help in facilitating meetings and helping us to under
stand the geohydrology of the three case study areas. Finally the authors ac
knowledge the input of Eng. Mahmood Sultan (of NWRA) in preparing for the 
field work, the input of the field team coordinators of NWRA Eng. Ali Qasem As
sayar (Hadramout), Eng. Amin AlMushraqi (Sana'a) and Eng. Amer (Taiz) in se
lecting the sample and the important work done by the various interviewers 
from NWRA and MAI.  
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 The authors are also grateful for the comments received from the steering 
committee that consisted of the following people: Eng. Salem Bashueib 
(NWRA/Chair), Eng. Abdulla AlThary (NWRA/Deputy), Dr. Mohammed AlHamdi 
(Ministry of Water and Environment /Deputy Minister), Mr. Gerhard Redecker 
(KfW/Country Director), Ton Negenman (Embassy of the Kingdom of the Nether
lands/First Secretary of Water and Sanitation), Prof. Dr. A. Babaqi 
(WEC/Director). Finally, we would like to thank Derek Kim for keeping us in
formed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof.dr. R.B.M. Huirne 
Director General LEI Wageningen UR 
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English summary 
 
 
Until the 1970s, water use in Yemen was sustainable. Agriculture used water 
resources that are rainfalldependent and hence, while the country was excep
tionally watershort, an approximate annual balance between renewable supply 
and utilisation was maintained. This changed dramatically with the arrival of 
tubewell technology that allowed exploitation of water from deep aquifers. Ex
ploitation of this resource is not 'naturally' constrained by annual rainfall, and by 
now use in many areas is unsustainable.  
 The objective of this study is to review incentives  primarily economic incen
tives  that affect demand for water. To achieve this objective, first the literature 
on the theoretical role of economic instruments in limiting the demand for irriga
tion water is reviewed. Second, the current economic incentive structure and 
factors that have triggered groundwater overdraft are studied. This policy analy
sis is among others based on discussions with government officials in the water 
sector. Third, farmers behaviour regarding groundwater extraction is studied on 
the basis of indepth interviews with about one hundred farmers in each of the 
following three  rather different  basins: in the Sana'a Basin, the Taiz Basin and 
Wadi Hadramout. Fourth, a number of changes in the incentive structure are 
evaluated, among others incentives that decrease the profitability of irrigation 
water use and subsidies on improved irrigation technology. The usefulness of 
economic instruments in the context of the three basins is considered. Finally 
conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made, which have been pre
sented during stakeholder workshops in the three study areas for feedback. 
 In the Sana'a Basin, where the overdraft is substantial (around four to five 
times recharge), the remaining aquifer life is thought to be around a decade. In 
the Taiz Basin, where overdraft is less severe (abstractions are estimated to be 
double recharge), the water table is falling and aquifer life unclear. In Wadi 
Hadhramout, where overdraft is most severe (around seven times recharge), 
the aquifer is extremely large. 
 The results of the empirical field work show that the characteristics of farms 
in Hadramout differ from those in Sana'a and Taiz. In Hadramout farm size is 
bigger, most farms get as much water as needed and would leave extra water 
in the well, less farms deepened their well and water is considered to be of a 
worse quality. In Sana'a the majority of the farms have more than one well and 
the distribution of wells is strongly bimodal. There are a lot of shallow wells and 
a lot of deep wells. In Sana'a and especially in Taiz water is more actively traded 
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than in Hadramout. Hardly any of the farmers is aware of any subsidy received 
for irrigation. Most farmers grow crops for home consumption on a substantial 
area of their land. A minority of the farmers is aware that NWRA is responsible 
for giving licences to dig wells. The majority of the farmers is not a member of a 
WUA or WUG. They think that god owns the water and that only god knows 
whether their son or grandson will still have water. They support all kinds of in
dividual, communitybased as well as governmental actions that can be taken to 
reduce water scarcity.  
 The study shows that although the literature and economic theory suggest 
that the range of possible interventions is wide (water pricing, metering, water 
rights, water markets, targeted taxes, subsidies and incentives, information, 
participatory management, et cetera), the range of potentially effective interven
tions in the Yemeni political context is far more limited.  
 Direct incentives currently consist most importantly of a protected qat mar
ket (so that domestic prices are higher than would be the case under free 
trade), highly subsidised diesel and subsidies to improved irrigation technology, 
which encourages groundwater extraction. The case for and against opening 
the qat market is, however, not straightforward. Socially, the impact would be 
negative (increased consumption); medically, the impact would be positive (less 
exposure to pesticides); economically, the impact is negative  unless a produc
tive alternative use is identified. The diesel subsidy is a serious drain on the 
budget  but dealing with that problem will not substantially affect the demand 
for water (as it is shown in this study that the value of irrigation water is consid
erably higher than the costs of pumping water). The subsidies to improved irri
gation technology are unnecessary, as the private financial incentives to invest 
in some level of water 'saving' (certainly piped distribution to fields, maybe bub
bler and drip) are high because of the profitability for farmers.  
 Other conventional incentives (water rights, metering, water pricing, control
ling pumping, et cetera) have very limited prospects for success as government
administered schemes. For instance, where sustainable water rights are neither 
defined nor enforced, water markets simply strengthen the pressure of demand 
on already overexploited resources and are therefore negative in their impact 
on sustainable resource use. Water rights are currently loosely defined on the 
basis of historic use, and entitlement to exploit what lies beneath one's land. 
Converting this, through the formal sector, into quantitative entitlements, en
forced by the rule of law is an exceptionally difficult task. Encouraging water 
markets in the absence of defined rights is wrong. If local groups are persuaded 
that selfregulation is critical, some forms of regulation may evolve. Again the 
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first priority is the information base that will persuade local groups to act, and 
help them formulate actions that have the outcomes they desire.  
 Indirect incentives like education or training for farmers leaving agriculture, 
will have a role if it is accepted that the agricultural future for a significant num
ber of farmers is bleak.  
 Regulation has limited prospects for success (again, as a government
administered scheme), since a dominant characteristic of Yemen is its political 
power structure which comprises an exceptionally strong presidency, and pow
erful traditional institutions in rural areas that wield great influence in the dayto
day lives of most of the farming community. Between these two extremes, gov
ernment agencies are weak: 'central' rules limiting or regulating the actions of 
local people will have little impact unless the rural elites are persuaded of the 
argument and become part of the implementation process. Hence, support to 
these community actions is recommended in this study.  
 A key element will be the strong and explicit endorsement of what is re
quired from the other end of the political spectrum, namely the president. Such 
endorsement would be powerful in supporting actions by rural elites, and would 
give the government agencies  especially NWRA  added credibility as they pur
sue their responsibilities. 
 Persuasion based on information is a universal priority. At the national level, 
a 'water budget', setting out which activities use how much water would be 
powerful in mobilising political will to address the overdraft issue. Locally, infor
mation on projected aquifer life would be powerful in underpinning traditional in
stitutions. This is particularly the case given the relative weakness of central 
government (and concomitant strength of local traditional institutions). If local 
forces are to be mobilised to address local issues, the foundation for their ac
tions will be awareness: how much water do they have; where is it going? Cur
rently the information emphasis is on 'savings'. Whether the advertised savings 
are correct or not is one issue; a far more important issue is whether savings 
offer a route to a significantly different future. At the farm level, information is 
usually conveyed through extension services. While frequent references are 
made to the need to strengthen these (including establishment of an Irrigation 
Advisory Service), little information is available about messages to be conveyed.  
 The locational differences between the study areas have implications for pri
orities. In Sana'a the priority is to protect water supplies for the highest value 
use of alldomestic consumption. This priority is accentuated by the fact that 
those leaving the land will migrate to towns and cities. As there is currently a 
lack of accurate information regarding the remaining aquifer life, a technical 
study is recommended to define the areas around Sana'a required to be re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served for nonagricultural use. In Taiz the highest priority is information: what 
are the sustainable (local) aquifer yields; what are the recharge mechanisms; 
are there areas that will be totally depleted in the foreseeable future? In 
Hadhramout, while the level of overabstraction is high, and a fuller understand
ing of local hydrogeology is needed, the remaining resource is very large.  
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 ا ات ا	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	 	#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 .ا	#6 12 ا
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را 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ع ا	  ا	78-
ا	ار  <\ ا Zص ا	 ا	)-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 
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د<  X ا	7-ا اGK2ى . `2-ت
وأر Bة ا	- BE . ا	 9#E ا	2*7 D ام  ا	2ي وا	0 ا	9م 	9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	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  ا	T2، آ أن ا	ارع ا	 
و ;ء 1	 ا	ارع 	<F أآY2  *T2 و-ز<U ا"*ر <0 .  أJE و- هF  TP أ*ره
وJ 	-p أن )رة ا	 . آ أن هك o*ر  !7 آY2ة وo*ر 9 آY2ة ا<`. *>-رة n-اB
.  `2-تأآY2 	  آE  ;ء و، ا" اF *n8E او U    ه- #O ا	7ل 
وR0 ا	ار <ر-ن . و	-p أ<` أن ا	ار " <-H 	<F0 أي #0  وH-د أي د0 	#2ي
وا	9#E  ا	ار <2-ن *=ن ا	FT . 7;E D ا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 ت آ2ة  أراXF0
 أن 1	 ا	ار 	-ا آ. ا	 	#-ارد ا	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 ا	T-	  إ;ار ا	2اK\ 	762 ا"*ر
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 واr 9q . أ`ء 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د 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 . ا	)U وآC	s ا	78-ا	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 >ر 
وJ أوX7
 ا	را  أO *	210  آL وذآ2  R2< ا"J>د وا	 92ح أن ى 
2ة ا	، Jس آ ا	، 9-ق ا	، أ -اق ا	، ا	`2اBL )ا	KZت ا	8 وا U 
، إ" أن ى ا	KZت ا	6	 ا	8 .(.ا	F، ا	0 وا	7-ا، ا	#-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 . ا	7-ى ا	  ا	 7ودة إ	 أد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*7 8-ن )إن ا	7-ا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ل  	 72<2 )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إن J` U وX k  -ق ا	9ت، # أي . ا	2ي ا	7، وآ#F n)U # ا 2اج ا	 ا	)-
، d  8-ن اGM2 ا<)* (ز<دة اD FZك)إH  8-ن اGM2  # . ل، 	
 *G2 ا	FE
إن د0 . <E ا ام  L، إJ>د<،  8-ن اGM2  #  	0 <0 7< *(أJE 2ض 	#ات)
 	 <NM2 *n8E H-ه2ي # ا	!#L  و	8 ا	E U ا	n8#-<2 2ب K!2  ا	-ازا	<ل 
(. آ 0 -X7O  هC ا	را   أن J  ا	2ي 2 أ#  8	i Xv ا	)# ا	 
	7-ا ا		 ا	; 	Z Yر  *w إن د0 9ت ا	2ي ا	7 12 X2ور<، آ ان ا
	 ( *	=آ ا	-ز<U *	-ا 2 إ	 ا	79-ل، J <8-ن ا	2ي ا	69 وا	9q)ا	 " -2"-ى 
 . *L ا	2*7 	#ار
9-ق ا	، Jس آ ا	، 2ة ا	، ا	780  ا	`v، )وا	7-ا ا	9#< اGK2ى 
إن ا	79-ق ا	B ا	ا 12 7دة و" !9 . )F 7ود آ-F أR <2ه ا	78-( ..إ	v
*n8E 780، وأ -اق ا	 *d 9-ي ا	`?q 	#!#L # ا	-ارد ا	B ا	 ه  أ;Z 
B 	 <0 *ء # آ أن 7< ا	79-ق ا	. و	FCا 8-ن ذات أM2  # # ا ا ا ام ا	-ارد
و*7-<E هCا،  d2<P ا	9!ع . ا" ام ا	ر<، وأ9 ا 2اج <9U 7
 أرض أي 2د
وإO 	 ا	!= . ا	2 ، إ	 إ 79ق آ، <62ض *	Rم وا	9-ن ه F  1< ا	>-*
)-ت ا	7# *=ه ا	R0 ا	Cا، واذا إJ
 ا	. n)U أ -اق ا	  1ب 9-ق  7دة
و2ة أK2ى اGو	 اGو	 ه Jة ا	#-ت ا	 . Aن *w أV8ل ا	R0 <8 أن <n=ْ و<!-ر
 9U ا	)-ت ا	7# *ذ اGH2اءات، وه0 # ;1 ا"H2اءات وا	  8-ن 	F 
 . ا	Bm ا	 <21-ن *F
2 ا	V2ة YE ا	#0 او ا	ر<L 	#ار ا	C< <2آ-ن ا	را،  8-ن إن ا	7-ا 1
 .	F دور اذا 0 ا	#0 *=ن 9E ا	را 	د آ2  ا	ار J0
،  أن (YE ا	Rم ا	Cي <ار  JE ا	78-)إن ا	2J* 	<F -Jت 7ودة 	#)ح، 
ة 2آF ا	  ا	 8-ن  رB  J-< و*>-رة إ YB، ا	; ا	Bة 	# ه J-
وN ت 9#< J-<  ا	dP ا	2<6 وا	  *=M2 آ2  ا	7ة ا	- 	R0 ا	)ت 
7 " ا	2آ<"آ أن ا	9-ا : و* هC< ا	!2، Aن ا	Rت ا	78- 8-ن X6. ا	را
 او R0 >2ت ا	س ا	7# و<8-ن 	F أM2 XTE 	0 9U ا	L ا	2<6  d2<P ا	7-ار 
 .و	FCا FC ا	را  -; *0 >2ت ا	)U. و>k Hء  ا	# ا	6C<
إن هك >2 رB وا	Cي  8-ن J-< و><9 واX7 	 ه- !#-ب  ا	!2ف 
 ، وا	9>-د ه ا	2By، YE هC ا	>دJ  8-ن 	F J-ة  د0 >2ت ا"K2 	#!i ا	
 >اJ – K>-; ا	FT ا	 	#-ارد ا	B –ا	L ا	2<6، و ! ا	Rت ا	78- 
 .إX آ-F0 <*-ن T-	F0
 
" ا	-از ا	B"d # ا	-ى ا	-. أن ا"Jع *ء # ا	#-ت ه أو	-< V#
وا	 `U أي اGn! م آ0  ا	  8-ن 	F ا	9-ة  76 ا"رادة ا	  	ول =	 
ا	#-ت  2 ا	ان ا	)- ا	-JU  8-ن NM2ا  د0 ا	N ت , 7#. ا	7L ا	)B2
و<2اP ) هك Xi  	#78- ا	2آ< وهCا K>-;  ه- #O ا	7ل  <8-ن . ا	9#<
ن ا	- ه , اذا 0 ا 6ر ا	9-ى ا	7# 	ول ا"-ر ا	7#(. ذ	s J-ة ا	N ت ا	9#<
-2 "أ< CهL هC ا	؟ 	 ا	#-ت Nآ # , آ0 	<F0  ا	؟, ا" س 	>2F0
وأ2 F0 	#?< وه- ,  آن ا	-2 ا	# 	# ;77 أم " وهC J`*?w ا	R2   اذا". ا	
# -ى ا	ر <0 .  اذا آن ا	-2 	#  6` ا	 d2<P <Nدي ا	 9E #i 
*  )* <0 82ار ا"Vرة ا	 ا	7H 	9-< هCا اG2 . 9E ا	#-ت  d2<P Kت ا	-
 .ا	#-ت ا	-2ة  ا	2 BE ا	 <)L أن 9E J##( 	s = y K ا nر< 	#2يذ
إن . إن DKZف ا	-اJU ا	 أH2<
 F ا	را  آن 	F ا"M2  7< ا"و	-<ت
هC .  	Z ام ا		-ا"و	-<  ;ء ه 	7< اادات ا	 	Z ام ذات ا	2دود ا		 
و* اO " <-H 	 . ا"و	-< و أهF R2ا "ن ا	C< <2آ-ن أراXF0  FH2ون ا	 ا	ن
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-; *E درا   	#dP -ل ;ء وا	 , #-ت دJ9  ا	2 ا	9 	#ان ا	)-
 	-2 #-ت  ا	8 آ أن ا"و	-< ا	9>-ى   ه. <)L أن " <0 F أي nط زرا
هE هك dP <0 F ا اف ,  ه o	ت ا	?C<؟, "ا	7#"ا"H ا	ا 	#ان ا	)- 
 .آ# 	#  ا	9E ا	R-ر؟
هك H   	2 ا	Fرو	-H ,  -ى ا	7L 	, أ  `2-ت
 . -ارد ا	B ا	9 آY2ة Hاو*	210  ذ	s 	, ا	7#
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1 Introduction 
 
 
Until the 1970s, water use in Yemen was sustainable. Agriculture used direct 
rainfall, spate flows in rivers following rainfall events, flows from springs, and 
exploitation of the shallow aquifers. All these sources are rainfalldependent and 
consequently, while the country was exceptionally watershort, an approximate 
annual balance between renewable supply and utilisation was maintained. 
 This changed dramatically with the arrival of tubewell technology that al
lowed exploitation of water from deep aquifers whose recharge characteristics 
are much more complex than the shallow aquifers, and indeed whose water 
content often comprises infiltration from many years previously. Exploitation of 
this resource is not 'naturally' constrained to equal by annual rainfall, and by 
now use in many areas, including those covered by this study, is unsustainable. 
Dependence on this resource (which is now the dominant situation in many ar
eas) has socioeconomic implications for society generally, and in particular for 
those whose livelihoods are based on irrigated agriculture. 
 The current economic incentive structure seems to encourage instead of 
discourage groundwater extraction. It consists most importantly of a protected 
qat market (so that domestic prices are higher than would be the case under 
free trade); highly subsidised diesel; and subsidies to improved irrigation tech
nology. 
 According to the literature and economic theory there is a wide range of 
possible changes in the economic incentive structure (water pricing, metering, 
water rights, water markets, targeted taxes, subsidies and incentives, informa
tion, participatory management, et cetera). It is, however, important to under
stand the potential effectiveness (in terms of water conservation) and (socio
economic) implications of such interventions in the Yemeni context.  
 This study therefore aims to evaluate the potential role of economic incen
tives to reduce unsustainable irrigation water consumption by 1) identifying fac
tors that are driving groundwater overdraft in Yemen; 2) identifying realistic 
incentives to motivate the agricultural sector in reducing its groundwater extrac
tion from rapidly depleting aquifers, and 3) making recommendations for imple
menting water conservation incentives.  
 To accomplish this, the following six activities have been undertaken: litera
ture review, policy analysis, empirical field work, evaluation, recommendations 
and presentation/workshop. 
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 So first the international literature on the theoretical role of economic in
struments in limiting the demand for irrigation water is reviewed (chapter 2), 
then their usefulness in the context of three study areas: the Sana'a Basin, the 
Taiz Basin and Wadi Hadramout is considered.  
 The situation is not uniform: the three study areas present three distinct 
scenarios: 
- in the Sana'a Basin, where the overdraft is substantial (estimated to be 
around four to five times recharge), the remaining aquifer life is thought to 
be around a decade; 
- in the Taiz basin, where overdraft is less severe (abstractions are estimated 
to be double recharge), the water table is falling and aquifer life unclear; 
- in Wadi Hadhramout, where overdraft is most severe (around seven times 
recharge), the aquifer is extremely large. 
 
 The technical approach to all three situations is, however, common: to save 
water through improved technology and better irrigation management, and to 
seek higher value crops that maintain or enhance farm incomes. In other words, 
improve the 'crop' and reduce the 'drop'. 
 In chapter 3, the major government policy decisions which have affected the 
incentive structure facing farmers are summarised. A distinction is made between 
developments in the agricultural sector and in the water sector as well as macro
economic developments. The policy analysis is among others based on discus
sions with government officials in the water sector.  
 The results of the empirical field work are presented in chapter 4, which 
aims at a better understanding of farmers' behaviour regarding groundwater ex
traction. Information is collected on the basis of indepth interviews with about 
one hundred farmers in each case study area.  
 A number of changes in the incentive structure are evaluated in chapter 5, 
such as incentives that decrease the profitability of irrigation water and subsi
dies on improved irrigation technology. Special attention is paid in the evaluation 
to differences between the study areas. In some areas there is a close linkage 
between water and a central socioeconomic issue, qat, which adds to the diffi
culties of implementing or enforcing change. 
 Finally, conclusions and recommendations for implementing water conserva
tion incentives have been formulated (chapter 6) and presented at three work
shops in the case study areas. The feedback from the workshops as well as the 
comments from the steering committee on the interim progress report have 
been incorporated in the various chapters of this report.  
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2 Literature Review  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Internationally, as competition for water has increased, demand has exceeded 
sustainable supply in many countries, leading to deteriorating ecosystems, dry
ing rivers and declining aquifers. In recent years, the concept of demand man
agement has gained popularity. The approach proposed is that instead of 
continuously increasing the supply of water through new dams, wells and other 
facilities, attention should be paid to the demand side by discouraging waste 
and encouraging reallocation of water from lower to higher value uses. The Dub
lin Principles (the fourth of which is Water has an economic value in all its com
peting uses and should be recognised as an economic good) encouraged the 
idea. 
 This chapter is a review of international experience on the theoretical and 
practical role of economic instruments in limiting the demand for irrigation wa
ter.  
 Yemen is far from unique in facing excessive water use and aquifer deple
tion. Mexico, the United States, Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Israel, Turkey, 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and China, and many other countries (or significant 
areas within countries) could be added, but it is clear that size, wealth and to a 
degree even relative resource abundance are no bar to excessive water de
mand and aquifer management. In one respect the Yemeni case is unique: it in
volves a close linkage between its central resource issue (water) and a central 
socioeconomic issue (qat). This adds to the political and social complexity of 
the issue  and indeed the difficulties of implementing, encouraging or enforcing 
change. 
 This review is in two parts: the first part examines the evidence that inter
ventions that decrease the profitability of water use can reduce significantly the 
demand for water. The second part examines the role of technology in reducing 
water consumption, and hence the contribution that subsidies to technology 
may have in balancing supply and demand of water. 
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2.2 Interventions to decrease profitability 
 
The vast majority of the literature on demand management for irrigation water 
relates to surface water. The reason for the dominance of surface water in the 
literature is most probably because a principle concern has been that surface ir
rigation water is underpriced because governments have failed to recover the 
full costs of the service from the beneficiaries. Consequently, general taxes are 
required to ensure financial sustainability. Most groundwater irrigation is pri
vately owned and therefore cost recovery is less of a concern, but in both sur
face and groundwater, demand often exceeds supply so that economic 
instruments are of relevance to the objective of 'demand management'. 
 The most comprehensive recent general review of international experience 
is that of Bosworth et al. (2002) undertaken to assess the lessons learnt from 
existing experience around the world and to make full use of existing thinking on 
the subject. Completed in October 2002, the review covered almost 50 coun
tries. 
 This review (and the associated guidelines for irrigation service charges, 
Cornish et al., 2003) were careful to clarify terminology. The terms charge, 
price, cost and value are commonly used interchangeably. To avoid confusion, 
the terminology used in the rest of this summary, and throughout the Guidelines 
is consistently based on the following definitions: 
- irrigation service charge: the total payment made by a user for an irrigation 
service. It may comprise fixed elements (e.g. USD20 per hectare) plus vari
able elements (e.g. USD1 per 1,000m3 of water). In this example, if a user 
with 1ha took 10,000m3 under the above charging system, the charge 
would be USD30; 
- price in the above example, the average price of water would be the total 
charge divided by the total quantity of water received (USD30/10,000 = 
USD0.03 per m3). The marginal price would be the cost of an additional unit 
of water (USD1/1,000m3); 
- cost of the irrigation service: the expenses incurred by the supplying agency 
in providing the service. Precise definitions depend on local rules, but typi
cally include operation, maintenance, staff and fuel costs, plus some ele
ments of replacement costs and amortisation of capital; 
- value of water: incremental income received by the farmer as a result of irri
gation services, divided by the quantity of irrigation water used. 
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 These definitions (aside from ensuring clarity in defining what is meant by 
'price', 'cost', et cetera) are of particular relevance to demand management: 
clearly if the value of water to a farmer  the incremental income that he derives 
from its use  is significantly higher than the cost of the water, so that he derives 
a substantial profit from its use, then demand will be high.  
 The main conclusions of the Bosworth report are worth extensive quotation, 
as they bear directly on the Yemeni situation, and embody experiences from 
many countries. 
- Volumetric water pricing or tradable water allocations are used where the 
objective is to reduce water demand in the agricultural sector. However, 
'there is little practical evidence from the field to support the view that volu
metric pricing changes farmers' water demand patterns.'  
- Even in Jordan, Israel and Morocco, countries facing extreme water scarcity, 
the aim of water pricing is to recover service delivery costs. 'Volumetric wa
ter allocations, rather than water price, are used to ensure that other sector 
needs are met.'  
- In all of these countries water is priced on a volumetric or approximate 
volumetric basis to indicate its value to users and discourage profligate use, 
'but there is no attempt to use water pricing to achieve the balance between 
supply and the demand' of competing sectors.  
- Water markets and tradable water rights could theoretically be more effec
tive than water pricing as a means of achieving allocation efficiency. How
ever, formal water markets may potentially lead to inequitable access to 
water resources and disadvantage poor farmers who lack resources to buy 
water.  
- Unless safeguards are provided there is a risk that water will flow increas
ingly according to purchasing power. 
- Formal markets for large transactions between sectors require a well
defined legal and regulatory framework and are mainly found in developed 
countries, with Australia and Spain being widely cited examples. 
- 'The price response to volumetric water charging is widely shown to be 
minimal.' Current prices are well below the range where water saving is a 
significant financial consideration for the farmer, so prices must be raised 
dramatically and generally well beyond estimates of the cost of the service, 
if volumetric charges are to have a significant impact on demand.  
- Water scarcity will continue to increase, leading to more competition for wa
ter between agricultural, municipal and industrial sectors. The agricultural 
sector is seen as wasteful in its use of water when, on large irrigation 
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schemes with open channel conveyance, as much as 70% of water diverted 
from a source fails to arrive at the crop.  
 
 However, three important points must be made concerning these 'losses:' 
- 'lost' water often returns to an aquifer or river and is therefore not lost to 
downstream users.' It is only lost if it deteriorates in quality or drains to a 
sink from which it cannot be economically recovered. Consequently, switch
ing to 'high tech' irrigation methods such as drip or sprinkler may not result 
in any overall savings of water if the previous losses were recaptured by 
others; 
- the farmers' infield management of water accounts for less than half of the 
losses. More than half the total losses occur in the conveyance and distribu
tion canals. As individual farmers have no control of this infrastructure, pric
ing incentives cannot affect these losses; 
- withdrawal of water, which then returns to a river or an aquifer, will increase 
the cost of service delivery but may not affect overall levels of water scar
city; 
- Japan, France, Australia, Spain and the Netherlands stand out as achieving 
full recovery of annual O&M costs and some recovery of capital costs. 
 
 However, in the overwhelming number of cases, water charging is not cover
ing even annual O&M costs. The literature refers to various institutional and po
litical factors that hamper full cost recovery in different countries, including: 
  the lack of political will to impose higher costs on farmers; 
  practical and political difficulties associated with enforcement of pricing 
policies; 
  where volumetric charging is applied to limit consumption, delivery 
must be measured and controlled to the individual user.  
- the introduction of a water charging policy should not be viewed as a 'silver 
bullet' that can deliver all. In the case of demand management the literature 
again indicates that pricing is only one element. Legally recognised water 
rights and allocations and the use of tradable water rights are other com
mon elements in such a programme; 
- there is much written material on water pricing but far less on effective col
lection mechanisms. In many countries the issue is not one of how to deter
mine the level of water prices, but how to implement and enforce any pricing 
policy. Without due consideration of the revenue collection and enforcement 
systems, policy makers may design pricing policies that are theoretically 
sound but practically unmanageable. 
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 An additional point made in this review is that while there is an extensive 
academic literature demonstrating the linkage between the value and price of 
water and demand, this is primarily based on modelling exercises rather than 
field experience.  
 Cornish et al. (2004), summarise information on water charges from 50 
countries including surface and groundwater schemes, and finds only two (Spain 
and Israel) where the volumetric charge for water exceeds USD0.1 per m3. In 
both cases these are groundwaterbased schemes. These data relate to water 
charges in government schemes. Data from privately owned groundwater 
sources are rare. The report mentions Pakistan (USD0.17 per m3) and Yemen 
(USD0.021.46 per m3). This last price is the highest reported price for irriga
tion water in the review. 
 The general conclusions from these two reviews of international experience 
are that prices of water in irrigation systems are generally considerably lower 
than required even to recover operating costs, and are far below the levels re
quired to have significant impact on demand for irrigation water. Moreover, in
creasing the price of water (or decreasing the price of irrigated crops) is likely 
to be politically sensitive, and difficult to implement. For individual wells (as dis
tinct from publically operated surface irrigation projects) the difficulties in moni
toring use and relating the charge to the volume pumped are of course far 
higher. 
 Other sources offer additional information. The joint World Bank/GWP GM
MATE programme offers advice on issues related to groundwater management. 
It is comprehensive and clear:  
 Sustainable groundwater utilisation will require actions to be taken at two dif
ferent administrative levels: 
- macroeconomic policy interventions  because groundwater demand is 
strongly influenced by national subsidies (on water well drilling, electrical en
ergy, diesel fuel, food crops) and they affect the size of existing groundwa
terbased agriculture and the rate of transition to less waterdependent 
livelihoods; 
- locallevel management measures  to create effective institutional arrange
ments (empowered government agency, adequate legal framework, user 
awareness/participation, groundwater abstraction charging, landuse con
straints) to regulate, protect and monitor groundwater resources. 
 
 The Briefing Note Series addresses both of these levels, but puts greater 
emphasis on the latter in the belief that (especially in waterscarce and/or 
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denselypopulated regions) sooner or later effective local management ar
rangements will have to be put in place. 
 According to GWMATE1 the approach taken to groundwater management at 
any moment in time will depend on the following factors: 
- the size and complexity of the groundwater resource; 
- the degree of climatic aridity and the rate of aquifer recharge and resource 
renewal; 
- the scale of groundwater abstraction and the number and types of ground
water users; 
- the ecological role and environmental services dependent upon groundwa
ter; 
- the susceptibility and vulnerability of the aquifer system to degradation; 
- natural groundwater quality concerns (trace element hazards and saline wa
ter presence). 
 
 The focus of this review is on economic instruments and policies, but this list 
of 'relevant factors' highlights the extreme nature of the situation faced in 
Yemen. 
 
Table 2.1 Price, cost and value of water (USD/m3) in selected irrigation ar5
eas 
 Price paid 
(USD/m3) 
Price/Cost 
Ratio a) 
O&M Cost 
(USD/m3) 
Price/Value 
Ratio a) 
Value of water 
(USD/m3) 
Kemry 
(Egypt) 
0.0004 1:25 0.010 1:200 0.08 
Haryana  
(India) 
0.0005 1:2.6 0.0013 1:80 0.04 
Tadla  
(Morocco) 
0.0200 1:0.8 0.017 1:5 0.10 
Brantas  
(Indonesia) 
0.0002 1:5.0 0.001 1:200 0.04 
Crimea 
(Ukraine) 
0.0020 1:6.0 0.012 1:55 0.11 
a) Where the Price/Cost ratio exceeds 1, costs are not recovered; where the Price/Value ration is high, price has little 
impact on demand. 
                                                 
1 Sustainable Groundwater Management: Concepts and tools. Series overview. (GW  MATE, 20026). 
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 Hellegers and Perry's study of the literature and a number of case studies 
confirms particularly the fact that prices set to recover operational costs are al
ready rare, and that the extra price that would be required to induce farmers to 
modify their consumption of water are generally beyond the politically feasible 
level. Table 2.1 above summarises the ratios between the cost, price and value 
of water in a number of countries/areas. 
 GWMATE note 7 specifically addresses the role of economic instruments, 
making the important initial points that groundwater presents some special diffi
culties: assessing and monitoring resource availability is complex and expensive 
(aquifers are complex and differentiated; use is highly decentralised); groundwa
ter is invisible to the public; and the time lag between overdraft and measurable 
impact may be extremely long.  
 The note refers to the problem that the user of groundwater generally pays 
only part of the economic cost. Where the resource is scarce, current usage is 
at the expense either of alternative uses or future uses. The cost to the user is 
consequently too low and induces overuse. This in turn leads to the 'tragedy of 
the commons' (Hardin, 1968) where it is in each individual's interest to exploit 
the resource as quickly as possible, which is contrary to the collective interest 
of sustainable use for current and future generations. 
 The note then summarises the economic instruments available to influence 
abstraction: 
- direct pricing through abstraction fees  difficult because wells are widely 
dispersed and rarely metered, and conditions vary locally; 
- indirect pricing through energy tariffs  in order to offset impacts on poor, 
may require lumpsum payments. This is complex to administer; 
- groundwater markets require that water rights based on sustainable yields 
are in place and enforced1; may have negative impacts on the poor as water 
is transferred to higher value uses; water rights need to be specified in rela
tion to historic entitlements and local aquifer conditions; 
- modification of agricultural and food trade policies  can influence demand 
for water by making waterintensive crops less attractive; may also restrict 
                                                 
1 There is considerable confusion in the literature about what constitutes a groundwater market. It is 
commonly assumed that farmers who can purchase water from one of several local pump owners are 
participating in a water market (MeinzenDick, 1997). This is entirely misleading  they are in fact par
ticipating is a market for pumping services: usually all the pump owners are pumping from the same 
aquifer. There is no market in alternative sources of water. By contrast in Yemen, when water is pur
chased from tankers, this is often a genuine water market because they get their water from different 
sources. This means that each 'source' is exposed to its highestvalue use  further increasing de
mand and abstraction. 
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potential returns from groundwater by preventing export of high value crops. 
The impact of this is on the one hand to reduce the demand for water (posi
tive impact) while on the other hand reducing the benefits derived from using 
the scarce resource (negative impact); 
- subsidies to encourage real water saving measures  need to be carefully 
appraised to ensure real savings.  
 
 Where economic instruments are proposed, it is essential to ensure that en
forcement is feasible. 
 The literature described above is primarily aimed at practitioners, and identi
fies issues and options in the application of economic instruments to achieve 
objectives that include demand management. There is an additional wide litera
ture based on modelling, to demonstrate that indeed as the price of water in
creases farmers will change to different crops and try to limit water 
consumption. While academically interesting, the relevance of such work (aside 
from importantly demonstrating the directions of change) is severely limited by 
the extensive list of political and technical difficulties with implementation, im
pacts on farm incomes, and real uncertainties with the actual resource impacts 
of revised economic incentives. 
 In sum, while economic instruments that change the incentive structure at 
the farm level can influence farmers to use less water and to use it more pro
ductively, such interventions are not the basis for bringing about a balance be
tween supply and demand. 
 This conclusion is supported by the practical examples quoted in the text 
above as well as a review of the fifteen case studies that are provided in parallel 
with the GWMATE 'Concepts and Tools' series in its 'Profiles1' series.  
 The Profiles cover case studies from Thailand, Yemen, Paraguay, Argentina, 
Brazil, Kenya, Venezuela, China, Mexico, India, Nepal, a number of multicountry 
aquifers, and subSaharan Africa.  
 In only three of these studies (India, China, Mexico) were economic incen
tives mentioned as a direct vehicle for affecting demand  despite the promi
nence given to pricing elsewhere  in each case through increasing the cost of 
power. In Yemen, the use of subsidies to encourage improved irrigation tech
nology is mentioned. 
 A more common issue raised in these profiles is the need for participation 
by local stakeholders and water users to understand the problems they face, to 
reach jointly acceptable management plans, and perhaps most importantly to 
                                                 
1 GWMATE Profiles GWMATE website, viewed 22 January 2008. 
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enforce agreements through local peer pressure. In the Tamil Nadu (Indian) 
case study, reference is made to monitoring groundwater levels and taking local 
decisions on seasonal use based on water availability. 
 In most cases, however, both in the GWMATE cases and elsewhere in the 
literature, definition of water rights  based on sustainable average availability of 
water  is seen as the key intervention to control demand.  
 The reduced income to farmers resulting from inducing a specific reduction 
in water use through pricing water was compared to the income reduction from 
the same reduction by a direct quota was explored in Perry (1996) for Egypt. It 
was found that the water price increase required to induce a 15% fall in water 
demand would result in a 40% fall in farm income while a direct reduction in 
availability of water by 15% (equivalent to a reduced water right) would lead to a 
fall of less than 15% in farm income. 
 Terrink and Nakashima (1993) give a resume of water supply pricing in Cali
fornia. It is striking that water pricing is only perceived as a mechanism to re
cover costs  there are no practical examples of it being used as a demand 
management tool. 
 Israel's water supply is derived from three principal sources, the coastal aq
uifer, the inland, mountain aquifer and the sea of Galilee. In addition to these 
three main sources there are a further five, locally important aquifers. All of 
these sources have been overexploited, with annual withdrawals exceeding re
charge. The pragmatic response to this has been for the Water Commission 
Agency to cut back allocations to the agricultural sector. Ironically, despite this 
simple and practical response, Becker and Levine (2002) argue the theoretical 
case in support of using water pricing to reduce agricultural demand rather than 
further reliance on this apparently simple and transparent mechanism. 
 For the Yemen, Ward (2000) believes that combining an increase in water 
prices with the introduction of irrigation efficiency measures, is a viable option. 
He argues that if water pricing encourages farmers to use water more effi
ciently, they will then be more likely to adopt watersaving technologies. Invest
ment and research into water conservation techniques would complement a 
water pricing strategy, with support from government and donors.  
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 Ward comments that 'more efficient irrigation could help relieve pressure on 
groundwater resources and restore, or even increase, farm incomes' (p.393).1 
 Lichtenthaeler (2003) has written an exceptionally detailed review of the 
Sa'dah Basin, which faces water scarcity and overuse comparable (but perhaps 
further advanced) to other parts of Yemen. His analysis of the policy back
ground is referenced elsewhere in this report. For the purposes of this section, 
his key conclusion is that emerging actions to respond to the crisis centre on 
the capacity of local groups to learn lessons from their problems and devise lo
cal procedures to control exploitation of water. 
 
Conclusions from experience of demand management through profit reducing 
measures 
Interventions that raise the price paid by farmers for water, or reduce the value 
of water through changes to input costs or price of products have been of con
siderable interest recently, as a means of demand management. Such interven
tions are of particular relevance to groundwater, where control of over
abstraction in thousands of individual wells by a central agency is unrealistic. 
 However, demand management can be interpreted at two levels  first, as an 
effective incentive to reduce demand, and second as a means of achieving a 
balance between demand and supply. Pricing and other economic instruments 
will certainly achieve the first objective  at some cost to farm incomes, but 
there are consequently no examples of direct water pricing being used to meet 
demand management objectives in the full sense of bringing demand down to 
the sustainable supply level.  
 This is a critically important conclusion, because the implication is that addi
tional measures  typically the definition of water rights consistent with resource 
availability  are required for full demand management. Since the interventions 
required to raise the price of water (or lower its value) will be unpopular with 
farmers, following this with a programme of reducing access to the resource 
will be even more sensitive.  
 However, while economic interventions to reduce the incentives to use 
groundwater will be unpopular because of the impact on farm incomes, such in
                                                 
1 This is the theory. However, in Jordan, investment in water efficient technology has not led to any 
measurable water saving. Despite widescale adoption of drip technology, application efficiencies for 
irrigation water have not improved significantly and distribution efficiency remains low. Farmers per
ceive the JVA's water supply to be unreliable. Hence, when water is available they tend to over  irri
gate to store water in the soil, a situation that leads to greater losses (cited in Huppert and Urban, 
1999). 
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terventions are generally within the powers of central government  while control 
of abstraction at the individual well level is essentially impossible.  
 If input and output incentives cannot achieve a balance between demand and 
sustainable supply, there are two options  either the balance is achieved by de
fault as wells dry up, or collective actions at the local level must enforce reduc
tions in use. 
 Finally, the impact of economic interventions that reduce the profitability of 
water use is inevitably to reduce farm incomes, and if substantial reductions in 
use must be induced then the income effects will in turn be substantial. Given 
that many of the farmers affected are poor, compensation schemes would need 
consideration. 
 
 
2.3 Technical interventions to decrease consumption 
 
The alternative strategy of subsidising 'water saving' technologies is also as
sessed in the literature, with critical attention paid to the real hydrological im
pacts of such changes  whether the reduced 'losses' are indeed lost or are 
available for reuse from an aquifer or downstream in a basin. 
 Irrigation is widely seen as a wasteful, low value use of water. The observed 
efficiency of surface irrigation systems is in the order of 40%, while it is claimed 
that efficiencies of double this figure are feasible. Efficiency is here defined as 
the ratio of the water used by the plant to the water delivered to the system 
(project, canal, or field). Implicitly, very large quantities of water can be saved 
by improved technology. 
 Recently, however, there has been an extensive debate about the terminol
ogy of this analysis. A simple example illustrates the confusion: in Egypt, on
farm efficiency is assessed at 40% (World Bank, Irrigation Improvement Pro
ject). Yet of the 55.5BCM of water entering Egypt each year from Sudan, only 
about 10BCM go to the Mediterranean. Egypt has virtually no rainfall or ground
water, and irrigation dominates water use. If irrigation is 'wasting' 60% of the 
water at the field level, why is only 20% of available water flowing to the sea? 
The answer, of course is that losses at field level flow to drains, back to the 
Nile, and are diverted for use in downstream canals. Groundwater is no different 
 indeed it is generally the case that excess irrigation application infiltrate back 
into the water table  but in the case of groundwater there are often additional 
complexities. These issues have been alluded to in literature already referred to 
above. 
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 Bosworth et al. (2002) note (emphasis added): 
- water scarcity will continue to increase, leading to more competition for wa
ter between agricultural, municipal Water scarcity will continue to increase, 
leading to more competition for water between agricultural, municipal and 
industrial sectors. The agricultural sector is seen as wasteful in its use of 
water when, on large irrigation schemes with open channel conveyance, as 
much as 70% of water diverted from a source fails to arrive at the crop. 
 However, three important points must be made concerning these 'losses': 
- 'lost' water often returns to an aquifer or river and is therefore not lost to 
downstream users. It is only lost if it deteriorates in quality or drains to a 
sink from which it cannot be economically recovered. Consequently, switch
ing to 'high tech' irrigation methods such as drip or sprinkler may not result 
in any overall savings of water if the previous losses were recaptured by 
others; 
- the farmers' infield management of water accounts for less than half of the 
losses. More than half the total losses occur in the conveyance and distribu
tion canals. As individual farmers have no control of this infrastructure, pric
ing incentives cannot affect these losses. 
 
 These points are echoed in GWMATE Note 31 (emphasis added): 
- it is always essential to address the issue of constraining demand for 
groundwater abstraction, since this will normally contribute more to achiev
ing the groundwater balance, and in more arid and denselypopulated areas 
will always be required in the longer run. The concept of real water savings 
is critical in this regard. These savings include only reductions in evaporation 
(that is consumptive use) and in loss to saline water bodies, but not those 
reductions which would have generated aquifer recharge; 
- in some instances improvements in irrigation wateruse efficiency while gen
erating improvements in wateruse productivity and farmer incomes, lead to 
deterioration in the groundwater resources balance as a result of; 
- substituting increased fieldlevel evaporation/evapotranspiration (in spray ir
rigation) for major groundwater irrigation  return flows (occurring in flood ir
rigation); 
- making feasible the expansion of irrigation command and the area actually 
under cultivation (due to the capacity of pressurised water delivery); 
                                                 
1 Sustainable Groundwater Management: Concepts and tools. Groundwater Management Strategies. 
(GWMATE, 2002  6). 
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- facilitating the introduction of highervalue crops, which make it viable for 
farmers to deepen wells and to pump groundwater against greater hydraulic 
heads. 
 
 The points made here can be illustrated graphically by figure 2.1, following 
Hellegers and Perry (2004). 
 The 'Use' demand for water is the quantity that the farmer pumps from the 
aquifer. The value the farmer derives from that use is related to the consump
tion of that water in productive plant transpiration. Under Technology 1, at a 
given price P1, the 'Use' demand is Q1 while consumption is C1. The difference 
between Q1 and C1 are the 'Losses' to nonbeneficial evaporation, runoff, and in
filtration of excess applied water. If the price of water increases to P2, Use de
mand falls to Q2 and Consumption falls to C2,1. However, if the farmer then 
decides that should reduce his losses and invests in technology 2, then while 
Use demand remains at Q2, consumption increases to C2,2. If the 'losses' were 
indeed nonrecoverable all well and good; if the losses were contributing to aqui
fer recharge, then the net overdraft will increase as a result of the 'improve
ment'. Further, in relation to second and third points in the GWMATE quote, 
above, the farmer will with the new technology be able to afford to pump water 
from even deeper, because the beneficial component of a unit of 'use' has been 
increased.1 
 The implications of these points are that interventions in technology or the 
incentive structure must be carefully assessed in the relevant hydrogeological 
context before conclusions are drawn about the impact on an aquifer. 
 Meanwhile, countries facing water scarcity face difficult (and expensive) de
cisions regarding irrigation technology. The basis for meaningful discussion and 
analysis in this area must therefore be a clearly defined set of terms. 
 Widely used but illdefined concepts of 'efficiency' lead to misleading conclu
sions. In part this is because different disciplines (irrigation engineers, econo
mists, agronomists, resource planners) infer 'benefits' that conform to their 
particular point of view (more precise application of water, higher value of wa
ter, higher crop yields, availability of water for alternative uses). Some, all or 
none of these good things can be the outcome in the multiple scenarios in which 
'improvement' takes place. 
                                                 
1
 The common term for increasing the beneficial component of use is an increase in irrigation effi
ciency  a concept now rejected by ICID precisely because of counterintuitive results such as this 
(Perry, 2007  see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Modern technologies may induce an increase in water consumed 
 
Source: Hellegers and Perry (2004). 
 
 In consequence, the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage has 
over the last two years consulted all its National Committees, various Working 
Groups, and many experts, and adopted terms that avoid the word 'efficiency' 
altogether, relying instead on the hydrological framework that simply defines 
component water flows (Perry 2007). These are: 
1   water use: application of water to any specified purpose, comprising; 
2.1  consumed Fraction: Water evaporated or transpirated, comprising; 
2.1.1  Beneficial Consumed Fraction: Water consumed for the desired  
   purpose; 
2.1.2   nonbeneficial Consumed Fraction: Other evaporation or  
   transpiration; 
2.2  nonconsumed Fraction: Water not lost to the atmosphere,  
   Comprising; 
2.2.1   recoverable fraction: Water that can be recovered and reused; 
2.2.2   nonrecoverable fraction: Water that cannot be economically  
   recovered; 
 
 The benefits of this framework include: identification of consumptive uses 
(crops transpire water  a consumptive use  while most domestic uses are non
consumptive. Lowflow showers reduce water use but have no effect on con
sumption); clarity in identifying how water can most effectively be saved (by re
ducing nonbeneficial consumption and the nonrecoverable fraction); and 
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making sure that the accounts are done properly, because the sum of the com
ponent flows at each level MUST add up to the flow at next level. 
 Traditionally, 'irrigation efficiency' has been calculated as the ratio of 2.1.1, 
above, to 1  a term that can vary greatly depending on the scale of observa
tion.1 
 The term 'Water Use Efficiency' is also proposed by ICID to be replaced by 
'water productivity'. Although WUE is internationally defined as a productivity 
term (output of crop per unit water applied, for example), it is one of the most 
misused terms in the literature. 
 Other terms needed for the analysis are evaporation (E) which is direct con
sumption of water  for example when wet soil is exposed to the atmosphere  
and transpiration (T) which is the water that goes through the crop in the proc
ess of plant to growth.2 
 Improved irrigation technologies (drip, sprinkler) basically change the relative 
size of the fractions. Typically, the beneficial consumption fraction increases 
(from perhaps 40% to 70%), but the other components (before and after im
provement) depend on local conditions. If the water table is saline, infiltration is 
lost to further productive use; if the water table is extremely deep, infiltration 
may remain 'stranded' in the unsaturated zone, et cetera. 
 The first implication of this approach is that the analytical framework for as
sessing the impact of improved technology must take account of local hydro
geological conditions. The simple ratio of water consumed by the crop to water 
applied is of no particular use in assessing the impacts of improved technology 
from a resource perspective. Until the destination of the nonconsumed fraction 
is known, water savings are indeterminate. 
 From the farmer's perspective, however, the situation is rather clearer: im
proved technologies result in a higher level of beneficial consumption  which is 
the fraction that actually produces crops and income for the farmer. So from 
the farmer's perspective every unit of water used'  whether pumped from the 
aquifer or diverted from a canal  is more productive because a higher propor
tion goes to beneficial consumption. 
                                                 
1
 Egypt is 85% 'efficient' at the national scale, but only about 40% efficient at field scale, because 
most field 'losses' simply return to the Nile. Because of this measured diversions from the Nile are at 
least 50% higher than the water available to the country  a rather confusing statistic that suggests 
that a further reduction in 'efficiency' could make even more water available to Egypt! 
2 ET is the combined total of evapotranspiration which is measured  for example in lysimeter experi
ments. It is often difficult to precisely separate ET into its constituent components based on field 
measurements.  
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 This, in turn increases the value of water use: if the farmer could afford to 
pump from 100m when the beneficial fraction of the water pumped was 40%, 
he can afford to pump from much deeper when the beneficial fraction is 80%. 
 Therefore, while the intervention described in the first section of the litera
ture review act to decrease the attractiveness of water use as a means to dis
courage demand, improvements in technology have the reverse effect and 
actually increase demand. 
 Consequently, starting from a situation where groundwater use is excessive 
and difficult to control, improved technology will generally make the incentives 
to overexploit the resource even higher, and the difficulties of control similarly 
more severe. 
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3 Policy Analysis  
 
 
3.1 Background 
 
Though it is not the purpose of this study to add to technical information regard
ing the status of aquifers, some estimates are summarised. It shows that differ
ent estimates are available. Although it is not clear which ones are most 
accurate, estimates point in the same direction.  
 The annual renewable water resources of the Republic of Yemen are esti
mated at 2.5 billion cubic meters (BCM), while the current population is 21.6 
million people. Currently, per capita availability of water in Yemen is therefore 
less than 120m3 a year compared to an average of 7,500m3 per capita for the 
world and 1,250m3 for the Middle East and North Africa. The minimum required 
for food self sufficiency is 1,100m3 per capita per annum. 
 Water scarcity is more acute in the western part of the country where 90% 
of the population is concentrated. Major cities are located there, in catchments 
with limited local water resources. Examples of such waterstressed catchments 
are the Upper Wadi Rasyan and the Sana'a Basin that include, respectively, the 
city of Ta'iz and Sana'a.  
 Average rainfall is annually approximately 60BCM; most of it evaporates in 
situ shortly after rainstorms. The remainder goes as surface runoff or perco
lates into the ground to recharge to local aquifers. The average yearly runoff 
used as surface water in the Wadis is estimated to be about 1.0BCM. The per
colated amount is estimated to be 1.5BCM, which is going to renew the 
groundwater. Hence, total annual renewable water resources are 2.5BCM, while 
annual abstraction is 3.4BCM. This means that 0.9BCM of groundwater is de
pleted every year, which lowers the water tables in some aquifers by as much 
as 6 meters per year (JICA, 2007). Redecker (2007) reports annual abstrac
tions of 4.45BCM in 2006 of which 3.981BCM for agriculture and 0.465BCM 
for domestic consumption. This gives an annual deficit of 1.95BCM. This figure 
is based on gross abstraction and does not allow for recharge from pumped 
water. AlHamdi (2000) estimated that in 1994 total water use in Yemen was 
2.8BCM and total renewable water 2.1BCM, leading to an annual deficit of 
0.7BCM in 1994.  
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 The amount of water used in agriculture is currently about 88% followed by 
urban 10% and industrial use 2%. This is expected to change by 2025 to re
spectively 79, 18 and 3%. 
 The imbalance between recharge and abstraction varies among basins and 
subbasins. The water balance in the Sana'a Basin, where the capital of Yemen 
is situated, illustrates the very severe imbalance in some of the basins very well. 
Table 3.1 shows that the abstracted amount is more than five times the re
charge amount (JICA, 2007). The deficit of about 220MCM annually is being sat
isfied from fossil groundwater storage. Total fossil storage was estimated to be 
in the order of 3,220MCM in the Sana'a Basin (AlHamdi, 2000). Given a con
stant abstraction rate, this suggests that storage would be depleted within 15 
years1 (from 2000), or potentially even earlier as groundwater abstractions are 
increasing.  
 
Table 3.1 Water Balance (2005) in Yemen and in Sana'a governorate, 
Taiz and Hadramout governorate (MCM) 
 Domestic 
abstrac5 
tion 
Irrigation 
abstrac5 
tion a) 
Industry 
abstrac5 
tion 
Total 
abstrac5
tion 
Total 
Recharge 
Water 
Balance 
Yemen 265 3,235 65 3,565 2,500 1,065 
Sana'a  55.4 209.2 4.8 269.7 50.7 219 
Ta'iz 18.5 39.3 4.2 62 20 42 
Hadramout 40 360 0 400  150  250  
a) Sana'a Actual evapotranspiration is 83.7MCM/year, but calculated abstractions 209.2MCM assuming an irriga
tion efficiency of 40%. 
Source: JICA (2007).  
 
 GWMATE (2008) shows different estimates of the ratio between recharge 
and current abstraction. For Taiz, this is estimated at 50%, for Hadhramout 
13%, and for Dhamar 7%. It becomes clear that the data on water availability 
are particularly uncertain. Annual rainfall varies from year to year, so that 're
newable' sources are not easily characterised as averages. The deep aquifers 
are complex and difficult to assess with accuracy; recharge is often lateral, via 
waterbearing strata that bring water from distant points of recharge; some wa
ter is fossil, and is not recharging at all; local 'perched' aquifers intercept verti
                                                 
1 This figure is purely indicative of the scale of excess abstractions  in fact as local resources are 
depleted the number of functioning wells will fall, and the rate of depletion will decline. 
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cal infiltration; and there are areas where shallow aquifer overlies the imperme
able strata that confine the deep aquifers.  
 What is certain is that the current levels of gross abstraction in many areas 
is much higher than recharge from all sources, so that water levels are falling, 
and most aquifers are expected to fall. The most acute problems regarding 
overdraft are found in the highland plains of Yemen extending from Sadah to 
Taiz where most of the population of Yemen live and work. Groundwater levels 
are declining at alarming rates and they are expected to continue declining 
unless some actions are taken. The socioeconomic results of depletion will be 
dramatic. Already Yemen is witnessing a decline in the areas cultivated by irriga
tion from wells.  
 In this chapter the major government policy decisions which have affected the 
incentive structure facing farmers will be described. A distinction is made between 
developments in the agricultural sector and in the water sector as well as macro
economic developments. The policy analysis is partly based on discussion with 
government officials, among others His Excellency the president of Yemen. See 
appendix 1 for a summary of some of these discussions and a list of the officials 
met. The physical development of water resources since 1970 can best be illus
trated and understood on the basis of the development of the cropped area over 
time by source of water.  
 
 
3.2 Categorisation of farming systems according to the source of water 
 
Most of Yemen has an arid climate. Rainfall is erratic and limited while the agri
cultural demand for water is high  as much as ten times the average rainfall. 
Rainfed agricultural production depends on capturing and retaining as much 
rainfall as possible, and selection of crops that are tolerant of water stress. The 
resulting levels of productivity are rather low  as in most areas with similar con
ditions. Irrigated agriculture provides the basis for far higher levels of productiv
ity, and over the centuries, several distinct methods of irrigation have evolved.  
 Spate irrigation involves construction of dams across riverbeds, and associ
ated distribution systems to carry floodwaters to nearby fields. The dams were 
often temporary structures constructed in series on ephemeral rivers or wadis, 
and did not survive major floods. Spate irrigation, while more productive than 
rainfed agriculture, still depends on unpredictable rainfall events to provide er
ratic irrigation. 
 Spring irrigation depends on the flows from naturally occurring areas where 
the groundwater from surrounding hills reaches the surface. Manmade springs 
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(where a gently sloping tunnel is constructed so as to intersect the watertable 
and induce flow to a specific point) are also common in Yemen, as elsewhere in 
the region. The flow of water from springs is usually at a low rate, but relatively 
continuous (the opposite of spate irrigation  although in both cases the water 
supply is uncontrolled) and consequently provides a more assured agricultural 
environment. 
 Well irrigation from shallow aquifers also developed, providing a controlled 
source of water based on pumping. This was by far the most assured source of 
water, at least in the short term/seasonal sense. In the longer term shallow aq
uifers tended to become overexploited as the number of wells increased, the 
population increased, and the demand for water for domestic and agricultural 
products increased. 
 Importantly, though, these three traditional sources of water for agriculture 
were selfregulating. Each is dependent on current or recent rainfall, or on the 
rainfall in recent years. Therefore, while the country was very watershort, an 
approximate annual balance between renewable supply and utilisation was un
avoidable. In this context farmers had extensive experience of the likely levels of 
water availability, and traditional, negotiated systems of rules and organisation 
evolved for the development and management of the water resource. Disputes 
arose, because water was extremely scarce, but the transparency of the link 
between availability, location and use allowed local reconciliation procedures 
and judgment to guide the process towards agreements and rules. Lichtentaeler 
reports in detail on the essential linkage between land ownership and water 
rights, and the negotiations required when land use changed so as to affect the 
runoff to established downstream riparians; Ward reports the many ways in 
which priorities are defined. 
 According to Agricultural Statistics (MAI, 2001) the total agricultural land is 
1.66 million ha, of which the cultivated land varies from 0.98 million ha to 1.5 
million ha according to the amount of annual rainfall. Common categorisation of 
farming systems in Yemen is done according to the source of water. Four sys
tems categories are identified: rainfed, well irrigated (groundwater), spring irri
gated (perennial) and spate irrigated (flood). The data in table 3.2 indicate that 
the cultivated area under well irrigation increased from 2% in 1975 to 40% in 
2000, while the cultivated area under rainfall decreased from 85% to 45% in the 
same period. 
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Table 3.2 Development of cultivated areas (x 1,000 ha) in Yemen ac5
cording to the source of irrigation between 1975 and 2005 
Year Rainfed Well Spring Spate Cropped area 
1975 1,285 37 73 120 1,515 
1990 685 310 25 101 1,121 
1995 579 368 20 100 1,067 
2000 515  457 46 126 1,144 
2005 609 393  34 137 1,202 
 
 The cultivated area of Yemen was estimated in 2005 to be about 1.2 million 
ha of which 50% is depending on rainfall (608,525ha) , while 50% (593,588ha) 
is irrigated either by groundwater (393,089 ha.) or surface water from seasonal 
floods (spate irrigation and irrigation by springs). These percentages vary 
among basins. In Wadi Hadramout less than 10% of the cultivated area depends 
on rainfall, while 90% is irrigated (see table 3.3). In all three basins around 35%
40% of the cultivated area is under well irrigation.  
 
Table 3.3 Cultivated areas (x 1,000 ha) according to the source of irri5
gation in 2005 in Sana'a, Taiz and Hadramout governorate 
Year Rainfed Well Spring Spate Other a) Cropped 
area 
Sana'a  66.5 53.2 3.5 1.5 8.3 133 
Taiz  41.9 26.1 2.6 0.5 1.9 73 
Hadramout (8)3.7 (12)13.4 6.7 14.2 0 (20)38 
a) Others includes tankers. 
Source: Agricultural Statistics Book, 2005 (Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, 2006). 
 
 The increase in cultivated area under well irrigation can be explained on the 
basis of the development of the cropping pattern shown in table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 Development of cropping pattern (x 1,000 ha) between 1990 
and 2005 
Yemen  Yemen  Yemen  Yemen  Sana'a Taiz Hadhra  
1990 1995 2000 2005 2005 2005 2005 
Sorghum and Mil
let 
643 540 463 530 27.1 38.0 (0)12.0 
Maize 52 43 32 39 5.0 5.0 0.1 
Wheat 98 102 87 86 20.0 0.2 (2.2)4.0 
Barley 52 50 37 35 13.0 0.1 0.0 
Total Cereals 845 733 619 689 65.1 43.3 16.1 
Tomatoes 11 13 17 15 2.0 0.4 0.3 
Potatoes 14 14 17 17 1.4 0.2 0.2 
Other vegetables 27 27 31 42 3.3 8.7 2.9 
Total Vegetables 52 54 65 74 6.7 9.3 3.3 
Sesame 19 23 32 19 0.0 0.2 0.7 
Cotton 10 13 27 18 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tobacco 4 4 5 8 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Coffee 25 27 33 29 9.0 0.0 0.0 
Total Cash crops 58 67 97 73 9.0 0.2 1.1 
Grapes 17 21 23 12 10.0 0.1 0.0 
Palm Trees 15 19 23 14 0.0 1.0 5.0 
Other fruits 24 35 46 57 6.8 1.4 1.6 
Total Fruits 56 75 92 83 16.8 2.5 6.6 
Alfalfa 17 21 26 21 2.0 0.0 3.0 
Sorghum fodder 44 63 90 102 3.3 6.6 6.4 
Total Fodder 61 84 116 123 5.3 6.6 9.4 
Total Pulses 49 54 52 39 7.2 0.6 0.0 
Qat 80 90 103 124 23.0 10.0 0.0 
Total area 1,201 1,157 1,144 1,204 133 73 37 
 
 The area used to grow vegetables, fruits and qat, which are mostly grown 
under well irrigation, has increased; the area rainfed cereals has decreased 
substantially. The area under qat was only 8,000ha in 1970 and 70,000ha in 
1980, while it is now more than 125,000 ha. In Yemen 10% of the cultivated 
area is under qat in 2005. In Sana'a and Ta'iz even larger percentages of the 
cultivated areas are under qat (respectively 17 and 14%), while in Hadramout 
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hardly any qat is cultivated. The area under fruit and vegetables was 39,000ha 
in 1970 and 75,000ha in 1980, while it is now more than 150,000 ha. The area 
under cereals decreased from 1,080,000ha in 1970 to 850,000ha in 1990. 
The overall cultivated area remains rather stable with some annual fluctuations. 
 The number of wells in Yemen rose from a few thousand in 1971 to more 
than 50 thousand at present. Some believe that the number of wells may be in 
the order of 60 to 70 thousand. In the Sana'a Basin it is estimated there are 
more than 12 thousand wells. The 200 to 300 rigs available in Yemen are not 
sitting idle. Wells are still drilled without permits from NWRA even after the pass
ing of the Water Act in 2002. Despite the fact that there is no reduction in the 
number of wells drilled every year, the cropped areas in some of the gover
norates is decreasing as a result of the decrease in irrigation water extraction 
per well (because of the lowering of the water table).  
 Crop yields have declined or at best remained static over time, despite the 
increasing availability of labour to work on decreasing areas of land and despite 
increasing mechanisation and use of fertilisers and pesticides.  
 So the increase in well irrigation is not the result of the increase in the size 
of the cultivated areawhich remains rather stable over time  nor the result of 
higher crop yields, but can mainly be ascribed to a shift in the composition of 
the cropping pattern (towards irrigated crop). Focus will therefore be on the irri
gated waterintensive crops and their irrigation water use per hectare.  
 The shift from rainfed and runofffed agriculture to groundwater based irriga
tion was partly financed by remittances earned by up to one million Yemenis 
working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf from the mid seventies up to the Gulf War 
in 1990. The main drivers of the water crisis in Yemen since 1970 are de
scribed in more detail below. 
 
 
3.3 Physical development of water resources since 1970 
 
The three traditional sources of water for agriculture were selfregulating. As al
ready noted, this changed dramatically in the 1970s with the arrival of tubewell 
technology. The new pumping technology allowed exploitation of the recharge
able 'shallow' aquifer that is recharged annually by rainfall to much greater 
depths, and at higher rates. Recharge and net abstraction quickly became un
equal and water tables fell. More advanced well construction allowed exploita
tion of water from deep aquifers whose recharge characteristics are much more 
complex than the shallow aquifers, and indeed whose water content often com
prises infiltration from many years previously.  
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 Exploitation of this resource is not 'naturally' regulated by the annual rainfall, 
and carries with it the danger of unsustainable use. Dependency on this re
source (which is now the dominant situation in many areas) has socioeconomic 
implications for society as a whole and most directly for those whose livelihoods 
are based on agriculture. 
 In the subsequent period, Yemen  already one of only four countries in the 
world designated as absolutely water short, with per capita annual availability of 
120 cubic meters compared to an average of 7,500 cubic meters per capita 
for the world and 1,250 cubic meters for the Middle East and North Africa  saw 
irrigation from wells expanded tenfold  from 40,000ha to over 400,000ha. 
There are about 50,000 private wells in the country (8,000 operational wells in 
the Sana'a Basin alone, half of which are tubewells), together with more than 
200 drilling rigs.  
 Groundwater use began to exceed recharge in the mid 1980s, with more 
than 80% of abstraction going to irrigated agriculture. At the present rate of de
pletion, the sustainability of livelihoods is jeopardised. Already, farming has been 
scaled down or abandoned, and some communities and towns are also running 
out of domestic water. 
 See appendix 2 for a detailed description of factors that have triggered 
groundwater overdraft.  
 
Agricultural development 
Currently there are no formal trade barriers on crops. In 1984 the Government 
of Yemen but a ban on fruit imports, which encouraged farmers to change their 
cropping patterns in favor of fruits that depended on irrigation from wells. This 
ban was removed in 1995 during trade liberalisation negotiations in order to ful
fil requirements for entering the WTO. In parallel with this general shift towards 
more productive, groundwaterbased agriculture, many migrant workers re
turned to Yemen after the first Gulf War with money to invest  and opted for ir
rigated agriculture. 
 And most importantly, qat production, trade, and consumption became a 
very substantial part of the economy. Qat is an extraordinary crop. Once estab
lished, it is drought tolerant, requires only welldrained, usually poor quality soil, 
and produces the new shoots that are harvested and marketed throughout 
Yemen more or less 'on demand' in response to one or two heavy irrigations. 
Consequently, farmers can time their production to meet the demand peaks that 
coincide with major festivals, or simply to respond to expected favorable market 
conditions.  
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 The market is well developed and efficient, with various arrangements be
tween the farmers and the traders. Qat can be harvested in small or large quan
tities according to the farmer's need for money, and it brings cash in on the 
very day of harvest. From the economic viewpoint qat creates a regular and 
large transfer of money from town to country. It pays high returns to water, but 
is the major user of the nation's rapidly depleting groundwater.  
 Output prices of qat are high compared to the import price of qat from 
countries like Ethiopia. Officially qat imports are allowed, but in reality it does 
not happen  the single attempt to do this ended unsuccessfully. Domestic pro
ducers hinder such imports in order to keep the price of qat at a high level. This 
means that there exist informal obstacles for qat import. It is important to note 
in this respect that this is not a formal policy. Formally qat is taxed. However, 
the Government of Yemen only collects a small part of the tax and is not trying 
hard to remove the import obstacles as it will affect their trade balance and the 
income of rural qat producers substantially. Besides historically donors did not 
like such imports.  
 This shows that past attempts at regulation proved ineffectual. Even if for
mal regulations are in place, they are often not enforced at the central level 
since at the local level customary laws are enforced. Informal groundwater mar
kets  which require that water rights are in place and enforced  consequently 
only exist at the local level.  
 Qat has become a very large part of the economy  some estimate as much 
as 25% of GDP, 16% of employment and 30% of water use.1 The government 
has had no explicit policy on the stimulant qat, and implicit policies are ambigu
ous; development programmes exclude it, yet qat is a prominent part of public 
life. 
 In sum, developments after 1970 constituted a powerful engine pushing in 
the direction of depleting Yemen aquifers by subsidising inputs and protecting 
outputs, consequently making irrigation highly profitable with little control from 
law and tradition. Qat, meanwhile, was once a weekend habit of the welloff, but 
has now become part of the Yemeni way of life. 
 
Policy development in the water sector 
Since 1975, the government, through different ministries, regional development 
authorities, and the cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank supported a major 
investment programme to expand the cultivated area under well irrigation.  
                                                 
1 Reported in Ward, C., Building Block  Qat, 1999. (World Bank working paper). 
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 The public and private sectors have drilled thousands of wells and equipped 
them with pumps and motors to extract underground water resources for the 
expanding agricultural economy especially the production of fruits, vegetables 
and most importantly qat.  
 In addition to the direct investments by the government in irrigated agricul
ture, subsidies were provided to the private sector to import pumps, motors 
and rigs. The Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank provided loans at subsi
dised rates for irrigation. Diesel and electricity prices were kept very low com
pared to international prices. Consequently, virtually all aspects of groundwater 
development and exploitation have been supported and subsidised by govern
ment actions over the last 30 years. 
 Since the mid1990s the government of Yemen has been aware of the water 
crisis and has begun taking steps to mitigate the water problem. Pressure and 
encouragement from the World Bank, UNDP and the government of the Nether
lands resulted in noticeable changes in policies of the government concerning 
the water sector. One of the most important developments in the water sector 
was the creation in 1996 of the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) with 
responsibility for water resources planning and monitoring, legislation, regula
tion and public awareness. In the year 2003, the Ministry of Water and Environ
ment was established to oversee the water and environment sector and in 2005 
the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program for the period 
2005 to 2009 was prepared for implementation (NWSSIP 20052009). 
 This document is of fundamental importance in defining the policy position of 
the Government with respect to water resources management and develop
ment. Key statements of the NWSSIP of relevance to the aims of this study are 
set out in appendix 3 In brief, the strategy emphasises: 
- ensuring the maximum possible degree of sustainability; 
- allocative efficiency, subject to priority for domestic uses; 
- demand management, including economic incentives; 
- regulatory measures (including community selfregulation); 
- assignment of water rights linked to specific uses. 
 
 The NWSSIP document is direct in its reference to the role of qat (pages 10
11): 
 
Qat now occupies at least half of the irrigated area in Yemen, growing at an 
annual rate of 9% (double the growth rate of other crops). This crop has 
even invaded virgin land never cultivated before, in addition to expansion in 
regions not known for its cultivation. 
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 The reality is that between 1970 and 2000 the area under other crops, par
ticularly grapes and coffee, has also expanded annually at nearly 3 and 5%, 
respectively. However, the area under qat expanded at a much faster rate 
(9% per year) because it is more profitable. 
 
 If the existing situation continues as it is, without intervention, then qat farm
ing will in the end deplete the water in the rural areas and consequently wipe 
out the rural economy… serious consideration should be given to allowing 
qat importation.  
 
 Indeed, the hardcurrency spent on developing qat farms in neighbouring wa
terrich countries, which would permit qat growing and export to Yemen, will 
be much less than the hardcurrency which Yemen currently spends on qat 
irrigation (subsidised diesel fuel; maintenance and depreciation of drilling 
rigs; cost of well casings, pumps and spare parts; well deepening and drill
ing) as well as the cost of pesticides for spraying qat shrubs and the cost of 
the medical bill for treatment of the pesticidescaused diseases (as Qat 
shrubs growing in a humid environment like Ethiopia will not need an inten
sive use of pesticides). This is in addition to the value of the water which will 
be saved as a result of reducing qat farming in Yemen. 
 
 These extracts from the NWSSIP document  not least the final paragraph  
are a clear recognition of the scale of the problems facing Yemen, and a well 
articulated list of the issues to be addressed in resolving the overexploitation of 
nonrenewable resources. Implementation remains the challenge, and this report 
identifies some of the limitations that will be found in trying to implement de
mand management approaches through the use of economic instruments. 
 
Macroeconomic context 
The recent (November 2006) Development Policy Review highlights and rein
forces many of the problems faced in the water sector, but does not provide an 
optimistic backdrop to the difficult challenges faced. Key points are that in order 
to redress fiscal imbalances, tax revenue must rise and public expenditure fall. 
(The report anticipated full removal of the oil subsidy, which then accounted for 
some 8% of GDP, by 2007). 
 Yemen's balance of payments is strongly linked to oil. The country is an oil 
producer and exporter and also an importer of refined products. Oil is a major 
source of revenue to the government, but subsidies on oil products are a major 
  
44 
government expenditure and are assessed as being poorly targeted, with only 
25% reaching needy groups. 
 The DPR bases its projections on assumptions that oil is expected to remain 
above USD55/barrel until 2001[sic  the accompanying graph in the DPR sug
gests that 2011 is intended], after which a steady decline is expected and then 
a stabilisation between USD3540 for the long term. While Yemeni oil production 
is expected to fall in the medium term, Yemen already imports more than half of 
its diesel (the main fuel used in irrigation), and sells it at 39% of the world price. 
These figures relate to 2005, when oil prices were around USD60 per barrel. 
With prices now in excess of USD100 per barrel, the sensitivity of Yemen's eco
nomic future (and the costs to government of subsidies) is clear. It is likely that 
domestic oil pricing policy decisions will be strongly influenced by a number of 
factors beyond their impact on the demand for water. While internal pressures 
for fiscal stability and external pressures from donors will continue in the direc
tion of higher domestic oil prices. The recent rise in oil prices simultaneously 
reduces overall fiscal pressure by increasing revenues while requiring strong 
government action to avoid an offsetting increase in the level of subsidies re
quired to maintain current domestic prices. 
 This scenario strengthens the case for improved irrigation technology to the 
extent that this is an energy saving measure, provided demand for water does 
not expand. 
 The DPR notes that the civil service is weak, and that corruption is a serious 
problem. The enforcement of regulations such as those required to control over
abstraction of groundwater will be particularly challenging in these circum
stances. Of the five key elements set out in the DPR (maintaining fiscal sustain
ability, improving the investment climate, managing energy resources, 
managing water resources, and slowing population growth) groundwater irriga
tion constitutes one and is closely linked to two others. 
 The assessment of the DPR in respect of water use in its broader economic 
context is clear and to the point: conserving groundwater, sustaining the rural 
economy, transferring water to higher value uses, and addressing poverty are 
sound objectives that are difficult to reconcile. Progress on any one element is 
likely to threaten at least one of the others. 
 The technical prescriptions set out in the DPR are less well articulated. In
creasing the efficiency of irrigation and water markets are proposed, with 'de
velopment of formal water markets a priority'. The former will be addressed 
separately where the implications of taxes and subsidies are considered. The 
issue of water markets is addressed below. 
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 Water markets are often seen as a means of transferring water from lower 
to higher value uses (whether from agriculture to industry, or from a less pro
ductive to a more productive farmer). Water markets are often confused with 
markets in pumping services  where wellowners who pump from the same aq
uifer sell water to local farmers. In this case, the 'market' is not for water but 
rather for the use of the pump and well. 
 Many well owners sell water to neighbours, and water is routinely trucked 
from wells to distant fields and to cities (major cities such as Sana'a depend 
primarily on water tankers for domestic supplies). The water market is in fact al
ready in operation  and the value of water is already determining its allocation 
and is driving the unsustainable pumping of water. 
 Establishing water rights at levels below those which wellowners would wish 
to pump is an exceptionally difficult task in any circumstances. The Ogallala aq
uifer that underlies vast areas of America's farmland is overexploited in many 
areas, but attempts to control pumping have failed. In India, where the writ of 
government is relatively strong in rural areas, water rights for groundwater are 
undefined (the landowner 'owns' 'all' the water beneath his land) and agricultural 
production in large areas  for example in the western state of Gujarat  has col
lapsed, or is threatened by reduced supplies or reduced quality. In the North 
China Plain, groundwater levels have been falling for many years and only re
cently have there been local successes in persuading farmers to limit their irri
gation to sustainable levels. 
 In Yemen the challenge of establishing water rights at sustainable levels is 
compounded by the weakness of government in rural areas, where tribal rules 
and powers are far more important than edicts from the centre. 
Hence, the primary issue is not tradability of rights but establishing water rights 
in the first place, and establishing these rights at levels that make significant 
contributions to the sustainability of water use. According to the recent JICA 
study of the Sana'a Basin, this would mean inter alia a 70% reduction in the irri
gated area. Whether water rights are tradable or not in such a context is a sec
ond order issue compared to the definition (at individual well level) and 
enforcement of the right to pump. 
 
Summary of the present situation in Yemen 
Aquifers are being overexploited at rates that are already forcing farmers to 
abandon wells; cities are serviced largely by water tankers; government policies 
that originally drove this overdevelopment (subsidies on wells; controlled im
ports; cheap diesel) are still at least partially in place. Meanwhile government 
has a comprehensive policy in place but limited power to undertake the ex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tremely difficult tasks that are required  most significantly the establishment 
and enforcement of water rights that will allow sustainability to be achieved and 
water to be diverted from existing uses to the priority uses defined in policy. 
 Current donor interventions therefore centre on the less challenging goal of 
introducing new technologies that are designed to 'save' water. In parallel with 
these investments, farmers are encouraged to join together to address their 
problems collectively. In the Yemeni context the latter makes sense; group 
pressures in rural areas are stronger than the government. The water policy 
supports this, and also stresses the need for information, so that farmers can 
make informed (if still exceptionally difficult) choices about how they utilise their 
resources. Some are reported to be doing this, and are for example banning 
the construction of new wells, deepening of existing wells, and export of water. 
 This report evaluates in chapter 5 an additional tool that is part of govern
ment's expressed policyeconomic instruments that influence the demand for 
water. 
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4 Empirical Field Work 
 
 
4.1 Approach 
 
To get a better understanding of farmers behaviour regarding groundwater ex
traction indepth interviews with about one hundred farmers have been executed 
in each of the study areas: the Sana'a Basin, the Upper Wadi Rasyan (Taiz) and 
Wadi Hadramout (excluding coastal areas).  
 First of all the three study areas have been visited, which helped the con
sultants to better understand some of the issues facing farmers in the region.  
 Secondly, questions for the survey have been prepared in close collabora
tion with NWRA. The steering committee has reviewed the questionnaires. Af
terwards the questionnaire was fieldtested. It turned out to be too long and too 
detailed. On the basis of that it was modified and submitted to NWRA again for 
approval. See the final version of the field survey questionnaire in appendix 4. It 
includes general questions, questions regarding financial incentives faced (sub
sidies), nonfinancial incentives of farmers behaviour (household livelihoods ob
jectives, traditional rules and customs regarding water, community solidarity), 
role of the institutional and regulatory structure in modifying farmer behaviour, 
farmer and community wisdom and mobilisation capacity. After approval it was 
translated into Arabic.  
 The field work in each of the three basins started with training the NWRA and 
MAI enumerators, who undertook the surveys. NWRA entered the data into 
SPSS for the analysis. The project team has provided overall monitoring of the 
field work and analysed the results. 
 The NWRA field team coordinators played an active role in the selection of 
the sample. In total 27 districts in 3 governorates were visited to interview 385 
farmers, see table 4.1.  
 The empirical field work at the farmer level is carried out over a two months 
period (March and April 2008). About 133 questionnaires (including some pre
tests and surveys to train the enumerators) were executed in the Taiz Basin in 
the period between 211 March 2008. About 115 surveys were executed in 
Wadi Hadramout in the period between 2230 March 2008 and about 137 sur
veys in the Sana'a Basin in the period between 716 April 2008.  
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Table 4.1 Number of farms interviewed in each district 
Sana'a Basin Taiz Basin Wadi Hadramout 
17 in BaniAlharith 10 in Saber AlMawdem 5 in AlSoom 
28 in Sanhan 39 in Taiziah 17 in Syoon 
14 in Khwlan 18 in DhSofal 30 in Triem 
30 in BaniHashish 15 in AlMakha 10 in Saah 
14 in Nihm 4 in Magbanah 23 in AlQatn 
16 in Hamdan 9 in Khadyer 9 in Haorah WadiAlain 
12 in Arhab 6 in Sharab AlRonah 21 in Shbam 
6 in BaniMatar  15 in Mawia  
 9 in AlMafer  
 2 in GabelHabashi  
 5 in ShrabAlsalam  
137 in Total 133 in Total  115 in Total 
 
 
4.2 Results of the field survey 
 
General characteristics 
Farmers seem to have a lower education level in Wadi Hadramout (91% of the 
famers did not go to secondary school) than farmers in the Sana'a and the Taiz 
Basin (see table 4.2). A smaller number of people depend on the farm in Taiz (at 
85% of the farms less than 20 people) than in the Sana'a Basin and Wadi Had
ramout. About 33% of the farms in Sana'a have nonagricultural income and 
26% of the farms in Taiz, but only 12% of the farms in Wadi Hadramout.  
 The average farm size in Sana'a is 2.5ha and 7.5ha in Wadi Hadramout, 
while the average farm size in Taiz is somewhere in between. The size in Taiz 
depends on whether a few exceptionally big farmers are taken into considera
tion. The percentage of farms with less than or equal to 1ha in Sana'a, Taiz and 
Hadramout is respectively 42, 52 and 1%. In Taiz a substantial part of the land 
(about onethird) is rented. 
 In Sana'a more than 50% of the farms have more than one well, while this 
number is significantly lower in Taiz. and in Wadi Hadramout. In Sana'a and Taiz 
water is more actively traded than in Wadi Hadramout. About 60% of the farm
ers in Sana'a and Taiz buy water. In Taiz farmers mainly buy from neighbors, 
while in Sana'a tankers also play a substantial role. 
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 In Hadramout 65% of the farmers get as much water as they need, while 
only 1718% of the farmers in Sana'a and Taiz get sufficient. In case of extra 
water: 55% of the farms in Taiz would sell it and 45% of the farms in Hadramout 
would leave it in the well (they have already sufficient water). About 1419% 
would expand the area and 1527% would apply more. 
 The field survey shows evidence that in the Sana'a Basin the distribution of 
wells is strongly bimodal. There are a lot of relatively shallow wells (about 20% 
is less than 40m deep) and a lot of deep wells (about 70% is more than 150m 
deep). About 65% of the wells in Taiz are less than 80m deep, while 90% of the 
wells in Hadramout is less than 150m deep. The average well depth in Sana'a, 
Taiz and Hadramout is respectively 254, 107 and 86m, while the average depth 
of the water table is respectively 180, 94 and 63m. About half of the farms in 
Sana'a and Taiz have deepened their well over the last 10 years and onethird of 
the farms in Wadi Hadramout. Farmers' perception of water quality is worst in 
Wadi Hadramout although still about half of them consider the water to be of a 
good quality.  
 
Table 4.2 General characteristics of the farms surveyed in the three 
study areas 
 Sana'a  Taiz Hadramout 
Illiteracy of farmer (%) 13 20 17 
Able to read and write (%) 19 23 28 
Primary school and preparatory school (%) 18 14 46 
Secondary school (%) 24 23 6 
Diploma (%) 2 5 2 
Bachelor degree (%) 24 16 1 
≤10 people live from the farm (%) 22 38 16 
>10 ≤ 20 people live from the farm (%) 48 47 47 
>20 ≤ 30 people live from the farm (%) 16 9 20 
>30 ≤ 40 people live from the farm (%) 5 3 9 
>40 ≤ 50 people live from the farm (%) 6 2 3 
>50 people live from the farm (%) 4 2 6 
Nonagricultural income: yes (%) 33 26 12 
Average farm size (ha) 2.5 5 7.5 
Farm size ≤1ha (%) 42 52 1 
Farm size >1 ≤ 5ha (%) 46 31 50 
Farm size >5 ≤ 10ha (%) 7 7 27 
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Table 4.2 General characteristics of the farms surveyed in the three 
study areas (continue) 
 Sana'a  Taiz Hadramout 
Farm size >10 ≤ 20ha (%) 4 3 16 
Farm size >20 ≤ 50ha (%) 1 4 7 
Farm size >50ha (%) 0 4 0 
Yes, rent out (part of) the land (%) 5 29 11 
Yes, one well (%) 45 50 93 
Yes, more than one well (%) 51 11 7 
Yes, selling water (%) 13 41 1 
Yes, buying water from neighbor (%) 44 62 1 
Yes, buying water from tanker (%) 17 4 0 
Yes, getting as much water as needed (%) 18 17 65 
With extra water the farmer applies more (%) 27 15 27 
With extra water the farmer changes crop (%) 27 0 9 
With extra water the farmer expands area (%) 14 15 19 
With extra water the farmer sells water (%) 27 55 0 
Extra water is left in the well (%) 5 15 45 
≤40m deep well(%) 17 40 21 
>40 ≤ 60m deep well (%) 2 15 15 
>60 ≤ 80m deep well (%) 1 10 25 
>80 ≤ 150m deep well (%) 6 3 29 
>150 ≤ 200m deep well (%) 12 8 4 
>200 ≤ 250m deep well (%) 14 7 4 
>250 ≤ 300m deep well (%) 19 14 1 
>300 ≤ 500m deep well (%) 28 0 0 
>500m deep well (%) 2 1 0 
Average well depth (m) 254 107 86 
Average depth of the water table (m) 180 94 63 
Yes deepened well over the last 10 years (%) 48 47 32 
By how many meters (m) 101 33 22 
Perception of water quality: good (%) 71 67 49 
Perception of water quality: medium (%) 14 24 30 
Perception of water quality: poor (%) 15 9 21 
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Financial drivers 
The results of the field survey show that hardly any of the farmers is aware of 
any subsidy received for farm expenditures on pumps, diesel, digging the well, 
improved onfarm irrigation equipment nor subsidies on the conveyance sys
tems (see table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3 Financial drivers of the farms surveyed in the three study ar5
eas 
 Sana'a  Taiz  Hadramout 
No pumps are not subsidised (%) 98 99 100 
No diesel is not subsidised (%) 100 100 97 
No digging the well not is subsidised (%) 100 98 97 
No subsidy on improved onfarm irrigation equip
ment (%) 99 100 96 
No the conveyance system is not subsidised (%) 100 96 100 
 
Nonfinancial drivers 
Table 4.4 shows that about 80% of the farmers in Taiz and Hadramout grow 
crops for home consumption (like sorghum) and 68% of the farms in Sana'a. 
 
Table 4.4 Non5financial drivers of the farms surveyed in the three study 
areas 
 Sana'a  Taiz  Hadramout 
Yes, crops grown for own consumption (%) 68 80 82 
Average size of area used for own consumption (ha) 1.2 1.4 2.1 
Yes, famers did change the cropping pattern (%) 57 63 37 
Crops increased    
 of which increase in fodder crops (%)  43 66 65 
 of which increase in qat (%) 26 12 0 
 of which increase in wheat (%) 4 0 17 
 of which increase in other crops (%)  27 22 18 
Crops decreased    
 of which decrease in grapes (%)  25 0 0 
 of which decrease in sorghum (%) 19 18 13 
 of which decrease in tomatoes (%) 7 3 5 
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Table 4.4 Non5financial drivers of the farms surveyed in the three study 
areas (continue) 
 Sana'a  Taiz  Hadramout 
 of which decrease in other crops like onion, potato 
 (%) 
49 79 82 
New crops intended to grow    
 of which wheat 32 3 48 
 of which tomato 11 7 3 
 of which mango  0 23 0 
 of which other crops  57 67 49 
 
 The average size of the area used for home consumption varies between 1
2 ha. Especially in Sana'a a substantial share (half) of the farm area is used to 
grow crops for home consumption. In Sana'a and Taiz the majority of the farm
ers changed their cropping pattern. They increased the size of the area under 
fodder crops and to some smaller extent the size of the area under qat. In Had
ramout there was mainly an increase in the area under wheat. Farmers de
creased the size of the area under sorghum and in Sana'a under grapes. They 
intend to grow wheat in Sana'a and Hadramout and Mango in Taiz.  
 
Regulatory framework 
Table 4.5 shows that respectively 29, 35 and 62% of the farmers in Sana'a, 
Taiz and Hadramout do not know which institution is responsible for well li
cences. Only in Taiz about half of the farmers is aware that this is the responsi
bility of NWRA. Half of the farmers in Sana'a who wanted to dig a well were 
given a licence, whereas this percentage was substantially less in Taiz. Farmers 
in Taiz find it more complicated to get a licence to dig a well than farmers in 
Sana'a or Hadramout. It is interesting to note that this has not triggered the 
number of illegal drillings in Taiz (it is relatively low compared to Sana'a and 
Hadramout), maybe due to the fact that about 75% of the farmers would inform 
the authority about illegal drillings. This implies that there a high social control in 
Taiz.  
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Table 4.5 The regulatory structure faced by the farms surveyed in the 
three study areas 
 Sana'a  Taiz Hadramout 
Do not know which institution is responsible for well  
licences (%)  
29 35 62 
NWRA is responsible to give well licence (%) 7 47 13 
MAI is responsible to give well licence (%) 7 4 13 
Other institutions (like governorate, police) is responsi
ble (%) 57 14 12 
Yes, a licence is given to anyone who want to dig a well 
(%) 50 3 32 
It is easy to get a licence (%) 16 4 26 
It is complicated to get a licence (%) 63 74 42 
Do not know whether it is easy/complicated (%) 21 23 32 
Yes, farmers dug a well without a licence (%) 67 32 50 
Yes, farmers informed authorities about illegal drilling 
(%) 40 76 20 
 
Collective action 
In Taiz farmers seem to be more organised in Water User Groups or Water User 
Associations than in Sana'a and Hadramout (see table 4.6). Farmers who are a 
member expect support from projects among others for equipment (like pumps, 
wells, drills), but also to be organised. Farmers decided not to become a mem
ber for various reasons: the association is far away, they are too old, they do 
not like the responsibility, no time, registration has not started yet, it is costly 
and it is only for a limited number of persons (especially Alshikes and village 
leaders). Most farmers in Sana'a and Taiz previously discussed their problems 
already with others, like neighboring farmers.  
 
Table 4.6 Collective action of the farms surveyed in the three study ar5
eas 
 Sana'a Taiz Hadramout 
Yes, there is a WUG or WUA in the village (%) 19 37 11 
Yes, the famer surveyed is a member (%) 18 35 8 
Yes, previously discussed water problems with 
others (%) 84 91 21 
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Individual and community wisdom 
The results of the field survey show that most farmers (more than 80%) think 
that the groundwater levels will increase after the rains and that Allah owns the 
water (see table 4.6). The majority of the farmers interviewed think that god 
owns the water, although a quarter of the farmers in Sana'a and Taiz think that 
the water is owned by the well owners. If water is becoming more scarce, about 
80% of the farmers think it is better to use less and make it last longer and 
agree as a group to use less water. Only about 20% propose to use it quickly 
before it is finished or before others use it. More than 90% of the farmers in all 
three areas think that scarcity becomes more dangerous in the future, mainly 
due to an increase in groundwater overdraft for agricultural and domestic pur
poses and to a smaller extent due to less rainfall.  
 The best individual action against water scarcity is according to the farmers 
to reduce the hours of pumping. In Sana'a and Hadramout reducing water
intensive crops is considered as one of the best actions, while in Taiz the major
ity does not consider a change in the cropping pattern as a valuable action. The 
majority realises that putting new wells is not a good action.  
 The various actions that can be taking by the community, like limiting the 
number of wells, reduce hours of pumping, reduce area irrigated and reduce the 
waterintensive crops, are considered to be useful by the majority of the farmer. 
In Taiz the majority of the farmers prefer the community to limit the number of 
wells and reduce hours of pumping instead of reduce the area irrigated and re
duce the waterintensive crops.  
 Less attractive actions that can be taking by the government are to stop the 
deepening of wells and to reduce the irrigated area. It is interesting that farmers 
prefer construction of dams and reservoirs, subsidies on improved irrigation 
technology and organisation of collective action. They are also very much in fa
vour of providing alternative jobs and punishing illegal drillings.  
 There is a big difference in the percentage of farmers that want to use im
proved irrigation technology: only about 30% and Sana'a, 100% in Taiz and 88% 
in Hadramout.  
 About half of the farmers in Sana'a and Taiz have received advice on saving 
water, while only a quarter of the farmers in Hadramout have received such ad
vice. They mainly received advice on wise use of water and on improved irriga
tion technology.  
 More than a third of the farmers answered that only God knows whether 
there will still be water for their son and grandson. In Taiz farmers are most 
pessimistic (about 40% answered that there will be no water for their son and 
grandson left).  
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 Many farmers do not see an alternative for the future and fear starvation. 
About 23% relies on God. 
 
Table 4.7 Individual and community wisdom in the three study areas 
 Sana'a Taiz Hadramout 
  Yes groundwater levels increase after the rains (%) 96 92 83 
  God owns the water (%) 44 56 91 
  all people own the water (%) 16 12 1 
  well owners own the water (%) 25 25 5 
  others (like land owners, government et cetera) own the 
  water (%) 
15 7 3 
If water is becoming more scarce, is it better to  
Yes use it quickly before it is finished (%) 17 18 26 
Yes use it quickly before others use it (%) 18 20 24 
Yes use less and make it last longer (%) 93 89 86 
Yes agree as a group to use less water (%) 90 89 85 
Yes scarcity becomes more dangerous in the future (%) 98 93 90 
  due to increased overdraft and less rainfall (%) 39 32 26 
  due to less rainfall (%) 15 11 19 
  due to increased water demand for domestic purposes 
  (%) 
10 13 16 
 due to increased water demand for agricultural purposes 
  (%) 
13 9 5 
 due to more wells, cities, dams, irregular prayer, projects 
  (%) 
23 35 34 
What action can you take as an individual:  
  Yes put deeper well (%) 82 79 94 
 ,Yes put new well (%) 25 20 47 
  Yes change technology (%) 81 72 92 
  Yes change crop (%) 71 45 74 
  Yes reduce hours of pumping (%) 88 80 90 
  Yes reduce area irrigated (%) 83 71 83 
  Yes reduce the waterintensive crops (%) 90 65 95 
What action should be taken by the community: 
  Yes limit number of wells (%) 86 79 92 
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Table 4.7 Individual and community wisdom in the three study areas (con5
tinue) 
 Sana'a Taiz Hadramout 
  Yes reduce hours of pumping (%) 88 82 90 
  Yes reduce area irrigated (%) 84 68 87 
  Yes reduce the waterintensive crops (%) 89 68 96 
What action should be taken by the government: 
  Yes stop new well digging (%) 82 80 80 
  Yes stop deepening of wells (%) 55 36 58 
  Yes reduce irrigated area (%) 69 45 76 
  Yes reduce waterintensive crops (%) 78 53 88 
  Yes construct dams/reservoirs (%) 100 94 97 
  Yes subsidise improved irrigation technology (%) 99 92 99 
  Yes provide alternative jobs (%) 85 84 71 
  Yes organise farmers for collective action (%) 100 76 81 
  Yes punish illegal drilling (%) 88 80 83 
  Yes, want to use improved irrigation technology (%) 32 100 88 
If no, why not? 
  Not suitable for certain crops and land types (%) 43 19 100 
  Because of the absence of extension and subsidies (%) 21 24 0 
  Unfamiliar and unknown (%) 0 17 0 
  Other, like no water, they damage quickly, not profitable 
  (%) 
36 40 0 
If yes, what will the benefit be for you?  
  Water saving (%) 77 19 38 
  Expansion of agriculture (%) 5 38 19 
  Reduces the costs of pumping (%) 9 0 18 
  Other, like saves time (%) 9 43 25 
Yes have received advice on saving water (%) 54 52 25 
  If yes, on wise use of water (%) 49 78 62 
  If yes, on improved irrigation technology (%) 41 20 24 
  If yes, on other things like construction of dams, qat  
  cultivation (%) 
10 2 14 
  Yes there will still be water for my (grand)son (%)   24 20 51 
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Table 4.7 Individual and community wisdom in the three study areas (con5
tinue) 
 Sana'a Taiz Hadramout 
  No there will be no water for my (grand)son (%)  29 41 15 
  Only God knows whether there will be water for my  
  (grand)son (%) 
47 39 35 
What do you see as an alternative for the future? 
  Without solution, there will be well depletion and  
  starvation (%) 
19 58 19 
  God will help us (%) 22 23 23 
  Water saving, rainfall, dam construction, waste water re
use (%)  
22 16 31 
  Improved irrigation technology (%) 2 1 19 
  Seawater desalination (%) 14 0 0 
  Immigration to where water is available (%) 10 0 2 
  Other, like transport, water saving education (%)  11 2 6 
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5 Evaluation 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the potential role of economic incentives to reduce unsustainable 
water consumption in agriculture is evaluated. Incentives that decrease the prof
itability of water use (by increasing the costs of water or by decreasing the 
price of outputs) have been evaluated in Section 5.2 The alternative strategy of 
subsidising improved irrigation technology has been evaluated in Section 5.3. A 
broader review of the options can be found in Section 5.4. 
 The policy context, as set out in the Poverty Impact Assessment comprises 
three components that are closely interlinked: 
- to maintain or increase agricultural incomes; 
- to reduce overabstraction of water; 
- to be mindful of the implications for the poor. 
 
 Given that agricultural income is essentially a function of water consumption 
by crops, and that the rural poor are largely dependent on the level of agricul
tural activity, there are obvious tensions between these objectives. 
 Governments act in many ways to influence behaviour and in reality every 
action (or inaction) by government will have some direct or indirect impact on 
the agricultural sector and hence on the demand for water. 
 Government interventions are of three types (see some examples in table 
5.1): 
 
Persuasion:  
 Provision of information to the population in general or target groups regard
ing the implications of their actionsand suggestions for change. 
Incentives: 
 Interventions (taxes, subsidies, regulating or deregulating markets) that af
fect the profitability of particular activities. 
Regulation: 
 Actual restriction of water use through allocation and enforcement of quanti
tative water rights, restricting pumping capacity or hours, or preventing 
construction of new wells.  
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 Interventions can be narrowly targeted (a specific location; a specific crop; a 
technology); regional (a basin or aquifer); or national. Some interventions (for 
example increasing the price of diesel) can only be implemented nationally. 
 
Table 5.1 Examples 5 NOT RECOMMENDATIONS 5 of interventions 
 National Local Individual 
Persuasion - Information on crop 
water consumption 
(How much water does 
a family use per day; 
how much water does 
a day's qat supply 
use?) 
- Water saved by im
ports 
 
- Water balance 
data  
- Aquifer life data 
- Promote/support 
WUAs 
- Extension 
- Crop options 
- Technology op
tions 
Incentives - Increase fuel price 
- Import Qat to reduce 
price 
 
- Support for estab
lishing and run
ning WUAs 
- Establish water 
markets  
- Meter water use 
- Subsidies for 
improved tech
nology 
Regulation - Enforce water rights 
- Buy wells for urban 
use 
- Define sustainable 
water rights 
- Restricting con
struction of new 
wells 
- Restricting 
pumping ca
pacity or hours 
 
 The prospects for success  and risk of failure  of any proposed interven
tions must be assessed from several perspectives.  
 First, does the Government have the political will to implement the policy? 
Recent attempts to significantly increase the price of diesel produced a sub
stantial backlash, and eventual retreat from the original proposal. An attempt to 
import qat some years ago was violently resisted by local interests and has not 
been repeated. 
 Second  and closely related to political will  does the government have the 
power to implement the policy without generating local or national unrest? While 
National policies on groundwater propose licensing of wells and prohibition of 
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well drilling and deepening without licences, it is commonly agreed that devel
opment continues and enforcement is weak. In the sociopolitical context of 
Yemen, where local leaders have more authority than central government on 
many issues, policies that are not endorsed and accepted at the local level have 
limited likelihood of success. 
 Third, all interventions  especially those that are broadly targeted  carry a 
risk of unintended consequences: an increase in the price of diesel will increase 
the cost of domestic water supply BOTH because water will cost more to pump, 
AND because transport and distribution costs are a significant proportion of the 
cost of tanker supplies. It will make some crops (perhaps those most important 
to the poor) nonviable. Similarly, a decrease in the price of qat may induce in
creased consumption by urban consumers  with consequent negative health 
and social impacts  while decreasing rural incomes to qat growers. 
 
 
5.2 Water saving through instruments that decrease the profitability of 
irrigation 
 
Whether instruments that decrease the profitability of water use (by increasing 
the costs of water itself or the costs of other inputs or by decreasing the price 
of outputs) will reduce significantly the demand for water, requires insight into 
the crop budgets of the main irrigated crops and the components of those 
budgets that can be influenced by government interventions. Attention will there
fore first be paid to the main irrigated crops.  
 
5.2.1 The main irrigated crops in the study areas 
 
It is important to note in this respect that the data on cropping patterns of irri
gated crops may not be reliable because (a) well irrigation is dispersed widely 
and difficult to account for; and (b) unlicenced well development is known to be 
happening and it is unlikely that irrigation under these wells is properly reported. 
Besides data on irrigation water use may also not be reliable, because there is a 
lot of confusion between 'water applied' to crops and 'water consumption' by 
crops. For instance in the JICA report (2007) estimated water consumption in 
the Sana'a Basin of 83.7 MCM is multiplied by 2.5 to get estimated water ab
stractions of 209.2 MCM, i.e. water applied). The actual irrigation water use fig
ures presented in table 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 is water applied. As part of actual 
irrigation water applied returns to the aquifer, it may exceed total net abstrac
tion figures shown in table 2.  
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 The objective of this study is, however, not to assess water balances, but 
rather to assess the impact of 'economic instruments' on the demand for water. 
In that case, it is much more important to understand the link between the eco
nomic instrument and water demand at the individual crop level than to under
stand the overall water balance. 
 Despite these uncertainties there seem to be significant big differences in 
the actual irrigation water use of the various crops. Some crops use more than 
10,000m3 per hectare, such as alfalfa, fruits and qat. Grapes use about 
8,500m3 per hectare, while most cereals use less than 7,500m3 per hectare. 
The average irrigation water consumption per hectare in irrigated agriculture is 
9,215m3 per hectare according to Redecker (2007), given that agricultural irri
gation water consumption in Yemen is 3.981BCM and an irrigated area of 
432,000 ha. About 81% of qat areas use groundwater, which is more than 
100,000 ha. This means that qat occupies about 25% of irrigated land and 
about 37% of the groundwater used goes to qat. 
 
Table 5.2 Irrigated area and actual irrigation water use (IWR) in the 
Sana'a Basin in 2005 
Irrigated crop Irrigated 
area (ha) 
Actual irrigation  
water use 
(m3/ha) 
Total irrigation  
water use 
(MCM) 
Share in 
total (%) 
Qat 14,997 8,90012,500 187.5 59 
Grapes 7,301 8,4008,500 62.1 19 
Alfalfa 1,402 14,500 20.3 6 
Tomatoes 1,953 5,0005,750 11.2 4 
Coffee 2,510 5,000 12.6 4 
Wheat, Maize, Barley 1,320 6,2207,530 8.7 3 
Potatoes 1,398 5,420 7.6 2 
Sorghum 726 7,401 5.4 2 
Onion 646 7,500 4.8 2 
 32,253 a) 9,921 b) 320 100 
a) The irrigated area in table 5.2 is smaller than the irrigated area in table 3.3, because table 5.2 shows figures 
for the main irrigated crops in the Sana'a Basin instead of figures for all irrigated crops in Sana'a governorate; b) 
Total actual irrigation water use in table 5.2 is higher than the figure in table 3.1, because table 5.2 is based on 
gross abstraction and does not allow for recharge while table 3.1 shows net abstraction. 
 
 According to the Sana'a Basin water management project 8,900m3 per hec
tare is used to irrigate Qat. This is large relative to the estimated typical per 
capital water consumption for domestic water usage (about 100 litres per day, 
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which is 36.5m3 annually). This means that the amount of water used on one 
hectare of Qat is, equivalent to the consumption of 240 persons. The questions 
is raised: when water is scarce, who should get priority? 
 Table 5.2 shows that in the Sana'a Basin about 60% of actual irrigation wa
ter use is applied for qat production and about 20% for grapes production. Av
erage water use is about 10,000m3 per hectare. 
 Table 5.3 shows that in Taiz more than 35% of actual irrigation water use is 
applied to qat and about 25% to onion production and 18% to sorghum. Aver
age water use is about 8,000m3 per hectare. 
 
Table 5.3 Irrigated area and actual irrigation water use in the Taiz Basin 
in 2005 
Irrigated crop Irrigated area 
(ha) 
Actual irriga5
tion water 
use (m3/ha) 
Total irriga5
tion water 
use (MCM) 
Share in total 
(%) 
Qat 6,435 9,980 64.2 35.4 
Onion 7,183 6,100 43.8 24.2 
Sorghum food 4,888 6,700 32.7 18.1 
Mango 867 18,800 16.3 9.0 
Sorghum  
fodder 
2,138 6,700 
14.3 7.9 
Bananas 375 16,800 6.3 3.5 
Tomatoes 364 6,700 2.4 1.3 
Potatoes 183 5,600 1 0.6 
Total 22,433 a)  8,080 b) 181.2 100.0 
a) The irrigated area in table 5.3 is smaller than in table 3.3, because we focus only on Upper Wadi Rasyan; b) The 
difference in total actual irrigation water use in table 5.3 and table 3.1 can be explained on the basis of the large 
recharge flows, which are deducted in table 3.1 (showing net abstractions), but included in 
Table 5.3. 
 
 Table 5.4 shows that in Wadi Hadramout more than 40% of actual irrigation 
water used is applied to alfalfa and about 24% to wheat production. Average 
water use is 7,500m3 per hectare.  
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Table 5.4 Irrigated area and actual irrigation water use in Wadi Hadra5
mout in 2005 
Irrigated crop Irrigated 
area (ha) 
Actual irrigation 
water use 
(m3/ha) 
Total irrigation 
water use 
(MCM) 
Share in  
total (%) 
Alfalfa 2,869 16,000 45.9 43 
Wheat 3,932 6,500 25.6 24 
Onion 1,188 13,096 15.6 15 
Bananas 209 27,037 5.7 5 
Dates 5,291 1,000 5.3 5 
Mango 178 26,339 4.7 4 
Tomatoes 239 7,389 1.8 2 
Potatoes 168 6,946 1.2 1 
Garlic 90 12,016 1.1 1 
Total 14,164  7,533 a) 106.7 100 
a) Total irrigation water use seems to be low compared to table 3.1.  
 
 Since qat, fruits and vegetables and alfalfa have a relatively high irrigation 
water requirement and a substantial share in the cropping pattern, they are the 
main irrigation water users. Special attention is therefore be paid to changes in 
policies that reduce the profitability of these crops.  
 
5.2.2 Methodology to assess the implications of changes in prices 
 
Whether changes in the policies that affect input and output prices will provide 
incentives to reduce groundwater extraction will be studied on the basis of a 
more quantitative analysis. The cost of pumping and delivering groundwater will 
be compared to the value of groundwater in irrigated agriculture. When the 
costs are substantially below the value, it is unlikely that policies that double or 
triple the costs of water will substantially reduce groundwater use. A more sig
nificant increase in the costs of water will be required. This will substantially re
duce farm incomes which will be politically unacceptable.  
 Whether the costs of groundwater are low compared to the value of 
groundwater in each of the case study areas will be evaluated for various crops 
on the basis of crop budgets. Costs of production can in principle be observed 
directly or derived from financial data.  
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 The value of water, by contrast, must be estimated, as water is not actively 
traded on a market. Here, we take the average value of irrigation water as the 
net value added by the farmer per unit of water applied. By subtracting the cost 
of production from the gross production value, the net value added per unit wa
ter applied can be calculated. This is the value to irrigators of the groundwater 
they use or in other words the returns to water. 
 This approach is the one employed by most analysts and known as the Re
sidual Method. Young (2005) provides an extensive review of the Residual 
Method, detailing its theoretical foundations, uses, benefits and limitations. The 
basic approach relies on the fact that the value to a producer from producing a 
good is exactly exhausted by the summation of the values of the inputs required 
to produce it. If the value of one input is unknown, then the value of that input 
can be found by making the unknown value a function of the price by quantity of 
the output, less the values of all known inputs, divided by the quantity of the un
known input. Young (2005) describes it as the 'value of water' or 'net return to 
water' or 'residual value'.  
 It is important to note that 'net returns to water' are difficult to compute pre
cisely for a number of reasons. Firstly, the precise technical coefficients (yield 
per hectare, water use, et cetera.) will vary across farms and by year. Second, 
some inputs are difficult to capture accurately because they are not monetised 
(like family labour), or may be subject to distortions.. Third, a precise analysis of 
the impacts of policies would require identification of marginal and average re
turns, since these are the values that induce responses. In this study marginal 
returns to water are not derived (the extra income that a farmer would derive 
from an additional cubic meter of water), since in general under conditions of 
water scarcity, average value is a reasonable proxy for marginal value because 
farmers are trying to maximise the return to the scarce resource. 
 
5.2.3 Cost of groundwater abstraction as a function of depth of pumping 
 
According to the literature (World Bank, 2006) the unit cost of pumping 
groundwater (USD per m3) in the Sana'a Basin increase as follows with the 
depth of pumping: at a depth of 100 m, 200m and 400m costs are respectively 
USD0.15, USD0.21 and USD0.28/m3 (see table 5.5).  
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Table 5.5 Calculation of the unit cost of pumping from the aquifer at dif5
ferent depths 
 100m 200m 400m 
Drilling cost (USD) 9,000 20,000 44,000 
Lifetime (hr) 80,000 80,000 80,000 
Depreciation cost (USD/hr) 0.11 0.25 0.55 
Pump investment cost (USD) 14,500 16,000 16,000 
Lifetime (hrs) 40,000 40,000 40,000 
Depreciation cost (USD/hr) 0.36 0.40 0.40 
Diesel engine cost (USD) 16,850 18,350 18,350 
Lifetime (hrs) 40,000 40,000 40,000 
Depreciation cost (USD/hr) 0.42 0.46 0.46 
Total capital cost (USD/hr) 0.90 1.11 1.41 
Maintenance cost (USD/hr) 0.25 0.28 0.23 
Diesel cost (USD/hr) 1.40 1.75 2.28 
Lubricant costs (20% diesel cost) 0.28 0.35 0.46 
Labour cost (USD/hr) 0.20 0.25 0.25 
Total O&M cost (USD/hr) 2.134 2.625 3.205 
Total capital and O&M cost (USD/hr) 3.03 3.73 4.61 
Well discharge (litre/second) 5.5 5 4.5 
Well discharge (m3/hr) 19.8 18 16.2 
Total cost of pumping (USD/m3) 0.15 0.21 0.28 
Source: MidTerm Assessment Final Report ,18 October 2006 for the Sana'a Basin prepared by World Bank Team. 
 
 Table 5.6 shows the breakdown of the unit cost of pumping in USD per m3. 
It shows that total costs consist mainly of diesel and lubricant costs (about 60%) 
and capital costs (about 30%).  
 
Table 5.6 Breakdown of the unit cost of pumping in USD/m3 for the dif5
ferent components 
 100 m 200 m 400m 
Capital cost of pumping (USD/m3) 0.05 0.06 0.09 
Maintenance cost (USD/m3) 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Diesel and lubricant cost (USD/m3) 0.09 0.12 0.17 
Labour cost (USD/m3) 0.01 0.01 0.02 
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 Given the current diesel price of YER35/litre or USD0.176/litre, the amount 
of diesel required to pump one m3 of water can be calculated (by dividing the 
diesel and lubricant costs by the diesel price). The quantity of diesel required to 
pump water from a depth of 100, 200 and 400m is respectively 0.49, 0.67 and 
0.96 litre per m3. These figures are rather comparable to the figures used by Al
Hamdi (2002).  
 To be able to calculate the costs of pumping at various depth of pumping in 
the three case study areas, the unit cost of groundwater pumping are estimated 
as a function of the depth of pumping on the basis of the figures shown in table 
5.5. Figure 5.1 shows that the unit costs of pumping (ya) are increasing with well 
depth (x), but at a decreasing rate. The following relationship has been esti
mated: ya = 0.0194 x 0.448 
 
Figure 5.1 Unit cost of groundwater pumping as a function of the depth 
of pumping 
 
 
 Figure 5.2 shows that the diesel and lubricant cost (yb) are also increasing at 
a decreasing rate with well depth (x). The following relationship has been esti
mated: yb =0.0087 x 0.4933 
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Figure 5.2 Diesel cost of groundwater pumping as a function of the 
depth of pumping 
 
 
 These relationships can be used to calculate the costs of groundwater 
pumping in the three case study areas. Although the depth of pumping varies 
largely within basins the following average depths of pumping are assumed: 
180m in the Sana'a Basin, 94m in the Taiz Basin and 63m in Wadi Hadramout. 
These depths are based on the results from the field surveys (see table 4.2). 
This means that the unit costs of pumping are respectively USD0.20, USD0.15 
and USD0.12 per m3, while the diesel costs are respectively USD0.11, 
USD0.08 and USD0.07 per m3.  
 These figures are conform other unit cost of pumping found in the literature 
(which show unit cost of USD0.21 per m3 at 100m depth and USD0.25 per m3 
at 200m depth in Sana'a, USD0.19 per m3 at a depth of 140m in Taiz and 
USD010 per m3 at a depth of 150m in Hadramaut). 
 As the profitability of irrigation depends on the assumption made regarding 
average depth, the sensitivity of the results to this assumption made will be 
studied in more detail later on. As returns to water vary a lot among crops, a 
change in the costs of water may affect the profitability of some crops more 
than others. It is therefore likely that some crops can no longer be profitably 
grown at certain pumping depth. It will be shown at which particular depth of 
pumping it is no longer profitable to irrigate a particular crop (as returns to wa
ter and costs of water breakeven). This is of interest as water tables in some 
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aquifers are lowered by 6 meters on average a year  which might even be ac
celerated in the future. 
 
5.2.4 Crop budgets and the implications of changes in prices 
 
The crop budgets of the crops with high shares in total irrigation water use are 
presented for the Sana'a Basin, the Taiz Basin and Wadi Hadramout in Tables 
5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 respectively. The data come from various sources, among 
other the statistical year book 2006. It is important to note that data vary a lot 
among years and have therefore been compared to other years as well and ad
justed in case of an extreme bias.  
 Table 5.7 shows high returns on land (in USD per hectare) and water (USD 
per m3) for qat, grapes, tomatoes and potatoes in the Sana'a Basin. Net returns 
to water vary among crops with values between USD0.18 and 1.13 per m3, 
while the unit costs of pumping water are USD0.20 per m3. This means that in
creasing the costs of water, might trigger substitution of crops with a relatively 
low return to water by crops with a relatively high return to water. The ratio be
tween the value of water and the unit cost of water ranges from 5.6:1 for qat to 
0.9:1 for alfalfa. This is an approximate estimate of the water cost/price in
crease required to drive a particular crop out of production. As the cost of wa
ter is far below the value of water for qat, grapes, tomatoes and potatoes, it is 
unlikely that policies that double the costs of water will substantially reduce 
groundwater use. 
 The total costs of pumping water can be calculated by multiplying irrigation 
water applied by the unit cost of pumping water and has a rather high share in 
total production costs. For qat costs of water are USD2,500 per hectare, which 
is about 80% of total production costs of USD3,180 per hectare. 
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Table 5.7 Crop budgets of qat, grapes, tomatoes and potatoes in the 
Sana'a Basin 
 Qat Grapes Alfalfa  Tomatoes Potatoes 
Gross production value 
(USD/ha) 
14,823 6,612 3,000 6,060 4,480 
 yield (kg/ha) 900 8,700 18,750 20,200 11,200 
 price (USD/kg) 16.47 0.76 0.16 0.3 0.4 
Costs of production 
(USD/ha) excl. costs of 
water  
680 708 375 793 531 
 costs of fertiliser,  
 pesticides, clay 
 (USD/ha) 
354 381 202 427 286 
 costs of labour 
 (USD/ha) 
326 327 173 366 245 
Net production value 
(USD/ha) or net returns  
to land 
14,143 5,904 2,625 5,267 3,949 
Actual irrigation water  
applied (m3/ha) 
12,500 8,500 14,200 5,750 5,420 
Net returns to water 
(USD/m3) or value of  
water 
1.13 0.69 0.18 0.92 0.73 
Costs of pumping water 
at a depth of 180m 
(USD/m3) 
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Value/Cost Ratio  5.6:1 3.5:1 0.9:1 4.6:1 3.7:1 
 
 Table 5.8 shows high returns on land (in USD per hectare) qat, onion and 
mango in Taiz. Net returns to water vary among crops with very low returns for 
sorghum (which is grown to be selfsufficient in their own sorghum demand). 
The ratio between the value of water and the unit cost of water (USD0.15 per 
m3) ranges from 7.5:1 for qat to 0.2:1 for sorghum. Where the value cost ratio 
is smaller than 1, costs of pumping water exceed the value of water. Policies 
that triple the costs of water have a limited impact on qat, onion and mango as
suming, of course that the output prices are unchanged.  
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Table 5.8 Crop budgets of qat, onions, sorghum and mango in the Taiz 
Basin 
 Qat Onion  Sorghum Mango 
Gross production value (USD/ha) 11,970 4,500 238 10,990 
 yield (kg/ha) 700 15,000 720 15,700 
 price (USD/kg) 17.1 0.3 0.33 0.7 
Costs of production (USD/ha) excl. 
costs of water  
680 720 30 680 
 costs of fertiliser, pesticides, clay 
(USD/ha) 
354 387 13 354 
 costs of labour (USD/ha) 326 333 17 326 
Net production value (USD/ha) or net 
returns to land 
11,290 3,780 208 10,310 
Actual irrigation water applied 
(m3/ha) 
9,980 6,100 6,700 18,800 
Net returns to water (USD/m3) or 
value of water 
1.13 0.62 0.03 0.55 
Costs of pumping water (USD/m3) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Value/Cost Ratio  7.5:1 4.1:1 0.2:1 3.6:1 
 
 Table 5.9 shows relatively low returns on water in Hadramout. The ratio be
tween the value of water and the unit cost of water (USD0.12 per m3) ranges 
from 2.7:1 for onions to 1:1 for alfalfa. This means that doubling the cost of 
water may change the cropping pattern, while tripling the cost may reduce 
groundwater use substantially (as there are no substitutes with high returns). 
 The current subsidy on diesel for irrigated agriculture decreases the unit 
cost of pumping water. Farmers paid a price of YER35 per litre of diesel in 
2007, which is only USD0.177/litre. The price was raised in 2004 from 17 YER 
per litre to YER35, but diesel is still subsidised. A substantial share of the na
tional budget (25%) is spent on diesel subsidies and 8% of GDP. In May 2008 
farmers already paid YER50 per litre. The impact of a higher diesel price of say 
USD0.35/litre (or YER70/litre) will double the diesel costs (upward shift of figure 
5.2). Diesel costs will increase by respectively USD0.11, USD0.08 and 
USD0.07 per m3 and the unit cost of pumping will become respectively 
USD031, 0.23 and 0.19 per m3. This may reduce groundwater use in Hadra
mout. It is, however, not likely that it will affect crops with a high return to water, 
like qat, grapes, tomatoes, potatoes, mangos and onions. It may trigger substi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tution of some crops with low returns to water by crops with high returns to wa
ter.  
 
Table 5.9 Crop budgets of alfalfa, wheat and onions in Wadi  
Hadramout 
 Alfalfa  Wheat Onions 
Gross production value (USD/ha) 3,188 1,800 4,500 
 yield (kg/ha) 18,750 3,000 15,000 
 price (USD/kg) 0.17 0.6  0.3 
Costs of production (USD/ha) excl. costs of water  413 400 345 
 costs of fertiliser, pesticides, clay (USD/ha) 222 300 186 
 costs of labour (USD/ha) 191 100 159 
Net production value (USD/ha) or net returns to 
land 
2,775 1,400 4,155 
Actual irrigation water applied (m3/ha) 22,590 7,000 13,096 
Net returns to water (USD/m3) or value of water 0.12 0.2 0.32 
Costs of pumping water (USD/m3) 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Value/Cost Ratio  1:1 1.7:1 2.7:1 
 
 In the same way changes in output prices can be assessed. It is clear that 
the gross and net returns to land and to water are very sensitive to these price 
levels. Nevertheless under a 50% reduction in the output price of qat, it is still 
profitable to grow qat. The benefits and costs of some other crops, like grapes, 
tomatoes, potatoes and mango will almost breakeven under a 65% reduction in 
the output price. While sorghum will probably only be grown for noneconomic 
reasons, for instance to be selfsufficient in their own sorghum demand. Such 
subsistence farming is often crosssubsidised by benefits from more profitable 
crops like qat.  
 It becomes clear that the implications of economic incentives on water are 
not so easy to assess as farmers will not always behave in a rational manner. 
Besides the crop budgets have shown that there are big differences among 
crops in their responsiveness  in terms of a reduction in groundwater use  to 
various incentives that affect input and output prices. This also means that the 
suitability of a policy that gives a certain incentive in a particular region depends 
a lot on the composition of the cropping pattern in that region.  
 In sum, the danger of increasing the price of water is that farmers will con
vert on a largescale (to the extent that agroclimatic conditions allow) to qat 
production as for this crop the costs of water are substantially below the value 
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of water. This will trigger groundwater extraction even further (as actual irriga
tion water use of qat is above the average). Besides a very substantial reduction 
in the output price of qat will not reduce groundwater extraction (under an ap
proximately five times smaller qat price benefits and costs will break even). This 
will reduce rural incomes substantially and is therefore politically sensitive. In 
other words economic instruments that change the incentive structure at the 
farm level can trigger farmers to use less water and use it more productively, 
but it will be hard to substantially reduce groundwater use through such policy 
instruments. Such interventions are not the basis for bringing about a balance 
between supply and demand. If input and output incentives cannot achieve a 
balance between demand and sustainable supply, there are two options  either 
the balance is achieved by default as wells dry up (and the irrigated area can not 
be maintained), or collective actions at the local level must enforce reductions in 
use. 
 
 
5.3 Improved irrigation technology and implications for water saving 
 
5.3.1 Technical background information  
 
To study the impact of improved irrigation technology  which is currently the 
cornerstone of donor policy  on water savings in Yemen requires some techni
cal background information. The current subsidy programmes for improved irri
gation equipment, like provided under the groundwater and soil conservation 
project of the World Bank, reduces the capital costs of investments in modern 
irrigation technologies. Some projects even subsidise 70% of the investment 
costs of adopting drip at the field level. These projects assume/claim to save 
large quantities of water and greatly increase the productivity of water.  
 For the purpose of our study a note was prepared assessing two aspects of 
the substantial ongoing investment projects in improved irrigation technology  
first, the extent to which such investments will actually extend the life of the 
Sana'a Basin aquifer, and second questioning whether claimed water savings 
are actually real. The original note is included as appendix 5. 
 Subsequent exchanges with donors  especially the World Bank  were con
structive and extensive (in excess of 100 emails). The first point made in the 
note, that the extension to the life of the Sana'a Basin aquifer would be a matter 
of a few years was not challenged (and indeed is consistent with more detailed 
analysis in JICA 2007). 
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 The second point, regarding the extent of 'real water savings' was more 
controversial, and the World Bank proposed a number of scenarios in which wa
ter savings would be achieved  for example where aquifers were polluted, 
where evaporative losses are high, or where capillary rise was prevalent. It was 
agreed that in future it would be appropriate to assess every individual site 
where improved technology is proposed to assess the likely disposition of flows 
before and after the introduction of improved technologies. This is a significant 
policy change. 
 An additional point of discussion was the extent to which improved irrigation 
technology allows higher productivity of water. This issue has a number of com
ponents: first, if improved technology allows farmers to change from low value 
field crops (wheat, maize) to higher value crops (fruit, vegetables) then there is 
an economic gain. This of course raises the issue identified in GWMATE 3 and 
Bosworth et al. (2002), namely that incentives to pump are actually increased 
by this change.  
 Second, in some cases farmers may practice controlled deficit irrigation 
when improved technology allows more precise scheduling and application of 
water. While the predominant relationship between yield and beneficial con
sumption is essentially linear, it is possible with very careful management (Gold
hammer et al., 2008) to reduce water consumption by more than the fall in yield 
per hectare and consequently increase the productivity of water. 
 In Yemen, as elsewhere, this may be possible, but a number of caveats are 
relevant:  
- the relationship is uncertain for important irrigated crops in Yemen (Qat, for 
example  which is irrigated infrequently and heavily to induce new shoots.); 
- farmers only pursue such strategies when they are short of water  and the 
impact of the improved technology is to increase the beneficially usable wa
ter supply at farm level. As long as farmers are pursuing maximum income 
per unit land, they will tend towards full irrigation strategies; 
- practicing deficit irrigation requires a very high degree of management 
competence. Farmers must be fully confident that the reduced supply during 
stress periods is appropriate in timing and quantity (which means knowledge 
of soils as well as plant physiology) and able to apply this knowledge by pre
cise on farm water management. 
 
 Finally, leaving aside the question of whether the extra water would have 
been a recoverable loss or not, it is accepted that improved irrigation technol
ogy delivers more water to the field per unit of water pumped  and hence deliv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ers a private benefit to the farmer. The question arises as to whether this is ap
propriate use of public subsidies.  
 So, in some parts of Yemen where irrigation water losses are recoverable, 
like in parts of Taiz and parts of Hadramout, improved irrigation technology will 
save less water than calculated (as 'losses' are reused). In other parts like in 
parts of the Sana'a Basin where irrigation water losses may be nonrecoverable, 
improved technology might save some water but it depends on the remaining 
size of the aquifer whether investment in improved technology is worthwhile. If 
the anticipated depletion of Sana'a's aquifers is indeed within 15 years, invest
ments in improved technology may extent the lifetime of the aquifer by only a 
few years.  
 According to Lichtenthaler (2002) a reduction of groundwater abstraction 
may similarly be achieved by a nonintervention strategy. Indications are that 
within the next decade a large percentage of farmers will be forced to stop 
pumping. In this sense, irrigation support measures, as envisaged by the pro
posed programmes, may be even counter productive and prolong the process. 
All this may be doing is buying up time.  
 This view is also confirmed by Chris Ward a longterm observer of Yemen 
when he states: decentralisation and the partnership approach can only be 
viewed as elements of a damage limitation exercise aimed at slowing down the 
rate of resource depletion, to allow Yemen time to develop patterns of eco
nomic activity less dependent on water mining (Ward 2001).  
 According to Lichtenthaler (2002) the solution is clear: 'The extent of irri
gated agriculture in the Sa'dah Basin has to be returned to sustainable levels. 
And livelihoods have to shift out of agriculture. Waves of migration have charac
terised the history of Yemen and we may not assume that we have the power or 
the wisdom to change this.' 
 
5.3.2 Evidence from the field 
 
Various projects in the irrigation sector have aimed to reduce the overdraft of 
aquifers through improved technology. It consists of hardware (replacing open 
earthen conveyance channels with pipes, and replacing traditional technology 
with onfarm drip or bubbler systems) and software through an Irrigation Advi
sory Service (recommending improved schedules, appropriate quantities, and 
crops that are more productive per unit of water consumed). 
 In this section the impact of improved irrigation technology is addressed. It 
looks at evidence from the field and builds upon findings of other studies. The 
Report on Evaluation of Water Savings and Groundwater and Hydro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meteorological Observations1 provides the basis for the analysis. Similar claims 
of water saving and increased yield are made in other documents. 
 The report assembles information from eight Field Units covering 27 differ
ent cropping patterns and a total of 18ha (page 12). Water savings and yield in
creases resulting from replacing the earthen conveyance channels by pipes, 
and replacing traditional field irrigation techniques by drip/bubbler systems are 
reported. The results are impressive and the average percentage changes in 
key components of the farm budget are summarised in table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10 Initial Results from Pilot Farm Units on Water Saving and Crop 
Yield (in %) 
 Water 
Applied 
Fuel Pumping 
Hours 
Labour Crop 
Yield 
Fodder 
Yield 
Pipe vs Open con
veyance Channel 
17 24 21 28 +16 +15 
Modern vs Tradi
tional onfarm irriga
tion technology 
32 33 33 32 +13 +15 
Combined 44 49 47 51 +31 +32 
 
 The report is appropriately cautious about extrapolating these shortterm re
sults from relatively small areas with intensive supervision  but the results are 
taken as indicative of the potential of these technologies to change onfarm irri
gation economics dramatically.  
 In the pilot areas, the productivity of water (Water Use Efficiency) increases 
by a factor of 2.3.2 This figure is critical because it is a measure of increased 
profitability of irrigation: or put in another way, if the farmer continues to pump 
the same quantity of water from the aquifer with the modern technology, he 
could irrigate (for the same cost in fuel and labour) almost twice the area AND 
get 30% more production per unit area. 
 From the farmer's perspective this is clearly an excellent new technology, as 
it increases the profitability of abstracting water from the aquifer considerably. 
 From the resource perspective, the situation is not so clear. The report re
peatedly uses the term Net Water Savings. Comparing water delivered by the 
well with traditional technology to water delivered with modern technology is a 
                                                 
1 Republic of Yemen MAI, Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project (IDA Credit 3860  YEM) Un
dated. 
2 Productivity = crop production/water use = (1+0.31)/(10.44). 
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measure of gross water saved, but only a hydrogeological assessment of where 
the large quantities of 'saved' water were previously going can firmly conclude 
the extent of net water savings. The situation is not black or white  inevitably 
some water is lost to nonbeneficial evaporation, especially near earthen water 
courses  but extensive literature on this topic1 points to extreme caution in as
suming that the difference between 'before' and 'after' deliveries is an accurate 
indicator of savings available for alternative use. An appropriate analysis is criti
cal if resource planners are to be provided with useful planning data. This posi
tion is entirely endorsed by the GWMATE approach, sponsored by the World 
Bank. 
 However for the farmer, the 'savings' in pumping charges, labour, wear and 
tear on his machinery, time, et cetera are real and strongly increase the profit
ability of pumping. The 'savings' he experiences provide the scope to reduce his 
expenditure, or to maintain his pumping rate and increase his irrigated area. 
 This issue is addressed in the project: farmers who receive subsidised 
equipment must agree not to expand their irrigated area with the 'saved' water. 
Nevertheless, the report from the pilot areas indicates (page 20) that on aver
age irrigated areas have already increased by 10% (range 022%). While this 
may be interpreted as broad compliance with the project 'rules', it is important 
to note that (a) farmers might wait a year or two to be sure that they really 
would have the potential to irrigate more land before making the investments 
required; (b) farmers may not have any additional land to expand onto; and (c) if 
expansion at the rate of 10% per year is happening on these closely monitored 
pilot areas, the prospect for controlling expansion on a wide scale is doubtful  
indeed since farmers already buy and sell water among themselves, selling 'sav
ings' to nonparticipants in the programme would seem to be unmonitorable. Fi
nally, once the project period is over, it is not clear who will enforce the 
agreement. The field survey (see chapter 4) showed indeed that about 1520% 
of the farmers would expand the area if they had extra water available.  
 For the aquifer the issue distinction between net and gross water savings is 
critical. What is actually happening to the 'excess' deliveries applied through 
traditional techniques? In the course of this study, an extensive debate devel
oped around this topic, and also on the topic of increased productivity.  
 On both issues the situation is open to debate. Under the complex hydro
geological conditions of Yemen, return flows from excess irrigation deliveries 
                                                 
1 See Seckler, D. The New Era of Water Resources Management: From 'Dry' to 'Wet' Water Savings 
for an overview (www.worldbank.org/html/cgiar/publications/issues/issues8.pdf) Perry, C. Efficient 
Irrigation; Inefficient Communications; Flawed Recommendations for a review of the literature. 
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(or seepage from delivery channels) may not reach a usable aquifer because of 
capillary rise from the wet soil matrix, local pollution in the upper soil layers, and 
local impermeable layers due to perched water tables. Each of these will hap
pen; whether they are common or significant is unknown: certainly Yemenis 
have exploited relatively shallow aquifers in many places for many years. In all 
those locations, recharge certainly 'works', and is the source of an exploited re
source. 
 The field survey produced strong supporting evidence of this: in Sana'a, for 
example, the distribution of wells is strongly bimodal. There are a lot of rela
tively shallow wells (about 20% are less than 40m deep) and a lot of deep wells 
(about 70% are more than 150m deep). 
 Regarding the other 'loss'  nonbeneficial evaporation (E)  evidence from the 
literature1 generally suggests that if irrigation is reasonably well managed, E is 
rather small and difficult to reduce. If irrigation is strongly localised to the spe
cific plant (leaving the surrounding soil bare), then E will be reduced but transpi
ration will increase somewhat to maintain the energy balance. Of course, if 
irrigation is really badly managed, then losses to E are likely to be significant. 
One would expect where water is scarce and expensive, and crops generally 
highvalue, water would be well managed at the farm level. Losses in unlined 
conveyance systems, on the other hand, would be substantial (but most con
veyance systems of any length are already piped). 
 The conclusion on both these issues is that there are net water savings (as 
defined by GWMATE and ICID) from improved irrigation technology, but they are 
likely to be significantly smaller than the gross water savings assessed on the 
basis of measured deliveries. 
 A second issue, which proved more contentious, centred on whether the 
productivity of water can be increased significantly. Most peerreviewed scien
tific papers argue that biomass formation is a linear function of transpiration, so 
that yield increases are generally the direct result of the increased transpiration 
resulting from a better irrigation service. Nevertheless, deliberate stressing of 
certain categories of crop at specific periods in the growth cycle does result in 
increased water productivity, and field data from China confirm this for grain 
crops under excellent management and strictly limited supplies. Whether Yemen 
 and crops such as a qat, grapes and vegetables and yet to be enforced quanti
tative restrictions  meets these conditions remains to be demonstrated. 
                                                 
1 Evaporation Research: Review and Interpretation; Burt, C.M., A.J. Mutzinger, R.G. Allen and T.A. 
Howell, Journal Of Irrigation And Drainage Engineering, ASCE, January/February 2005. 
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 In considering this important issue, the context is critical: in China, farmers 
are first persuaded to accept reduced water deliveries to the field. Then they 
are assisted to find better ways to utilise that resource through improved irriga
tion scheduling, planning dates, or crop selection. In Yemen, the introduction of 
improved technology first increases the availability of water at the field, and the 
farmer is then to be asked (a) not to use the extra water available, and (b) rec
ommended to decrease water use such that his production will actually fall (the 
case for deficit irrigation is that a reduction of 20% in water used may only 
cause a 10% reduction in yield per unit area) with a consequent increase in yield 
per unit water. Consequently, from the farmer's perspective he is asked to in
vest in new technology, reduce water consumption, and (possibly) to reduce 
production because he is not 'allowed' to extend his irrigated area and reap any 
benefits of increased water productivity. 
 Another calculation in the note setting out these issues has not been chal
lenged. This indicated that if the reserves in the Sana'a Basin amount to ten 
years consumption at current levels, then the aquifer's life would be extended 
by only three further years if the technology works perfectly and saves water to 
the extent claimed. This conclusion was subsequently found to be consistent 
with the far more detailed JICA review of the hydrology of the Sana'a Basin, 
which reached essentially the same conclusion and further pointed out that sus
tainable water use in the basin would require a 70% reduction in the irrigated 
area  provided all else worked perfectly in terms of recovering return flows, et 
cetera. An irrigation efficiency of 90% is assumed in this scenario. 
 To summarise, it is certain that the new technologies make pumping far 
more affordable and profitable than traditional technologies for farmers. It is 
consequently certain that controlling pumping, areas, and cropping patterns will 
become far more difficult to enforce in future. 
 The JICA report suggests that equilibrium in the Sana'a Basin requires a 70% 
reduction in irrigated area if all possible savings in irrigation are achieved. For 
Taiz and Hadhramout the figures would be 50 and 87%, respectively based on 
current irrigation technology. If the reported pilot Farm Units savings are 
achievable, then Taiz might be able to maintain its current irrigated area. Given 
that aquifers in Taiz respond to rainfall (and hence recharge from 'losses' is 
likely to be effective there) this is an optimistic scenario (as net savings from 
modern technologies are smaller than gross savings). For Hadhramout, the irri
gated area must be severely curtailed  with or without savings  but the time 
available to achieve this is much longer, because the estimated volume of water 
available in this aquifer is much greater than in Taiz or Sana'a. The recent (April 
2008) GWMATE mission placed particular emphasis on the need to evaluate the 
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economic reserve in the various aquifers in Yemen as a basis for planning and 
prioritising interventions. 
 Nature's capacity to ensure a balance between supply and use is, however 
certain. Forty years ago, water use in Yemen was a balance between rainfall and 
usage  for rainfed crops, spate irrigation, and naturally recharged aquifers. That 
balance will be restored at some point. For many areas in the Sana'a Basin, and 
to a lesser extent in Taiz, the timeframe for natural equilibrium to be restored is 
short  farmers are already abandoning their land in some places. 
 
5.3.3 Agricultural Impact of Improved Irrigation Technology 
 
Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show available crop budget data based on water re
quirements using traditional technology for the main crops in the study areas. 
Some crops have relatively low returns1 (Alfalfa in Sana'a and Hadramout; Sor
ghum in Taiz). These crops are either grown for home consumption or as feed 
for livestock, and are therefore less sensitive to changes in the profitability. For 
the other crops, the value of water in Taiz and Sana'a is 49 times higher than 
the cost of pumping. 
 It is essential to realise that these ratios are for traditional irrigation tech
niques: the new techniques, which effectively lower the cost of water by 44% 
and increase its productivity by over 30% imply value:cost ratios in the range of 
1020:1. 
 While doubts remain about the extent of the positive impact of new tech
nologies on aquifers, the observed changes in the profitability of irrigation to the 
farmer are clear and undisputed. 
Conclusions  Resource Sustainability 
It is generally agreed that demand for water  manifested by overpumping of ex
isting wells, illegal deepening of wells and illegal construction of new wells  is 
out of control. Only local action by concerned groups is (in some areas) restrain
ing further expansion of well capacity and irrigated area. An oversimplistic 
statement of the situation would run as follows:  
 Changes to national incentives (for example by increasing the price of diesel, 
or finding some way of charging for water) would make irrigation unviable in 
Hadhramout before impacting significantly on demand in Taiz or Sana'a. Further, 
the increases necessary to impact significantly on the profitability of Qat would 
render all other irrigated agriculture nonviable. 
                                                 
1 Though by international standards, most of the returns achieved in Yemen are extremely high. 
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 In fact, of course, a change in one price results in a new equilibrium of all 
prices, and as such the changes would be in the directions indicated rather than 
to these extreme positions. 
 However, this is the predictably difficult situation while the value of water is 
'only' 49 times the cost of pumping. The implications of the results from the pi
lot Farm Units is that this ratio could rise to 1020 times if farmers use new irri
gation technology. 
 For aquifers with a relatively short remaining life it has been demonstrated in 
an earlier note (see appendix 5) and confirmed by the JICA review of the Sana'a 
Basin that the achievable extension of aquifer life through improved technology 
is limited  perhaps three or four years. 
 The GWMATE mission of April 2008 is clear on the importance of this issue 
stating (Table 1, page 3): Urgently needed to estimate economic storage as 
starting point for preparing a GWMAP for each pilot groundwater management 
body. 
 GWMATE also has estimates of the ratio between recharge and current ab
straction. For Taiz, this is estimated at 50%, for Hadhramout 13%, and for 
Dhamar 7%. The recommended approach from GWMATE to these situations is: 
 For Taiz  
 Implement sustainable irrigated agriculture on a surface close to the cur
rently irrigated area (only if GW is used more efficiently through 'real water 
savings' and crop pattern changes, provided horizontal & vertical expansion 
as well as abstraction from existing wells and new drillings are controlled). 
 For Hadhramout and Dhamar 
 Buy time to transform to a less water  demanding economy, through drastic 
reduction in irrigated area where same demandmanagement and control 
measures as in Taiz should be implemented  
 For all  
 Provide sustainable drinking water sources (only if strict measures to pro
tect the quality of the resource, ensure sound well drilling and construction 
practices and protect well heads are enforced) 
 
 In areas where a majority of farmers will no longer be irrigating in less than 
ten years, the priority is to prepare for the new economy (a postirrigation sce
nario) that is certainly coming  with or without improved irrigation technology.  
 Elsewhere, the emphasis may be different. If a local community decides to 
act collectively, based on awareness of the potential aquifer life, it can choose 
from a number of options: usage can be restricted in order to preserve aquifer 
life (almost certainly at a cost to current incomes); exploitation can proceed un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checked while the community saves money for the postirrigation scenario; 
some farmers could sell their wells (and hence the pumping right) to reduce 
overall abstractions and provide the seller with funds to move out of agriculture 
immediately. With proper information, individuals and communities will no doubt 
devise novel approaches to their situation. 
 But the remaining aquifer life is critical, and in this context, from two per
spectives: First, where the remaining life is short, is it worth subsidising further 
in improved irrigation technology? Second, where the remaining life is substan
tial, should priority be given to activities that support collective management or 
to technical innovations that are in any case profitable  and make pumping 
more profitable? Third, if limited funds are available for support, should priority 
be given to those whose livelihoods are most at risk (by supporting non
irrigation investments) or to those whose livelihoods are less threatened? 
 
 
5.4 A review of the options 
 
In sum, current policies lower the costs of power and consequently the cost of 
water by means of a subsidy on diesel  making irrigation more profitable. In
vestment in improved irrigation equipment is subsidised  which again makes ir
rigation more profitable while potentially saving power. The output price of the 
main waterintensive crop qat is high and protected by the obstacles to qat im
ports.  
 To repeat the point made in the DPR: conserving groundwater, sustaining 
the rural economy, transferring water to higher value uses, and addressing pov
erty are generally conflicting objectives. Adding to this the DPR's projection that 
fruit and vegetable production should increase for export purposes does not 
help.  
 In fact, any intervention that decreases profitability of irrigation water use in 
order to decrease water demand must in consequence decrease farm incomes. 
This is true whether the cost of water is increased (e.g. by raising the price of 
diesel), or the price of crops is decreased (e.g. by importing qat). The net result 
is a fall in the profitability of water use, and a parallel fall in farm incomes. Such 
effects could only be avoided by compensatory payments direct to farmers to 
offset their lost income, by identifying alternative, higher value crops, or by 
government support to the price of competing, less waterconsuming crops.  
Information available gives no cause for optimism: 
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- the introduction of compensatory payments would be administratively com
plex and open to misuse. It is widely agreed that the administrative capacity 
of the government is not strong, and that regulations are not well observed; 
- farmers already achieve exceptionally high returns to water by international 
standards, especially for qat. The scope to increase incomes by shifts in 
cropping pattern (other than converting more nonqat areas into qat, which 
is happening in any case) is limited. While some reallocation of resources to 
more productive uses may be feasible, the context will generally be one of 
falling agricultural incomes: if there is a way of making more money from 
available resources in the existing market, then farmers would already be 
exploiting this option; if there are innovations that farmers are not aware of, 
then none has been mentioned to the team preparing this report; 
- a crop subsidy programme  given the difficult state of the country's finances 
 is unlikely to be affordable, and would be difficult to target.  
 
 Other recommended approaches, frequently referred to in donor reports, in
clude the introduction of tradable water rights and/or water markets, and saving 
water through improved irrigation technology. These two issues merit careful 
analysis. 
 Water markets are already active in Yemen. Wellowners sell water to 
neighbours and also to tankers that transport the water to distant users1 (do
mestic and agricultural). The impact of this trade is economically desirable to 
the extent that it ensures that water is reallocated from lower to higher value 
uses. However, where sustainable water rights are neither defined nor enforced, 
water markets simply strengthen the pressure of demand on already overex
ploited resources and are therefore negative in their impact on sustainable re
source use. 
 While frequent reference is made in the literature and reports on Yemen to 
the need for 'formal' water markets and the benefits of tradable water rights, 
virtually no attention is paid to the need to define water rights, and the fact that 
definition of rights must precede trading. Water rights are currently loosely de
fined on the basis of historic use, and entitlement to exploit what lies beneath 
one's land. Converting this, through the formal sector, into quantitative entitle
                                                 
1 In the course of this study, though not adequately documented, it was found that the price differen
tial between what the well owner charged, and what the water was sold for to the final user was a 
multiple of 510, which seemed high. Further thought suggests that this is logical: to deliver 25 cubic 
meters of water from a rural well to a town involves several hours' transport with a large truck, and 
possibly distribution via smaller trucks. An implication of this calculation (which certainly needs further 
refinement) is that doubling the price at the well only raises the price of delivered water by 1020%. 
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ments, enforced by the rule of law is an exceptionally difficult task, in which 
many countries are failing (see literature review). Encouraging water markets in 
the absence of defined rights is simply wrong  and evidence that some tribal 
leaders are banning water exports is confirmation that this fact is already un
derstood by those affected. 
 Beyond this, the question of whether farmers will be prepared to invest (at 
least partially) in modern technologies, and then prevented from reaping the 
primary benefit that can be derived from this  to increase production by increas
ing consumptive use  remains to be tested. 
 Certainly, unqualified claims of water savings of thousands of cubic meters 
per hectare are misleading to policymakers and often, if not always, factually in
correct. Future investments may be justified on the basis of energy savings 
(which are real, and beneficial  but have the unfortunate sideeffect of making 
beneficial consumption cheaper), together with a local analysis of the extent of 
water savings in the specific hydrogeological context. This would be a step 
forward but not a solution. 
 Exchange rate policy has seen the Yemeni currency maintain stability against 
the dollar since 1996. According to the DPR, this Yemeni currency should be 
declining  but the report was written in 2006, prior to the recent dramatic fall in 
the dollar (which effectively devalues the Rial internationally) and rise in the price 
of oil, which supports a higher exchange rate. 
 Importing qat has been on the agenda in Yemen for some time, and is spe
cifically mentioned in NWSSIP. An earlier attempt to implement this was strongly 
resisted by vested interests, and failed. Now, there is discussion of establishing 
a farmerowned operation in Ethiopia, where qat can be grown solely for export, 
and the revenues distributed among the Yemeni farmers who would reduce their 
qat production.  
 A study is underway between the FAO and Ministry of Agriculture and Irriga
tion (MAI) on this proposal, but the team has been unable to obtain any informa
tion. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume the following: 
- qat can be grown much more cheaply in Ethiopia; 
- the quality would be acceptable to Yemeni consumers; 
- the output would be targeted at the lower quality/high volume Yemeni pro
duction; 
- qat would be grown without excessive use of pesticides (which is a health 
hazard to consumers in Yemen). 
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 The benefits of such a scheme include the positive health impact of reduced 
exposure to pesticides; potential savings in water if local production is reduced; 
and compensatory revenues to farmers who stop pumping. 
 Implementation issues include the problem of overcoming vested interests in 
the qat market; ensuring that there are actual water savings (for example, if a 
farmer whose well was about to dry up 'signed up' for the cooperative venture in 
Ethiopia, the actual water savings would be far less than implied by assuming 
that his current level of use would continue indefinitely). 
 Hence, ensuring the link between a share in revenues from the Ethiopian 
venture and actual reductions in water use is difficult  but beyond the difficulties 
of implementing this linkage, what are the implications of allowing qat imports? 
 First, importing cheap qat will lead to an increase in qat consumption, which 
would directly undermine alternative strategies aimed at reducing qat consump
tion by limiting the days of use, banning public consumption, banning use by civil 
servants during working hours, age restrictions, and so on. 
 Leaving these implementation issues aside, in economic terms, substantial 
imports of cheap qat would be expected to lead to the following: 
- an increase in total consumption, but a decrease in domestic production and 
consequent water saving but also lower rural incomes unless; 
- the profit from domestic production is so high that farmers can compete 
with imported qat (perhaps charging a premium for fresher 'local' produce); 
- in either event, domestic prices will fall and all qat producers will be worse 
off (except, perhaps those compensated by revenues from the Ethiopian 
venture). 
 
 Complex issues arise: if we assume that imported qat will render pumping 
from a specific depth unprofitable (just as it is currently unprofitable to pump for 
low value crops from deep wells), then the water below that depth is preserved 
for future use (in passing, we note that improved irrigation technologies will al
low pumping from deeper). If the aquifer is fossil (ie not recharged), then what 
interest is being served by preserving it? There is no necessary relationship be
tween the economic pumping depth at some new qat price and the required 
quantity (and indeed location) of water required for domestic use. Once water 
for domestic consumption is secured, it may be best to allow the maximum 
value to be derived for the benefit of local farmers from residual fossil reserves 
rather than 'save' the water for some unspecified future use. 
 Consequently, one certain impact of allowing importation of qat is that rural 
incomes will fall  and the corresponding benefit (if domestic water use can be 
preserved more efficiently by other means) is unclear. 
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 So, modification of agricultural and food trade policies  can influence de
mand for water by making water  intensive crops less attractive. It may also re
strict potential returns from groundwater by preventing export of high value 
crops. The impact of this is on the one hand to reduce the demand for water 
(positive impact) while on the other hand reducing the benefits derived by the 
farmers from using the resource (negative impact on rural incomes). It is impor
tant to note in this respect that, while instruments that change the incentive 
structure at the farm level can influence farmers towards using less water and 
using it more productively, such interventions are not the basis for bringing 
about a balance between supply and demand.  
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
Forty years ago, Yemen's water consumption was in balance with its available 
resources. Forty years from now, and often far sooner, that balance will be re
stored in many areas simply because the mining of reserves will have come to 
its natural conclusion as aquifers dry up, become saline, or become too expen
sive to exploit. That process is already underway and farmers are leaving the 
land. 
 A range of interventions is possible  but although the literature and eco
nomic theory suggests the range is wide (water pricing, metering, water rights, 
water markets, targeted taxes, subsidies and incentives, information, participa
tory management, et cetera), the range of potentially effective interventions in 
the Yemeni political context is far more limited. 
 Persuasion based on information is a universal priority. At the national level, 
a 'water budget', setting out which activities use how much water would be 
powerful in mobilising political will to address the overdraft issue.  
 Locally, information on projected aquifer life would be powerful in underpin
ning traditional institutions. This is particularly the case given the relative weak
ness of central government (and concomitant strength of local traditional 
institutions). If local forces are to be mobilised to address local issues, the 
foundation for their actions will be awareness: how much water do they have; 
where is it going? Currently the information emphasis is on 'savings'. Whether 
the advertised savings are correct or not is one issue; a far more important is
sue is whether savings offer a route to a significantly different future. 
 At the farm level, information is usually conveyed through extension ser
vices. While frequent references are made to the need to strengthen these (in
cluding establishment of an Irrigation Advisory Service), little information is 
available about what messages should be conveyed. Possible topics include 
landlevelling, improvements to delivery channels and other lowcost interven
tions that farmers can undertake. 
 Direct incentives currently consist most importantly of a protected qat mar
ket (so that domestic prices are higher than would be the case under free 
trade); highly subsidised diesel; and subsidies to improved irrigation technology. 
As noted above, the case for and against opening the qat market is not straight
forward. Socially the impact would be negative (increased consumption); medi
cally the impact would be positive (less exposure to pesticides); economically, 
the impact is negative  unless a productive alternative use is identified for the 
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'saved' water. The diesel subsidy is significant primarily as a macroeconomic 
issue. It is a serious drain on the budget  but dealing with that problem will not 
substantially affect the demand for water, and will have other impacts that the 
government will consider simultaneously. The subsidies to improved irrigation 
technology are unnecessary.  
 Other conventional incentives (water rights, metering, water pricing, control
ling pumping, et cetera) have very limited prospects for success as government
administered schemes. Where sustainable water rights are neither defined nor 
enforced, water markets simply strengthen the pressure of demand on already 
overexploited resources and are hence negative in their impact on sustainable 
resource use. Water rights are currently loosely defined on the basis of historic 
use, and entitlement to exploit what lies beneath one's land. Converting this, 
through the formal sector, into quantitative entitlements, enforced by the rule of 
law is an exceptionally difficult task. Encouraging water markets in the absence 
of defined rights is simply wrong. However, if local groups are persuaded that 
selfregulation is critical, some forms of regulation may evolve. Again, the first 
priority is the information base that will persuade local groups to act, and help 
them formulate actions that have the outcomes they desire.  
 Indirect incentives such as education or training for farmers leaving agricul
ture will have a role if it is accepted that the agricultural future for a significant 
number of farmers is bleak.  
 Regulation has limited prospects for success (again, as a government
administered scheme). The objective of this report was to review incentives  
primarily economic incentives  that affect demand for water. A dominant char
acteristic of Yemen, however, is its political power structure which comprises 
an exceptionally strong presidency, and powerful traditional institutions in rural 
areas who wield great influence in the daytoday lives of most of the farming 
community. Between these two extremes, government agencies are weak: 'cen
tral' rules limiting or regulating the actions of local people will have little impact 
unless the rural elites are persuaded of the argument and become part of the 
implementation process. Wells continue for instance to be drilled, and if re
ported are generally authorised. Indeed it can be argued1 that the licensing 
process is essentially redundant because if local farmers are happy with the 
construction of a new well, it will be authorised; if they are not happy they will 
use traditional pressures to prevent construction  and if that does not work it is 
probably because the new well owner it too powerful to resist through official 
means. Hence, support to these community actions is recommended in this 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Gerhard Lichtentaeler for this insight. 
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study. Local communities and water user associations can play a big role in 
managing water in the best possible way.  
 A key element in this strategy will be the strong and explicit endorsement of 
what is required  for example cessation of agriculture in the vicinity of Sana'a to 
protect urban supplies  from the other end of the political spectrum, namely the 
president. Such endorsement would be powerful in supporting actions by rural 
elites, and would give the government agencies  especially NWRA  added 
credibility as they pursue their responsibilities. 
 But the situation is locationspecific: it is predominantly true for the Sana'a 
Basin. In a few betterendowed areas, groundwater irrigation will continue, but 
the scale will eventually be a fraction of today's use.  
 In Taiz the situation is less clear: overdraft is estimated by GWMATE to be 
double the recharge so the scale of irrigation will eventually decline substantially 
but there is recharge, and the sustainable level of irrigation may be significant 
locally. 
 In Hadhramout overdraft is more severe than in Taiz, but the aquifer is very 
large, so the time available to reach a new equilibrium is much longer.  
 These locational differences have implications for priorities. In Sana'a the 
priority is to protect water supplies for the highest value use of alldomestic 
consumption. This priority is accentuated by the fact that those leaving the land 
will migrate to towns and cities. This will increase the need for domestic water 
and for water needed by industries and commercial activities that will provide 
new employment. 
 In Taiz the highest priority (as stressed by GWMATE) is information: what 
are the sustainable (local) aquifer yields; what are the recharge mechanisms; 
are there areas that will be totally depleted in the foreseeable future? Where the 
potential for sustainable agriculture is significant, the priority is to manage the 
remaining resource. 
 In Hadhramout, while the level of overabstraction is high, and a fuller under
standing of local hydrogeology is needed, the remaining resource is very large.  
 Beyond the discussion of the impacts of technical innovation, issues arise 
regarding the allocation of resources. Whether water is saved or not, the finan
cial incentives to invest in some level of water 'saving' (certainly piped distribu
tion to fields, maybe bubbler and drip) are high because of the power savings. 
Should such investments be subsidised? A World Bank working paper1 calculates 
the payback period for piped conveyance systems as one season (correspond
ing to less than two years with no subsidy). Clearly such innovations require no 
                                                 
1 Financial Price of Water for Irrigation, Ahmed Shawki, World Bank (undated). 
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support from government or donors (indeed many, many farmers have already 
installed such equipment). 
- If any subsidy is to be paid, should it go to farmers who will anyway be out 
of business soon as the remaining life of the aquifer is short (so why invest 
for just a few years' benefits?) or to farmers in an area where the remaining 
life is substantial (where the investment will pay off for many more years, 
and financial incentives are adequate to ensure private financing)? 
 
 Technical interventions therefore should be approached with caution, and 
there should be a significant additional reason to justify subsidies in this area. 
Dissemination of information is essential. It should stress not 'water saving', but 
the implications of consuming perhaps 3050% of the nation's water reserves to 
grow qat. At the local level, support to initiatives by local groups to conserve 
and manage their resources  again based on a clear understanding of what the 
future holds and what improved technology can contribute  would seem to be 
top priorities in the sector. 
 Importing qat would (if the price is as expected far below Yemeni levels) re
duce the demand for irrigation water substantially. In all likelihood, many of the 
areas now growing qat would not find another crop with similar returns (though 
if they did, the demand for water would not be much affected). Rural incomes 
would fall and the pace of exit from agriculture would (temporarily at least) rise. 
 Serious promotion of alternative waterconserving technologies (green
houses) is unlikely to be at the pace required to impact substantially on agricul
tural income and employment  and the supporting infrastructure of marketing 
and distribution would require a massive investment with little real knowledge of 
the resource sustainability. It is probably better to allow this sector to develop 
naturally based on knowledgeable investors. 
 In the Yemeni context, the question is therefore not demand management  a 
very low renewable resource, extremely high (and increasing) value of water  
together with limited institutional capacities to monitor, allocate and regulate  
make demand unmanageable. The problem is addressing the needs of the large 
number of farmers who will leave the agricultural sector in the coming decade 
or so because the water will run out.  
 The priority is consequently not subsidising improved irrigation technology  
which will be introduced by private financing anyway because it is profitable  
and may result in marginally faster aquifer depletion, or marginally slower, de
pending on whether the controls can be enforced. 
 There are two higher priorities. First, to direct resources towards 'buying 
out' or protecting water rights around major towns and cities so that water for 
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domestic and nonagricultural use is available for the migrants who certainly will 
be arriving  in need of water to drink, bathe, and cook. Hopefully, industries will 
develop in this improved environment to provide for their economic needs. 
 Second, to provide all possible support (information, advice, logistical sup
port) to the rural communities that are prepared to address their problems as 
best they can, and decide how to approach the future. 
 A change of emphasis should be considered. It is conceivable that new 
crops, deficit irrigation, an improved extension service, research to optimise ir
rigation scheduling and so on will find solutions that extend the life of some aq
uifers. However, these gains are at best uncertain, will certainly be hard to 
achieve, and will rarely lead to genuinely sustainable outcomes  rather they will 
put off the inevitable by a few years, or a decade. Wherever the projected aqui
fer life is less than two one or three two decades, resources are probably best 
devoted to needs of exirrigators in the postirrigation scenario. 
 To achieve the first priority  to direct resources towards 'buying out' or pro
tecting water rights around major towns and cities so that water for domestic 
and nonagricultural use is available  a good information base is required. Since 
deep aquifers are complex and difficult to assess, there is currently a lack of 
accurate information regarding the current situation of the aquifers especially 
regarding the remaining aquifer life (storage of water). It is therefore highly rec
ommended to do a technical study to define the areas  for instance around 
Sana'a  required to be reserved for nonagricultural use. This will protect water 
supplies for the highest value use of alldomestic consumption.  
 
  
91 
References and bibliography 
 
 
Becker N and D. Levine (2002), 'The effect and reform of water pricing: The Is
raeli experience'. In:Water Resources Development, Vol. 18 (2), pp. 353366. 
 
Bosworth B., G. Cornish, C. Perry and F. van Steenbergen, Water charging in ir
rigated agriculture: lessons from the literature. OD145. HR Wallingford Ltd., UK, 
December 2002. 
 
Briggs Clark J, K. Menz, D. Collins and R. Firth, A model for determining the 
short term demand for irrigation water. Discussion Paper 86.4. Bureau of Agri
cultural Economics, Canberra, Australia, 1986. 
 
Briscoe J., Water as en economic good: the idea and what it means in practice. 
A paper presented at the World Congress of the International Commission on Ir
rigation and Drainage. Cairo, Egypt, 1996. 
 
Cornish G. A. and C.J. Perry, Water charging in irrigated agriculture: lessons 
from the field. OD146. HR, Wallingford Ltd. UK, 2003. 
 
Cornish, G.A., C.J. Perry and F. van Steenbergen, Charging for Irrigation Ser
vices. Guidelines for Practitioners. OD Report No. 153. HR, Wallingford Ltd. U., 
2004. 
 
Cornish, G.A, Bridget Bosworth, C.J. Perry and J. Burke, Water charging in irri
gated agriculture; An analysis of international. FAO Water Report No. 28. FAO, 
Rome, 2004. 
 
Dinar A and J. Letey, Modelling Economic Management and Policy Issues of Wa
ter in Irrigated Agriculture. Praeger Publishers, Westport, USA, 1996. 
 
Dinar, A and A. Subramanian, Water pricing experiences: an international per
spective. World Bank Technical Paper No. 386. World Bank, Washington DC, 
1997. 
  
92 
Goldhammer, D., E. Fereres and M,Salinas (2008), 'Can Almond trees directly 
dictate their irrigation needs'. In: California Agriculture , Vol. 57 no 4, 
http://danr.ucop.edu/calag/. 
 
Hardin, Garrett, 'The Tragedy of the Commons'. In: Science, 162 (1968), pp. 
12431248. 
 
Hellegers, P.J.G.J., C.J. Perry, Water as an economic good in irrigated agricul
ture; Theory and practice. LEI, The Hague, 2004. 
 
Howitt R.E., Spot Prices, 'Option Prices and Water Markets; An analysis of 
emerging markets in California'. Chapter 8 in: Markets for Water, Potential and 
Performance. Eds: Easter W., M. Rosegrant and A. Dinar. Kluwer Academic Pub
lishers, Boston, 1998. 
 
Huppert W. and K. Urban, Institutional Analysis of Water Delivery and Mainte
nance Service Provision in Irrigation; The Example of the Jordan Valley. Division 
45  Rural Development. MAINTAIN  Case study no.3, pp. 77. Deutsche Gesell
schaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn, 1999. 
 
MeinzenDick R. (1997), Groundwater Markets in Pakistan; Participation and 
Productivity. FPRI Research, Report 105. 
 
Molle F., Water Pricing in Thailand; Theory and Practice. Research Report no.7, 
pp. 78. Kasetsart University, DORAS Centre, 2001. 
 
Perry C.J., Charging for irrigation Water; The Issues and Options, with a Case 
Study from Iran. Research Report 52, pp. 19. International Water Management 
Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2001a. 
 
Perry C.J. (2001), Potential Role of Water Pricing in irrigation; The example of 
India. Proceedings of conference on sustainable water management. New Delhi, 
India, November 2000. In press. 
 
Perry C.J. and M. al Hassan (2001), Control of Groundwater Use: The Limita
tions of Pricing, and a Practical Alternative. 7pp. 
 
  
93 
Perry C.J., M. Rock and D. Seckler, Water as an economic good: A solution, or 
a problem? Research Report 14, pp. 18. International Irrigation Management In
stitute, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1997. 
 
Perry, C.J., 'Alternative Approaches to Cost Sharing for Water Service to Agri
culture in Egypt'. In: IIMI Research Report No. 2. Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1996. 
 
Perry, C.J., (2007), 'Efficient Irrigation, Inefficient communication, flawed rec
ommendations'. In: Irrigation and Drainage, Vol. 56, Issue 4, pp. 367378. 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgibin/abstract/114281744/ABSTRACT 
 
Repetto, R., Skimming the water; Rent seeking and the performance of public ir
rigation systems. Research Report 4. World Resources Institute, Washington 
SC, 1986. 
 
Rosegrant, M. and H. Binswanger (1994), 'Markets in tradable water rights; Po
tential for efficiency gains in developing country water resource allocation'. In: 
World Development 11, pp. 16131625. 
 
Saleth, M.R., 'Water Markets in India: economic and institutional aspects'. Chap
ter 12 in: Markets for Water, Potential and Performance. Eds: Easter W., M. 
Rosegrant and A. Dinar. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1998. 
 
Savenije H.H.G. and P. van der Zaag (2002), 'Water as a economic good and 
demand management; Paradigms and pitfalls'. In: Water International, Vol. 27 
(1), pp. 98104. 
 
Seckler D., The new era of water resources management; From 'dry' to 'wet' 
water savings. Research Report 1. International Water Management Institute. 
Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1996. 
http://www.cgiar.org/iwmi/pubs/pub001/REPORT01.PDF 
 
Tardieu H. and B. Prefol (2002), 'Full cost or sutainability cost pricing in irri
gated agriculture. Charging for water can be effective but is it sufficient'. In: Irri
gation and Drainage , Vol. 51, pp. 97  107. 
 
Teerink J.R. and M. Nakashima (1993), Water allocation, rights and pricing. 
World Bank Technical Paper No. 198. 
 
  
94 
Ward C., 'The Political Economy of Irrigation Water Pricing in Yemen'. In: The Po
litical Economy of Water Pricing Reforms (ed. by Ariel Dinar). ISBN 019
521594X, pp. 381394. World Bank, Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 
World Bank, (1986), Lending conditionality; A review of cost recovery in irriga
tion projects. OED Report No. 6233. 
 
World Bank, GWMATE. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTWRM/0,,contentMD
K:20438923~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:337240,00.html 
 
World Bank (1993), Water Resources Management; A World Bank Policy Paper. 
ISBN 0821326368. 
 
Yaron D., 'Israel'. In: Water Pricing Experiences An International Experience (ed. 
by A. Dinar and A. Subramanian). World Bank Technical Paper no. 386, pp. 61
63. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1997. 
  
95 
List of reports that have been collected 
 
 
1 Yemenrelated  available 
AlHamdi, M., Competition for scarce groundwater in the San'a plain, Yemen; A 
study on the incentive systems for urban and agricultural water use. PhD thesis 
IHEDelft, the Netherlands, 2000. 
 
AlHebshi, M., The role of terraces on water harvesting and land conservation in 
KuhlanAffar/Wide Sharis Districts. Working paper. Hajjah, Yemen, 2005. 
 
AlHebshi, M. and S. Bin Rabaa, Traditional water harvesting systems and man
agement in Wadi Hadhramout. Conference paper. Yemen, 2006. 
 
AlHebshi, M., Does Small Farmer Investment In Bananas Jeopardize Macroeco
nomic Stability In Yemen? Working paper, 2005. 
 
Christopher Ward, Practical responses to extreme groundwater overdraft in 
Yemen. International conference Yemen: The challenge of social, economic and 
democratic development, 1998. 
 
Christopher Ward, Yemen: CDR Building Block: Qat. 
 
Christopher Ward, Yemen's water crisis. 
 
Redecker, G., Managing Water for sustainable Development; Towards a joint vi
sion for Water Resources and Agriculture. KfW Office Sana'a, 2007. 
 
JICAreport, The study for the water resources management and rural water 
supply improvement in the republic of Yemen, water resources management ac
tion plan for Sana'a basin, Earth System Science Co and Japan Techno, Sep
tember 2007. 
 
Joint Annual Review JAR (2007), NWSSIP year 2006 implementation. 
 
Khan, A.K., Agriculture and irrigation in Wadi Hadramawt Region. NWRA, 2004. 
  
96 
Lichtentaehler, G., Political ecology and the role of water; Environment, society 
and economy in northern Yemen. Aldershot, Burlington, Ashgate, 2003. 
 
Milich, L. and M. AlSabbry (1995), 'The 'Rational Peasant' vs Sustainable Liveli
hoods; The Case of Qat in Yemen'. In: Development (3). 
 
National Conference on Qat, Conference discussion materials, Sana'a. Republic 
of Yemen, The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation , Steps on the Way, Dams 
and Water structures, 2002. 
 
Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources (1995), The water re
sources of Yemen. Report WRAY35. 
 
Republic of Yemen, National Water Resources Authority (2003), National Pro
gram on Integrated Water. 
 
Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Water and Environment (2004), National Water 
Sector Strategy and Investment Program. 20052009 (NWSSIP). 
 
Rybakov, V.S., Water Resources Management Regions of Yemen. Mission Re
port, 1997. 
 
Steenbergen v. F., Local groundwater regulation. Water Praxis document Nr. 
14. Arcadis Euroconsult, 2000. 
 
World Bank (2003), Sana'a Basin Water Management Project PAD. Report 
25460YEM. 
 
World Bank (2004), Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project PAD. Report 
27168YEM. 
 
World Bank (2005), Yemen Economic Update. 
 
World Bank (2006), Yemen Development Policy Review. Report No. 35393RY. 
 
World Bank (2007), Yemen towards Qat demand reduction. Report No. 39738
YE. 
  
97 
World Bank (2007), Making the most of scarcity; Accountability for better water 
management in the Middle East and North Africa. MENA Development Report 
41113. 
 
2 International 
Bosworth, B., G. Cornish C.J. Perry and J. Burk, Water charging in irrigated ag
riculture; An analysis of international experience. FAO Water Report No. 28. 
FAO, Rome, 2004. 
 
Burke, J.J. and M. Moench, Groundwater and society: resources, tensions and 
opportunities, themes in groundwater management for the twentyfirst century. 
NY. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2000. 
 
Cornish, G.A., C.J Perry and F. van Steenbergen, Charging for Irrigation Ser
vices; Guidelines for Practitioners. OD Report No. 153. HR, Wallingford Ltd UK, 
2004. 
 
Foster, S., J. Chilton, M. Moench, F. Cardy and M. Schiffler, Groundwater in ru
ral development: facing the challenges of supply and resource sustainability. 
World Bank Technical Paper 463. World Bank, Washington, 2000. 
 
Hellegers, P.J.G.J. and C.J. Perry, Water as an economic good in irrigated agri
culture; Theory and practice. LEIReport 3.04.12. LEI, The Hague, The Nether
lands, 2004. 
 
Cornish, G.A. and C.J Perry, Water Charging in Irrigated Agriculture: Lessons 
from the Field OD Report No. 150. HR, Wallingford Ltd. UK, 2003. 
 
Perry, C.J. (2001), 'Water at Any Price? Issues and Options in Charging for Irri
gation Water'. In: Irrigation and Drainage, Vol. 50, no 1. 
 
Perry, C.J., Charging for Irrigation Water  Issues and Options; With a Case 
Study from Iran. Research Report 52. International Water Management Institute, 
IWMI, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2001. 
 
Perry, C.J. and Mehmood al Hassan, Control of Groundwater Use; The Limita
tions of Pricing, and a Practical Alternative. Regional Groundwater Management 
Seminar. Islamabad, Pakistan, 2000. 
  
98 
Perry, C.J., Potential Role Of Water Pricing In Irrigation; The Example of India. In
ternational Conference On Sustainable Development of Water. New Delhi, 2000. 
 
Perry, C.J., The IIMI Paradigm; Definitions and Implications. Agricultural Water 
Management, 1999. 
 
Perry, C.J. and Geoff Kite, Water Rights; Importance, Difficulties, and New Ap
proaches to Data Collection and Analysis. Water International, 1999. 
 
Perry, C.J., D. Seckler and M. Rock, 'Water as an Economic Good; A solution or 
a problem'. In: Water: Economics, Management and Demand. (Melvyn Kay, Tom 
Franks, Laurence Smith eds). E & F Spon, 1997. 
 
Shah,T., C. Scott, N. Peesapaty, A. Kishor and A. Sharma (2003), The Water
Energy Nexus in India; Approaches to Agrarian Prosperity with a Viable Power 
Industry. 
 
Vermillion, D. and S. AlShaybani, Small dams and social capital in Yemen; How 
assistance strategies affect local investment and institutions. Research Report 
76. International Water Management Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2004. 
 
Wester, F., B.P. Pimentel and C. Scott, Institutional responses to groundwater 
depletion; The aquifer management councils in the State of Guanajuato, Mexico. 
Paper presented at symposium on Integrated Water Management in Agriculture, 
Gomez Palacia, 1618 June. Mexico, 1999. 
  
99 
List of definitions and terms 
 
 
The nature and role of economic instruments is complex. Discussion and debate 
can only be based on clear and mutually understood terminology, and we there
fore summarise below the terms used in this report. 
 
Charge 
Includes all fees payable by the irrigator, which may be based on crops irrigated 
and/or volume of water received and/or fixed charges. 
 
Price 
The volumetric price of water  how much extra the irrigator pays per unit of wa
ter received. Often, with cropbased or quota systems, the marginal price is 
zero (even though the charge may be high) and once the farmer has decided to 
irrigate there will be no marginal incentive to save water. 
 
Cost of the irrigation service 
The expenses incurred by the supplying agency in providing the service. Precise 
definitions depend on local rules, but typically include operation, maintenance, 
staff and fuel costs, plus some elements of replacement costs and amortisation 
of capital. 
 
Value of water 
Incremental income received by the farmer as a result of irrigation services, di
vided by the quantity of irrigation water used. 
 
Volumetric charging and marketpricing are closely related concepts 
Volumetric charging occurs when the quantity of water provided is determined 
by an allocation procedure such as a quota, or water for an agreed cropping 
pattern, and the charge is based on the actual quantity of water delivered  but 
the farmer cannot simply demand as much water as he might wish to apply at 
the agreed price. Marketpricing implies that water is available at a set price, 
and the farmer decides how much water to take at that price.  
 
Tradable Water Rights 
Allow users with an assigned water quota to sell the quota to another user (or 
buy additional quotas from others).  
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Water use 
Application of water to any specified purpose, comprising. 
 
Consumed Fraction 
Water evaporated or transpirated, comprising. 
 
Beneficial Consumed Fraction 
Water consumed for the desired purpose. 
 
Nonbeneficial Consumed Fraction 
Wither evaporation or transpiration. 
 
Nonconsumed Fraction 
Water not lost to the atmosphere, comprising. 
 
Recoverable fraction 
Water that can be recovered and reused. 
 
Nonrecoverable fraction 
Water that cannot be economically recovered. 
 
Real water savings 
Include only reductions in evaporation (that is consumptive use) and loss to sa
line water bodies, but not those reductions which would have generated aquifer 
recharge. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GTZ   German Technical Cooperation 
IWMI   International Water Management Institute 
KfW   German Development Cooperation 
LEI    Agricultural Economics Research Institute 
MAI   Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation 
MWE   Ministry of Water and Environment 
NWRA   National Water Resources Authority 
NWSSIP   National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program 
O&M   Operation and Maintenance 
WB    World Bank 
WEC   Water and Environment Centre 
WUA   Water User Association 
WUG   Water User Group 
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Appendix 1  
Summary of discussions with government officials  
 
 
In order to get personal and official views and the latest thinking regarding wa
ter policies, plans and programmes from different government officials who deal 
with the water sector many interviews and meetings have been conducted A list 
of officials met can be found at the end of this appendix.  
 The serious water crisis has even been discussed with His Excellency, the 
president of Yemen over an extended period of time. The last time was on No
vember 2007. The President seemed to be very much concerned about the 
problem and on several occasions he discussed the issue of water in his 
speeches. However, he indicated that it is the government responsibility to find 
solutions to the water crisis in the country. 
 Among the other officials met is the minister of Agriculture and Irrigation. He 
pointed out that he agrees completely with the water strategy and plan to im
plement those sections of the strategy regarding agriculture. He mentioned also 
that his ministry would give more attention to the improvement of water use in 
irrigation by providing farmers with modern irrigation equipment which would be 
financed from the Agricultural and Fisheries Production and Promotion Fund. He 
further stated that the fund's activities in the future would be broadbased rather 
than concentrating on building dams as was the case in the past.  
 The overall responsibility of the water sector regarding its management and 
regulation is in the hands of the Ministry of Water and Environment (MAE). A new 
minister was appointed more than a year ago. On March 18th, 2007 he had an 
interview with Althawra official daily newspaper in which he indicated that the 
government approved the water strategy more than two years ago but unfortu
nately nothing much happened since that time and he put part of the responsi
bilities on the agricultural sector including the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Irrigation. He pointed out in his interview that the Investment Program of the 
general directorate of irrigation in the ministry of agriculture is completely op
posite to the Strategy since they are still planning to expand irrigated area in the 
country rather than slowing it. 
 He said that the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation is planning to construct 
more dams which he claimed to be of no important economic benefits and the 
Ministry's efforts to improve water management were very limited. He sug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gested that the ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation should give more attention 
to rain fed agriculture.  
 The Minister of Water and Environment indicated also that his ministry was 
enable to control the rigs and drilling of wells is continuing without permits be
cause of the lack of cooperation from other government ministries and agen
cies. The Minister of Water and Environment praised the Social Fund for 
Development and the Public Works Projects for their cooperation with his minis
try. These two government associations are working closely with the Ministry of 
Water and Environment to implement the water strategy by financing various 
projects in water harvesting and terrace improvements. 
 The Minister of Water and Environment proposed that a National Water Con
ference should be held to discuss the water problem in Yemen. 
 The Deputy Minister of Water and Environment Dr Mohammed AlHamdi was 
another important official met regarding our study. He repeated what he men
tioned in various newspaper interviews. He said since Agriculture is the main 
consumer of water he suggested that the Ministry of agriculture should give 
more attention to rain fed agriculture and the improvement of water usage effi
ciency rather than continuing investing in water structures such as dams. He 
emphasised also the need for more coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Irrigation since the water law specified that dams and other water harvest
ing structures should be constructed only after NWRA approved them. He sug
gested that the a joint unit between the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and 
NWRA should be established to perform studies on dams to be constructed in 
different parts of the country. He proposed that the Agriculture and Fisheries 
Production and Promotion Fund should finance waste water treatment projects 
to make it suitable for irrigation since this water is secured and could he readily 
available for irrigation. Dr AlHamdi is not very optimistic about the ability of dif
ferent government institutions to effectively manage the water resource of 
Yemen because of the lack of coordination and cooperation between them re
garding the implementation of the official Water Strategy of the government.  
 All the government officials met were very concerned about the role of qat in 
the fast depletion of Yemen ground water recourses but none of them was op
timistic that there will be a drastic solution to the problem of qat because of the 
strong vested interests involved in the production and marketing of qat. Also 
most of the officials met thought a price hike in diesel will go a long way in re
ducing the quantities of water extracted for irrigation purpose but they all agree 
that the government will not be able to raise the price of diesel in the next two 
years because of the political opposition to such move.  
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 The importation of qat was discussed with some officials but most of them 
thought such policy is not being discussed seriously at the present time since 
parliament will not approve such move by the government.  
 The directors and experts who run the Sana'a Basin Water management pro
ject, The Spate Irrigation Project, The rain fed and Livestock project and the soil 
and the water conservation project all agree that these kinds of projects are 
practical ways to solve the water crisis in Yemen. They claim that these projects 
are already saving millions of cubic meters of water every year. They also indi
cated that user groups are heavily involved in these projects and they are coop
erating in the management of these projects in their efforts to reduce water 
extraction which resulted in the serious overdraft in many basins of Yemen. 
However, it is doubtful whether this kind of response from farmers will continue 
in the future when these projects are completed and no longer subsidised irriga
tion technologies adopted are provided to them.  
 Meetings with Donors/other interested parties. Initial meetings were held 
with various individuals with expert knowledge of the situation in the water sec
tor, including:  
- Dr Mohamed AlHamdy (Ministry of Water and Environment); 
- Dr Gerhard Redecker (KfW); 
- Dr Michael Klingler and Mr Ashraf AlEryani (GTZ); 
- Dr Gerhard Lichtenthaler (GTZ); 
- Mr Saleh AlDubby (Sana'a basin World Bank project); 
- Dr Ismail Muharrm (Agricultural Research Extension Activity); 
- Mr Ton Negenman and Mr. M. AlAroosi (Royal Netherlands Embassy); 
- Mr Naju Abu Hatim (WorldBank); 
- Mr Saleh AlDubby and Eng. Ali Shouaib. (Sana'a Basin WB project); 
- Eng. Mutahar Zaid Mutahar (General Department of Irrigation, MAI). 
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Appendix 2  
Factors that have triggered groundwater overdraft 
 
 
In 1968 Yemen emerged from a civil war and its economy was in very bad 
shape. It was among the least developed countries of the World with a per cap
ita income of about USD120 per annum in 1971. The government has success
fully introduced some basic elements of modern administration starting in 1970 
and because of its limited natural resources encouraged Yemenis to emigrate 
abroad especially to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. That policy worked 
fairly well and workers remittances plus foreign aid and grants have increased 
substantially over the years. It was estimated that workers' remittances rose 
from only USD40 million in 1969/70 to over USD800 million in 1976/77 largely 
as a result of those cash inflows per capita income has more than doubled dur
ing the period 1970  1975 which allowed a significant increase in demand for 
food products and Qat. As a result of the changing market structure many 
farmers started to invest in irrigation wells and pumps and began shifting from 
growing cereals such as sorghum, barely and millet to high income crops such 
as fruits, vegetables and Qat. Before that time agricultural production consisted 
predominately of rainfed grains and only modest quantities of cash crops, fruits 
and vegetables were produced. The rainfed agriculture accounted for 85% of 
the cultivated area. Spate irrigation represented about 10% of the cultivated 
land. Pump and perennial irrigation area accounted for only 7.3% in 1969.  
 However, as a result of the changing market situation cropping patterns 
changed also and well irrigation started to increase in a rapid way. It became 
the stated policy of the government to increase the areas irrigated by spate and 
well irrigation. This policy was clearly stated in the government second five year 
plan for the period 19811986. The targets for irrigation were more than real
ised over the years for well irrigation by the increase in investments by both the 
private and public sectors in irrigation systems especially drilling of wells and 
installing of pumps. The government and the farmers unfortunately paid little at
tention to the overall resource limitation and excessive use of groundwater ab
straction has dangerously resulted in lowering of the water tables in many parts 
of Yemen and salinity problems were observed in Tihama. The huge investments 
by the private and public sectors in irrigation equipment was not accompanied 
by improvement in irrigation practices in farms and according to experts more 
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than 50% of the water pumped was wasted because of inappropriate irrigation 
methods.  
 
Factors which drove groundwater overdraft over the last thirty years 
The rising incomes in Yemen beginning in 1970 resulting from increased 
amounts of remittances plus the increase in foreign aid and grants were the 
main factors which caused the over exploitation of water resources in Yemen 
especially underground water to meet the increased demand for food products 
and Qat. The lack of research and extension services to help farmers in adopt
ing modern irrigation methods was another important reason for wasting pre
cious underground water resources. However government policies over the last 
thirty years were responsible for the acute scarcity and overdraft of under
ground water resources.  
 The government since 1973 embarked on an ambitious programme to in
crease the cultivated areas devoted to irrigation by spate and well irrigation. 
The government invested large amounts of money from its own financial re
sources and from loans and grants in rural and urban water projects to increase 
water supplies to meet the growing demnd for domestic purposes and for agri
culture. Thousands of wells were drilled and thousands of pmps and motors 
were installed by the government not only for domestic purposes but also for ir
rigation of crops all over the country since 1973/74. In fact many of the wells 
which were drilled and equipped by pumps and financed by the government 
ended up in irrigating Qat since no control and supervision was maintained to 
ensure proper use of those wells and pumps.  
 Government policies and actions were responsible over the last thirty years 
for the overdraft of groundwater resources in Yemen in addition to the in
creased income of the farmers resulting from remittances which increased 
dramatically since 1973. Cropping patterns changed substantially since 1971 in 
favor of cash crops, fruits, vegetables and Qat. All those products depended on 
water from wells. There were other factors and policies which caused the over 
exploitation of underground water resources. In 1975 the government created 
the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank to finance different agricultural pro
jects. About 30% of the Agricultural Credit Bank medium term loans have been 
to finance investments in irrigation systems. Those loans were provided to 
farmers at a very low interest rates and many of those loans were never paid 
back to the Bank until the present time. Mechanical pumping of water from wells 
became popular among farmers all over the country.  
 In Marib and AlJawf regions thousand of wells were drilled and equipped 
with pumps to grow wheat, citrus fruits and watermelons. The Tihama region 
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witnessed drastic change in crop patterns. Thousand of wells were drilled all
over the Tihama region to produce a wide variety of agricultural products such 
as bananas, papayas, tomatoes, melons and lately mangoes. Salinity problems 
and decreased water tables were recorded by experts all over Tihama. Agricul
ture continued to be the main user of water accounting for at least 90% of wa
ter consumption in the country despite the fact that scarcity of water 
represented serious problems for urban and rural households especially in 
places like Taiz, Sana'a, Amran, Hajja, Baidha and Dhala. However, the chal
lenge for Yemen regarding water is in agriculture where the average need per 
capita for food needs is more than 3,500 liters per day according to estimates 
by UNDP. Domestic needs in Yemen are only 25 litres per capita for rural popu
lation and 50  60 litres for the urban population.  
 The declaration by the government in 1984 to ban the importation of fruits 
such as apples, bananas and oranges was another factor contributing to the 
rapid abstraction rates of underground water resources in Yemen. The ban on 
imports of fruits resulted in a big increase in the cultivated areas devoted to 
fruit production. Most of fruit products depended almost entirely on irrigation 
from wells. Data for the year 1990 indicated that 310 thousand hectares of the 
cultivated land in Yemen got their source of water from wells compared to only 
37 thousand hectares in 1974 which meant that the area devoted to well irriga
tion has expanded 8 fold in a period of about 16 years, while the area cultivated 
under rainfed conditions has decreased by more than 50% between 1974 and 
1999. Areas allocated to perennial and spate irrigation have not expanded 
much. In fact the cultivated area under perennial irrigation went down substan
tially because of the dryness of many streams. It is interesting to note also that 
the total area under cultivation went down from 1515 thousand hectares to 
1133 thousand hectares indicating the wide variability of rain conditions in 
Yemen. Irrigated crops which earned farmers more incomes shifted the culti
vated land in Yemen from producing grains which depend almost entirely on 
rains to fruits, vegetables, qat and other cash crops which depend on irrigation 
from wells, therefore, creating an acute exploitation of underground water re
sources in Yemen never happened in the history of Yemen whose ancient agri
cultural civilisation depended on rains and spare irrigation systems.  
 Since 1999 the water crisis in Yemen deepened and became more unman
ageable as a result of inaction by the government and policies which encour
aged further abstraction of water rather than conserving it. In addition to that, 
another development which happened in 1990 also contributed to the water cri
sis and the serious overdraft in Yemen. Because of the Gulf War in 1990, hun
dreds of thousands of Yemenis became unwelcomed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
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and returned back to Yemen. Many of those individuals began looking for in
vestment opportunities and thousands of them invested their money on farming 
by drilling wells and installing pumps on their wells to produce fruits, vegetables 
and Qat. Production of Qat, and fruits such as oranges and mangoes expanded 
rapidly in many areas of the country where production of those individual prod
ucts was suitable. For example, mango production expanded very rapidly over 
the last fifteen years. Depletion of underground water resources increased rap
idly and many areas became completely dry.  
 Farmers in some parts of Yemen especially in Saddah, Amran, Sana'a and 
Radda began to deepen their wells because of the lowering of water tables. It 
was not surprising to have wells with depths of more than 400 meters. Some of 
those wells were producing water only for few hours during the day and produc
tion of many wells was reduced to about 3 to 4 litres per second. The cost of 
drilling of wells in areas like Amran, Sana'a, Saddah, AlDhala and AlBaidha be
came a big constraint. Some wells with depths of 400 meters cost more than 
40 thousand dollars for drilling alone. These high costs were made by individu
als who owned Qat plantations or were selling water to other Qat growers in ar
eas where water became very scare or not available at all. It is because of this 
situation that government statistics on irrigation began reporting cultivated ar
eas which their irrigation water was brought by tankers and barrels, a situation 
which is unheard off in other countries of the World.  
 Finally, there is another important factor which made it easier for farmers to 
exploit underground water resources over the last 30 years. During all that long 
period the cost of diesel fuel was always cheep because of the government 
subsidies to the petroleum products.  
 The big influential farmers and others have been always successful in keep
ing oil prices, especially, diesel fuel very low despite efforts by different gov
ernments to keep these prices in line with changing international prices of fuel 
products. It is expected that this kind of policy will continue in the near future 
given the political situation in Yemen at the present and foreseeable future. 
Therefore, it is expected that the over exploitation of the underground water re
sources will continue until farmers deplete these resources or find it uneco
nomic to further deepen their wells. But with the continuing strong demand for 
Qat there is no reason for the farmers to discontinue producing this high value 
crop and other relatively high value cash crops and fruits. So Yemen will con
tinue abstracting its valuable water resources unless the political leadership and 
the people of Yemen become clearly aware that this serious water crisis cannot 
continue unabated and real solutions must be implemented to mitigate it.  
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 Investments by the public and private sector in drilling and irrigation equip
ment have been continued over the last thirty years without major effort to stop 
this trend and therefore, the number of wells in Yemen rose from few thousands 
in 1971 to more than 50 thousand wells at the present time. In fact some esti
mates by experts I interviewed over the last several weeks told me the number 
of wells in Yemen may be on the order of 60 to 70 thousand.  
 In the Sana'a Basin it is estimated there are more than 12 thousand wells. In 
the governorate of AlDhala more than 500 wells were drilled in recent years 
mainly for the production of qat. The General Authority of Rural Water drills 
more than 200 wells every year for domestic purposes alone. Other govern
ment agencies and ministries still continue to drill wells in many parts of the 
country for both domestic and agricultural purposes. The 200 to 300 rigs avail
able in Yemen are not sitting idle. According to an owner of a drilling company 
who has been in the business of drilling since 1970 he told me that he did not 
notice any significant reduction in the number of wells being drilled in Yemen 
over the last few years. He also told me that drilling of wells is being done with
out permits from NWRA even after the passing of the Water Act in 2002. Infor
mation which was obtained from other sources also point out that the water act 
is not being implemented especially with regard to registration and drilling of 
wells.  
 Despite the fact that there is no reduction in the number of wells drilled 
every year it is important to note that because of the lowering of the water table 
in many areas of Yemen and the significant decrease in the production of 
pumped water from the wells drilled over the last decade or so the cultivated 
areas in some of the governorates are decreasing as a result of the decrease in 
irrigation water from wells. The cultivated area which depends on irrigation by 
wells in 2005 is 33% of the total cropped area. However, when the irrigated 
area by wells in 2005 is compared to the area in 1999 the area for 1999 was 
significantly higher by more than 41 thousand hectares or 9.4%. This is a very 
important development which indicates clearly that farmers are reducing the ar
eas planted by irrigated crops because of the reduced amounts of available wa
ter in their wells.  
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Appendix 3  
Key statements of the NWSSIP of relevance to this study 
 
 
Guiding principles for Yemen's water policy 
Principles of good natural resource management. 
- Integrated water resource management and the basin management ap
proach. 
- Management of the resource for achieving efficiency and sustainability. 
 
Social and economic principles 
- Priority to domestic uses, with due consideration to equity and poverty as
pects. 
- Allocative efficiency, so that water can flow to the use that pays the highest 
return, respecting basic domestic water needs for the poor. 
- Water supply concerns are to be balanced by demand management meas
ures, including the use of economic incentives to reduce the demand. 
- Enhancing national and household food security through marketdriven 
growth rather than selfsufficiency. 
- Fiscal, agricultural and trade policies to be factored into water sector policy. 
 
Institutional principles 
- Water sector governance and capacity building are considered a priority. 
- Decentralisation, participation and user organisation are key policy. 
 principles. 
- Role of the private sector is emphasised. 
- Role of the public sector in financing is clearly defined. 
- Regulatory function is separated from service delivery. 
 
NWSSIP p 16 
 
Ultimately, the overdraft problem will have to be dealt with by a comprehensive 
'package' of measures, including: 
- economic incentives, including trade and agricultural policy measures; 
- regulatory measures, including selfregulation by the community; 
- clear assignment of water use rights (linking them to specific uses); 
- technology packages that help farmers earn more income using less water. 
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NWSSIP p 19 
 
Water resources management objectives are: 
- ensure maximum possible degree of sustainability; 
- give priority to domestic needs of rural and urban populations; 
- thereafter, maximise economic benefits through improved allocation, while 
mindful of equity and social norms; 
- create a realistic and holistic vision among the general population regarding 
water resources availability/scarcity; 
- contribute to poverty alleviation by promoting efficient use and equity in wa
ter allocation, so as to enhance socioeconomic development. 
 
The government for its part assumes the following responsibilities: 
- create an enabling institutional framework; 
- provide information on water resources, raise awareness and create a 
shared water management vision among the beneficiaries regarding optimal 
management of the resources; 
- supply water related public goods (infrastructure); 
- protect water rights, implement the water law, and create conducive macro
economic environment. 
 
NWSSIP p 20 
 
The objectives for urban water supply and sanitation were set out in the Cabinet 
Resolution 237 of 1997, which adopted the reform programme. Those objec
tives remain valid: 
- increase percentage of population covered with WSS services; 
- financial sustainability of WSS utilities; 
- separation of sector regulatory and serviceprovision functions; 
- decentralisation; 
- knowledge and skills development; 
- community and private sector involvement. 
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NWSSIP p 23 
 
Within the global objective of improving rural livelihoods and sectoral value 
added in a sustainable manner, the specific objectives for irrigation and water
shed management are:  
- enhancing sustainability through water resources protection;  
- improving farmers' income through increasing water use efficiency;  
- enhancing supply;  
- improving institutional performance in support of farmers. 
 
The approach 
Reducing groundwater mining 
Securing farmers' water rights: Recognition of farmers' use rights to water, ac
quired under the water law, and registration of these rights, is key to responsi
ble management of such resources (paragraph 3.3.4). The MAI will therefore 
work with the MWE/NWRA to recognise and register farmers' use rights over 
water. 
 
Getting incentives right: The importance of incentives and the measures pro
posed to correct them are described above (see paragraph 3.3.4). The MAI will 
support the proposed study of incentives, in light of which changes in the incen
tive structure will be proposed, discussed and adopted. 
 
NWSSIP p 31 
 
On Qat… 
 
Qat now occupies at least half of the irrigated area in Yemen, growing at an an
nual rate of 9% (double the growth rate of other crops). This crop has even in
vaded virgin land never cultivated before, in addition to expansion in regions not 
known for its cultivation. 
 The reality is that between 1970 and 2000 the area under other crops, par
ticularly grapes and coffee, has also expanded annually at nearly 3 and 5%, re
spectively. However, the area under qat expanded at a much faster rate (9% per 
year) because it is more profitable. 
 If the existing situation continues as it is, without intervention, then qat farm
ing will in the end deplete the water in the rural areas and consequently wipe out 
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the rural economy serious consideration should be given to allowing qat impor
tation. Indeed, the hardcurrency spent on developing qat farms in neighboring 
waterrich countries, which would permit qat growing and export to Yemen, will 
be much less than the hardcurrency which Yemen currently spends on qat irri
gation (subsidised diesel fuel; maintenance and depreciation of drilling rigs; cost 
of well casings, pumps and spare parts; well deepening and drilling) as well as 
the cost of pesticides for spraying qat shrubs and the cost of the medical bill 
for treatment of the pesticidescaused diseases (since Qat shrubs growing in a 
humid environment like Ethiopia will not need an intensive use of pesticides). 
This is in addition to the value of the water which will be saved as a result of re
ducing qat farming in Yemen. 
 
NWSSIP pp 1011 
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 Appendix 4  
Questionnaire for empirical field work 
 
 
Questionnaire to get a better understanding of farmers behaviour regarding 
groundwater extraction on the basis of financial incentives, nonfinancial incen
tives, regulatory framework, collective action and individual and community wis
dom  
 
General information 
 
Governorate name    ……………. 
 
District name     ……………. 
 
Village name     ……………. 
 
Level of education of the farmer   ……………. 
 
How many persons live from this farm?  ……………. 
 
Male or female farmer    male ( ) female ( ) 
 
Do you have any nonagricultural income?   yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
Farm size     …………….  
In ha or labnah or fadan or ghasabh 
 
Do you rent (part of) the land?   ……………. 
In ha or labnah or fadan or ghasabh 
 
Do you own one or more wells?   yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
Do you sell water?     yes( ) no ( )  
 
Do you buy water?     yes ( ) no ( )  
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If yes from who?      …………….  
How often?     …………….  
 
Do you get as much water as you need?   yes ( ) no ( )  
 
If no, what would you do with extra water?  
a) Apply more water to existing crops   yes ( ) no ( ) 
b) Change crop      yes ( ) no ( )  
 To which crop?    ……………. 
c) Expand area     yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
How deep is the water table in your well?   …………….m  
 
Have you deepened your well over the  
last ten years?      yes ( ) no ( ) 
If yes when?     ……………. 
 
By how many meters?     …………….m 
 
Is the quality of the water you use:    good  ( )  
        medium ( )  
        poor  ( )  
 
Financial drivers 
 
What is your major crop    ……………. 
 
What is your second major crop   ……………. 
 
How many labnah of your [second major crop] gives the same income level as 
one labnah of your [major crop]?   …………….labnah 
 
Are any of these farm expenses subsidised? 
a) Pumps     yes ( ) no ( ) 
b) Diesel price     yes ( ) no ( ) 
c) Digging wells     yes ( ) no ( ) 
d) Improved onfarm irrigation equipment  yes ( ) no ( ) 
e) Conveyance system    yes ( ) no ( ) 
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Non financial drivers 
 
Do you grow crops for your own consumption?  yes ( ) no ( ) 
If yes, how much of your land is used for these  
crops?        ………….in ha or labnah 
 
Did you change the cropping pattern? 
Decreased crop …………….  Why?  ……………. 
Increased crop ……………. Why?   …………….  
 
Do you intend to grow new crops or better varieties?  ……………. 
Why?        ……………. 
 
Regulatory framework  
 
Which institution is responsible to give licences to  
dig new wells?      ……………. 
 
Are licences given for anyone who wants  
to dig a well?     yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
What are the conditions to get the licence?   …………….  
 
Did anyone dig a well without a licence?   yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
Did you inform the authorities about illegal drillings? yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
Collective action 
 
Is there a Water User Group or Association in  
your village?      yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
If yes, are you a member?    yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
If yes, what are your expectations?   …………….  
 
Did you previously discuss water problems  
with others?     yes ( ) no ( ) 
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If no, why are you not a member?   …………….  
 
If no, do you discuss water problems with  
other water users?    ……………. 
 
Individual and community wisdom  
 
Do groundwater levels increase after the rains?  yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
Who owns the water?     ……………. 
If water is becoming scarce, is it better: 
a) To use it quickly before it is finished?  yes ( ) no ( ) 
b) To use it quickly before others use it?  yes ( ) no ( ) 
c) To use less and make it last longer?  yes ( ) no ( ) 
d) To agree as a group to use less water?  yes ( ) no ( ) 
 
Does scarcity becomes more dangerous in  
the future?      yes ( ) no ( ) 
If yes, why?     ……………. 
What action can you take as an individual? 
 
Put deeper well?     yes ( ) no ( ) 
Put new well?     yes ( ) no ( ) 
Change technology    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Change crop     yes ( ) no ( )  
To which crop?     ……………. 
 
Reduce hours of pumping    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Reduce area irrigated    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Reduce the waterintensive crops   yes ( ) no ( ) 
Other suggestions    ……………. 
 
What action should be taken by your community: 
Limit number of wells    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Reduce hours of pumping    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Reduce area irrigated    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Reduce the waterintensive crops   yes ( ) no ( ) 
Other suggestions    ……………. 
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What action should be taken by the government? 
None       yes ( ) no ( ) 
Stop new well digging    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Stop deepening of wells    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Reduce irrigated area    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Reduce waterintensive crops    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Construct dams/reservoirs    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Subsidise improved irrigation technology  yes ( ) no ( ) 
Provide alternative jobs     yes ( ) no ( ) 
Organise farmers for collective action   yes ( ) no ( ) 
Punish illegal drilling    yes ( ) no ( ) 
Other suggestions    ……………. 
Do you want to use improved irrigation technology?  yes ( ) no ( ) 
If no, why not     ……………. 
If yes, what will the benefit be for you?  ……………. 
 
Have you received advice on saving water?    yes ( ) no ( )  
If yes, on what?      ……………. 
Will there still be water for your son/grandson?  yes ( ) no ( )  
What do you see as an alternative for the future?  ……………. 
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Appendix 5  
The impact of improved irrigation technology on water  
savings.  
 
 
Reducing losses and increasing the productivity of water: does modern irriga
tion technology help manage the resource? 
 
Chris Perry,1 February 2008 
 
This paper is in two parts. The first part, aimed at nonspecialists with an inter
est in water resources management, is designed to better inform the long
running discussion about the impacts of improved irrigation technology (drip, 
sprinkler, bubbler systems). It is widely assumed that such technologies save 
large quantities of water and greatly increase the productivity of water. Often  
but not always  such assumptions are greatly exaggerated, distorting policy 
recommendations and investment priorities. The second part applies these 
ideas to the case of Yemen  an exceptionally watershort country where im
proved irrigation technology is the cornerstone of donor policy. 
 
A. Technical background2 
 
Terminology 
The basis for meaningful discussion and analysis in this area must be a clearly 
defined set of terms. Widely used but illdefined concepts of 'efficiency' lead to 
misleading conclusions. In part this is because different disciplines (irrigation 
engineers, economists, agronomists, resource planners) infer 'benefits' that 
conform to their particular point of view (more precise application of water, 
higher value of water, higher crop yields, availability of water for alternative 
                                                 
1 This paper has been produced as part of the ongoing study 'Options for Changing the Economic In
centive Structures for Groundwater Extraction in Yemen'. 
2 I am most grateful to the following internationally recognized experts for their review and comments 
on the arguments presented in this section: Charles Burt, (Chair, Irrigation Training and Research 
Centre, Cal  Poly); Richard G Allen (main author of FAO Publication 56 on Crop Water Requirements); 
Pasquale Steduto (who leads the ongoing FAO analysis of the relationship between crop water use 
and yield); and Harald Frederiksen (former Principal Water Resources Specialist in the World Bank). 
Every effort has been made to reflect their comments, which were uniformly supportive of the general 
thrust of the argument, errors remain the responsibility of the author. 
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uses). Some, all or none of these good things can be the outcome in the multi
ple scenarios in which 'improvement' takes place. 
 In consequence, the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage1 
has over the last two years consulted all its National Committees, various Work
ing Groups, and many expert individuals, and adopted terms that avoid the word 
'efficiency' altogether, relying instead on the hydrological framework that simply 
defines component water flows. These are: 
2    Water use: application of water to any specified purpose, comprising; 
2.3   Consumed Fraction: Water evaporated or transpirated, comprising; 
2.3.1  Beneficial Consumed Fraction: Water consumed for the desired  
   Purpose; 
2.3.2  Non beneficial Consumed Fraction: Other evaporation or transpiration; 
2.4  Non consumed Fraction: Water not lost to the atmosphere,  
   Comprising; 
2.4.1  Recoverable fraction: Water that can be recovered and reused; 
2.4.2  Non recoverable fraction: Water that cannot be economically  
   Recovered. 
 
 The benefits of this framework include: identification of consumptive uses 
(crops transpire water  a consumptive use  while most domestic uses are non
consumptive. Lowflow showers reduce water use but have no effect on con
sumption); clarity in identifying how water can most effectively be saved (by re
ducing nonbeneficial consumption and the nonrecoverable fraction); and 
making sure that the accounts are done properly, because the sum of the com
ponent flows at each level MUST add up to the flow at next level  no more and 
no less. 
 Traditionally, 'irrigation efficiency' has been calculated as the ratio of 2.1.1, 
above, to 1  a term, that can vary greatly depending on the scale of observa
tion (Egypt is 85% 'efficient' at the national scale, but only about 40% efficient at 
field scale, because most field 'losses' simply return to the Nile. Because of this 
measured diversions from the Nile are at least 50% higher than the water avail
able to the country  a rather confusing statistic that suggests that a further re
duction in 'efficiency' could make even more water available to Egypt!). 
 The term 'Water Use Efficiency' is also proposed by ICID to be replaced by 
'water productivity'. Although WUE is internationally defined as a productivity 
                                                 
1 Efficient irrigation; inefficient communication; flawed recommendations. Perry, Chris. Irrigation and 
Drainage (Volume 56, Issue 4, Pages 367378). 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi  bin/abstract/114281744/ABSTRACT. 
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term (output of crop per unit water applied, for example), it is one of the most 
misused terms in the literature. 
 Other terms needed for the analysis are evaporation (E) which is direct con
sumption of water  for example when wet soil is exposed to the atmosphere  
and transpiration (T) which is the water that goes through the crop in the proc
ess of plant to growth. (ET is the combined total of evapotranspiration which is 
measured  for example in lysimeter experiments. It is often difficult to precisely 
separate ET into its constituent components based on field measurements.)  
 
Technology 
Traditional forms of irrigation tend to apply large quantities of water relatively in
frequently. For example, the climate may be such that the crop needs 5mm/day 
to grow. To meet this need, the farmer may supply 50mm every week. At the 
field level, it may be observed that large areas of soil are wetted, that some of 
the applied water percolates into the soil beyond the root zone, or runs off the 
field into drains. Additionally, if the field is not well levelled, some plants will get 
excessive water while others do not get enough. 
 This local observation suggests that crop needs could better be met by 
more precise delivery of the required amount of water at the right time. This is 
what improved irrigation technologies aim to do  providing the required amount 
of water to each plant with minimum runoff or percolation. Irrigation applications 
are typically light, frequent and directed (in the case of drip and bubbler) to the 
individual plant. 
 In 'ICID terminology', in the traditional situation described above the water 
use of 50mm would (at best, assuming even application) lead to 35mm (seven 
days * 5mm/day) of beneficial consumption leaving some 15mm is unac
counted for. To complete the accounts, we need to know whether the additional 
water went to nonbeneficial consumption, to the nonrecoverable fraction, or to 
the recoverable fraction. In general, in situations where there is an exploited, 
relatively shallow aquifer in the area, percolation losses are largely recoverable. 
In assessing this, it is important to consider water quality: if the local soil or un
derlying aquifer is saline, percolation water will pick up salts and may not be re
usable. 
 Similarly runoff that goes back to a water system upstream of irrigation or 
other intakes will be recoverable, while drainage that go to the sea or a salt sink 
is nonrecoverable. (Recovery will often require additional energy inputs  a real 
cost  but our interest here is water, not energy). 
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 In the example cited above, a switch to improved irrigation technology would 
have the following typical effects: 
- water Use (the volume of water applied) would fallsprinkler irrigation would 
allow daily application of appropriate quantities of the entire cropped area; 
drip or bubbler would allow daily application directly to the plant this reduc
ing the area wetted; 
- careful management would reduce the nonconsumed fraction (percolation 
and runoff) virtually to zero. 
 
 The primary impact of improved irrigation technology is consequently a re
duction in water use. However the extent to which this reduction translates into 
water savings that will be available for use elsewhere depends entirely on the 
hydrogeological situation, which determines whether excess deliveries are re
coverable or nonrecoverable. 
 The hydrogeological context, then, is the primary determinant of the impact 
of improved irrigation technology in terms of water consumption. 
 Secondorder impacts should also be considered and are not always 
straightforward. It is often assumed that nonbeneficial evaporation is higher 
with conventional irrigation because the entire field is flooded (or relatively large 
basins around trees), whereas improved technology directs the water precisely 
to the plant with minimum extra wetting. In fact, since improved technologies in
volve more frequent irrigation, the smaller wetted area may be wet (and evapo
rating) for a longer period than with the heavier, less frequent irrigation 
schedule. Further, the local evaporation from wetted soil acts to increase humid
ity and decrease transpirative crop demand. Except for widely spaced tree 
crops the savings in E with drip and bubbler irrigation is small. For sprinkler, E 
may often be higher as the entire area is frequently wetted, and wind can divert 
the water to areas not intended for irrigation.1 
 It is also widely assumed that the productivity of water (in ICID terms, pro
duction per unit of beneficial consumption, or transpiration) is increased with 
improved irrigation technologies  that is, that the same quantity of crop can be 
produced with less water, or more crop with the same quantity of water. Here it 
is essential to clarify the basis of the argument. For any given crop, production 
(in terms of biomass) is essentially a direct function of transpiration: an increase 
in production will require a similar increase in transpiration  so that productivity 
is constant.  
                                                 
1 Where these issues are important, models exist that can quantify the likely impacts of various irriga
tion technologies.  
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 There are several caveats to this point: first, and importantly, improved irri
gation technology often facilitates changes in cropping pattern to higher value 
crops. This may significantly increase productivity in USD per m3 terms. Water 
consumption will increase or decrease, depending on characteristics of the new 
crop. Second, at very high levels of management it may be possible to manage 
water stress in ways that improve the productivity of water  however this is very 
much a second order effect and only relevant when very high yields and excel
lent water management are already in place. Third, improved irrigation tech
niques can significantly improve the effectiveness of fertiliser application (either 
through direct distribution  'fertigation'  or by avoiding leaching.) Again, the ex
tra biomass generated through these improvements will result in higher T, and 
more water consumption. Finally, the improved distribution of water over the 
field will reduce excess application in some areas (possibly a saving, depending 
on the situation) while increasing the supply to other areas (a certain increase in 
consumptive use). 
 
Salt management 
Reference has already been made to salt in the context of whether percolation 
is recoverable or not. Improved irrigation technologies also have more general 
implications for salt management, especially because good irrigation manage
ment is needed in areas of water scarcity and climatic aridity. Here, the need to 
manage salt in the soil profile is of particular importance. Traditional irrigation 
systems that apply infrequent heavy irrigation usually ensure downward move
ment of water (and salt). Frequent light irrigations do not achieve this and salt 
management, so that occasional heavy irrigations may be required.  
 
Local incentives, basin impacts 
From the perspective of a farmer who has either a limited entitlement to surface 
water or limited ability to pump from an aquifer, the incentive to improve irriga
tion technology is clear. He or she will be able to increase the beneficial con
sumed fraction  which is the water that his crops consume  and hence increase 
production and income. For every unit of water available to his farm, he can 
grow more crops. Total consumption of water at the farm level will increase 
while water use (diversion or abstraction) remains constant. 
 From the basin (or aquifer) perspective, these farmlevel benefits are unlikely 
to be neutral in water terms. Only if all the excess water the farmer was apply
ing initially was nonrecoverable is the usable water balance unchanged. In the 
more common case where a significant part of the excess water was recover
able, then from the basin (or aquifer) perspective, things will now be worse be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cause consumption has increased. Further, as a result of the increased value of 
applied water, the farmer will be able to compete more vigorously for the 
smaller remaining pool. 
 
B. Hydrogeology of Yemen's Irrigated Areas, Improved Irrigation Technology 
and Implications for 'Water Saving' 
 
Yemen's Primary Source of WaterAquifers 
It is widely observed and accepted that most of the groundwaterirrigated areas 
of Yemen are over drafted. In some areas, the rate of overdraft is such that the 
water table is falling by several meters each year; elsewhere the rate of fall is 
lower but still persistent. 
 Overdraft occurs when the volume of water abstracted exceeds recharge. 
The volume of water abstracted is equal to the total volume pumped, and the 
recharge is equal to the water that reaches the aquifer as a result of infiltration 
from rainfall and other sources  often including excess application of irrigation 
water.  
 When the quantity of water available at the surface exceeds the capacity of 
the top layer of the soil to store the water, the excess either runs off, forming a 
stream, or infiltrates into the lower soil profile. The distribution of the excess 
moisture between nonbeneficial consumption, runoff and infiltration depends 
upon the quantity of excess water (very light rainfall will tend to be temporarily 
stored near the soil surface, and evaporate during subsequent dry days) and the 
nature of the soil. Obviously, infiltration is a source of local recharge, and when 
the underlying materials are filled to capacity, an aquifer is formed.  
 The soil in the aquifer is said to be saturated, whereas the soil above the 
aquifer, through which the infiltration must pass to reach the aquifer is unsatu
rated. This distinction is critically important, and may be understood as follows: 
if a hole is dug vertically into the ground, then while the soil above the aquifer 
may be moist, that moisture is 'held' in the soil. As soon as the hole extends be
low into aquifer, water will flow out of the saturated soil and fill the hole up to 
the level of the top of the aquifer. Wells must therefore penetrate into the satu
rated zone  the aquifer  in order to be productive. 
 Whether infiltration reaches the aquifer depends further upon a number of 
parameters, including: 
- nature of the soilpermeable soils allow water to pass readily; impermeable 
soils allow little or no water to pass; 
- variations in soil type with depth; 
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- if permeable layer is underlain by an impermeable layer, the upper layer 
forms an aquifer as excess moisture infiltrates and accumulates over time; 
- if a permeable layer is underlain by an impermeable layer that is further un
derlain by a permeable layer, then the lower permeable layer may be an aq
uifer but cannot be replenished by vertical infiltration from the surface 
because of the impermeable layer (this is a confined aquifer); 
- the depth from the soil surface to the aquifer. If the unsaturated zone is 
deep and relatively impermeable, then recharge may take many years to 
reach the aquifer. 
 
 This brief overview of the nature of aquifers and their recharge  which cov
ers most of the scenarios found in Yemen  already indicates that the patterns of 
flow induced by excess irrigation are complex and must be locally understood. 
In particular, with reference to the analytical framework adopted by ICID, it is 
critical to distinguish which excess irrigation deliveries that are recoverable and 
nonrecoverable, and what proportion of excess deliveries goes to nonbeneficial 
consumption (basically evaporation). 
 
Yemen's Primary Use of WaterIrrigation  
In parallel with the observation that Yemen's aquifers are over drafted, it is also 
observed that irrigation practices are crude and wasteful  large quantities of 
water are diverted through unlined channels and applied with very little control 
to the fields. The quantity applied is generally far greater than required on the 
basis of scientific computation of crop needs. The implication of this observa
tion is that improved irrigation technologies (piped supplies, precise application) 
and management (more frequent application of limited volumes of water) will 
save large amounts of water and reduce the pressure on the aquifers.1 
 The logic of this argument is simple: if a plant needs X quantity of water, but 
in order to provide this quantity it is necessary to pump 3X because water leaks 
from field channels and excessive water is applied to the field, then the 'de
mand' on the aquifer is three times the crop's need. If pipes and scientific 
scheduling and improved irrigation technology can reduce the pumping re
quirement to 1.5X, then the demand on the aquifer is halved. (In ICID terminol
ogy, water use has halved.) 
                                                 
1 An economist would wonder why farmers (who generally teach us more than we teach them) would 
pay very high rates for very scarce water are then silly enough to waste it through 'inefficient' irriga
tion. Further studies may be illuminating. 
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 (Experience suggests that it is worth reiterating at this point that this analy
sis is about water, not power. Any reduction in pumping as a result of improved 
irrigation technologies will save power, an unambiguous benefit. The topic here, 
however, is water.) 
 
Improved Irrigation Technology  Scenario 1  
The following tables and charts now explore the likely benefits (in water terms, 
not power terms) of improved irrigation technology that reduces water use in 
order to meet a defined level of beneficial consumption in a situation where ex
cess irrigation applications are nonrecoverable  in other words, the areas best 
suited to improved irrigation technology. 
 It is assumed, based on estimates in projects documents and the donors' 
Joint Vision statement (2007), that losses can be reduced from 65% to 40%. It 
is further assumed that once the technology is installed, it is fully used, that 
farmers immediately reduce deliveries to fields, farmers do not expand their ir
rigated area, and that maintenance is adequate to keep the new technology fully 
functional. This may be termed the optimistic scenario. 
 The analysis is presented in terms of a single unit of pumping (water use). 
This will result in 0.35 units of beneficial use if losses are 65%. With the im
proved irrigation technology and losses reduced to 40%, the same level of 
beneficial use will require only 0.58 units of pumping (0.58 * 0.6 = 0.35). 
 These basic data are summarised in table E1. Note that Water Use is re
duced while Beneficial Use is maintained constant, which is the plan for these 
project areas. 
 
Table E1 Losses, ET and Water Use 
 Now Potential 
Losses % 65 40 
Beneficial Use 0.35 0.35 
Water Use (pumping 1.00 0.58 
 
 Table E2 traces the impact of investment programmes introducing the im
proved technology, on the basis of a 10year programme (i.e. it will take ten 
years to cover the entire irrigated area with the new technology), and a slower, 
twenty year investment programme. 
 These data are most easily understood by first looking at the year when im
plementation is complete (year 11 for the 10year programme, year 21 for the 
20year programme) and noting that water use is now at the reduced level of 
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0.58 compared to 1 in year 1. Interim years are simply linear interpolations be
tween these two points, reflecting steady, continuous project implementation 
(the Sana'a Basin water Management Project appears to be based on a twenty 
years programme for full coverage. 
 
Table E2 Annual Abstraction for 10 and 20 year investment pro5
grammes 
Year 10 year 20 year 
1 1.00 1.00 
2 0.96 0.98 
3 0.92 0.96 
4 0.88 0.94 
5 0.83 0.92 
6 0.79 0.90 
7 0.75 0.88 
8 0.71 0.85 
9 0.67 0.83 
10 0.63 0.81 
11 0.58 0.79 
12 0.58 0.77 
13 0.58 0.75 
14 0.58 0.73 
15 0.58 0.71 
16 0.58 0.69 
17 0.58 0.67 
18 0.58 0.65 
19 0.58 0.63 
20 0.58 0.60 
21 0.58 0.58 
22 0.58 0.58 
23 0.58 0.58 
24 0.58 0.58 
25 0.58 0.58 
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 Figure E1 plots the cumulative abstraction that results from three scenarios: 
first, if no changes are made, then abstraction will continue at 1 unit per year 
(assuming no expansion of irrigated area); if the 10 year investment programme 
is followed, cumulative abstractions will (for example) in year 3 be equal to: 
 
1+0.96+0.92 = 2.88 
 
 The cumulative abstraction for the 20year programme is derived similarly. 
The graph show a progressive divergence between cumulative abstraction be
tween the 'Do nothing' scenario and the 10 and 20year investment pro
grammes, with the 10year programme producing larger, quicker divergence. 
 Estimates of the period of time that the Sana'a aquifer can support existing 
levels of pumping are uncertain, but 10 years is sometimes suggested. An in
teresting observation from this simple, yet rather optimistic analysis is that cu
mulative pumping for the 20 year investment programme will reach the 10 year 
'Do nothing' level around year 11, and even the 10 year investment programme 
only extends the aquifer life by about three years. 
 Additional conclusions are equally disturbing: The 'ten years remaining' sce
nario is an average. Some areas are already close to exhaustion while other ar
eas still have relatively plentiful supplies remaining. It is only worth investing in 
the areas where water is still available, and those who are most at risk will bene
fit little from investments of several thousands of dollars per hectare. 
 
Figure E1 Cumulative abstraction over time 
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 Clearly this analysis is simplistic, though the conclusions are rather similar to 
the recent JICA report1 which anticipates depletion of Sana'a's aquifers within 
15 years even with very substantial improvements in 'irrigation efficiency'. 
 Additional benefits that have been ignored include the fact that returns per 
cubic meter of water consumed by the crop can be higher with better irrigation 
technologies if cropping patterns change or crop husbandry improves signifi
cantly; labour is saved, increasing farmer profitability (at the expense of income 
to labourers). 
 However, against these positive factors, it is assumed that everything goes 
strictly according to plan; that all the farmers immediately achieve the full bene
fits of the investments; and most importantly that farmers do not increase their 
irrigated areas or sell water to others (despite the fact that every hour of pump
ing with the new system will allow irrigation of about 60% more area).  
 
Improved Irrigation Technology  Scenario 2 
The analysis so far is based on the most beneficial scenario for improved irriga
tion technology, where ALL uses other than beneficial consumption are non
recoverable losses. The impact on aquifer life is shown to be marginal. 
 However, where there is vertical recharge to an aquifer that is usable, the 
volume of water actually 'saved' will be much, much less than implied by the 
crude ratio of water use before and after 'improvement'. Power will be saved; 
degradation of water quality may be avoided; and minor savings in non
beneficial consumption may be achieved. Production may well increase  but this 
will generally be because crop transpiration, a consumptive use of water, has 
increased. Overall the water balance may be worsened. 
 Most importantly, however, the profitability of water use will increase dra
matically and the farmer's incentive to pump more water, and ability to afford to 
pump from deeper, will be significantly increased. The already near impossible 
task of controlling pumping will be made more difficult. 
 
                                                 
1 Study for the water resources management and rural water supply improvement in the republic of 
Yemen water resources management action plan for Sana'a basin, Earth System Science Co and Ja
pan Techno, September 2007. 
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